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Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred upon the above-entitled Court 
by Section 78-2a-3)2)(f), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from the Judgment of the Fifth District Court, in 
and for Washington County, State of Utah, the Honorable James L. Shumate, 
presiding, and sitting with a jury, wherein the Defendant was convicted of 
Murder, a first-degree felony. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
(PRESERVATION OF APPEAL ON THE RECORD) 
ISSUE I 
Did the trial court commit clear error by not instructing the jury as to the 
definition of duels, mutual combat, or consensual altercations? The appropriate 
standard of review for a trial court's response to a question of law is correction 
of error. State v. James, 819 P. 2d 781, 796 (Utah 1991) (discussing the standard 
of review for interpretation of statutory law). 
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ISSUE II 
Does Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended. Section 76-5-104 state that 
a duel, mutual combat, or consensual altercation, involving the use of a 
dangerous weapon, is not a defense, in and of itself, to a charge of criminal 
homicide; and, if not, i. e. it is a defense, does it deny a person his right to self 
defense when coupled with jury Instruction # 13. c? 
Did the trial court err in giving Instruction 13.c, because it was 
unnecessary, confusing, and misleading? 
Did the Trial Court Judge commit clear error by allowing a jury verdict to 
be entered prior to a juror submitted question being answered? 
Standard of review is found in State v. Garcia, 2001 UT App 19 (Utah 
App. 01/25/2001) ^6 ... Because [Defendant] did not object on the record to the 
jury instructions at trial, he can only obtain relief by demonstrating plain error. 
See State v. Parker, 2000 UT 51,^6, 4 P. 3d 778. Plain error requires a showing 
that "'(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial 
court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable outcome for [defendant]"' Id. at f7 (quoting State 
v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993)). 
ISSUEIII 
Richard Andrew Frausto has been denied his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article 1 
Page 2 of 49 
Scarth <Dent t&'WfiiteCey, <PC BRIEF OF APPELLANT FRAUSTO, R. A., CASE # 20000520-CA 
Section 12, of the Utah Constitution, and Rule 11 (d) (1) (g) and (h), of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, to Due Process of Law, because of mistakes, 
delays, and inaction, by the Court System charged by those same constitutional 
elements, with the processing of his case on direct appeal. Standard of Review: 
Plain error is a question of law, which we review for correctness State v. Ostler, 
2000 UT App 28,1J6, 996 P.2d 1065. 
SUMMARY OF FACTS 
A. On July 28, 1992, the police were called in response to a report of 
shots being fired at a residence in a trailer park in Ivins, Utah. Sergeant Pete 
Kuhlman testified that, upon arriving at the scene, he discovered the body of 
Larry Gilstrap inside of a pick-up truck. Upon checking vital signs, Sergeant 
Kuhlman confirmed that Mr. Gilstrap was dead. 
B. The police alleged that, in the early morning hours, after a night of 
drinking, Mr. Frausto got into an argument with Mr. Gilstrap. The police also 
alleged that, during the course of this argument, Mr. Gilstrap was shot three 
times by Mr. Frausto. 
C. Mr. Frausto testified that he shot Mr. Gilstrap twice, only after Mr. 
Gilstrap fell on him and after Gilstrap received a gunshot wound to the throat 
from someone else. Mr. Frausto also testified that he and Johnny Gourley put 
Mr. Gilstrap into Mr. Gilstrap' s truck. 
D. The Defendant was charged with criminal homicide, and was 
convicted after a jury trial. While the jury was deliberating, a note was passed, 
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from the jury, to the judge. The question was not answered before the jury came 
back with their verdict. The trial judge sentenced the Defendant to one term of 
imprisonment of not less than six years to life. 
FACTS OF THE CASE 
On July 27, 1992, Richard Andrew Frausto was feeling under attack. 
About five months before, he had moved his family, from California, to 
Ivins, Utah, to give his children a saner environment in which to live, and 
himself, a cleaner environment in which to rehabilitate him into a drug free 
lifestyle. [R. 1162,11.2-13] 
His efforts to "dry out," to date, had yielded mixed results; by his own 
words, an on again, off again, sort of lifestyle, with alcohol and Valium to 
reduce the pain and stress of withdrawal. [R. 1172,11. 2-19] 
Other problems had followed him from California. That day, his wife and 
children had reported spotting a former California associate, Terry Buck, an ex-
friend, with two strangers, all standing in front of the family home, in Ivins. [R. 
1175,11. 15-25, R. 1176,11. 1-21] A week or two before, Frausto had heard from 
his "friend", Johnny Gourley, that someone had been sent from California to 
"take care of him." [R. 1173,11. 17-25, R. 1174,11. 1-9] 
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On July 27, Frausto and his friend, Ray Perez, from California, were 
working together, building a front porch on Frausto's home, in Ivins. They 
drank all through the day, through the heat, as they worked. [R. 1163,11. 1-25, 
R. 1164,11. 1-9] 
Later, as the evening progressed, they went over to the residence of their 
neighbors, Johnny Gourley and Debbie Hem. They found those two present, 
along with Grant Arend, another neighbor. [R. 1164,11. 10-25] 
The group shared a few rounds of beer. A conversation transpired, during 
which Frausto informed Johnny Gourley that he did not trust Gourley, because 
Gourley worked for LeighAnn Reber. [R. 1168,11. 6-8] 
LeighAnn Reber was a source of frustration and anger for Frausto. 
LeighAnn had been the girlfriend of Frausto's friend, Tony Ambrose, who was 
now in jail in California. Since Tony's incarceration, LeighAnn had taken up 
with Larry Gilstrap, who had left his wife and moved in with LeighAnn. 
Frausto felt some kind of obligation, born out of a sense of loyalty to Tony 
Ambrose, to try to rectify the situation; but he did not know exactly how to go 
about that. He just knew he would want Tony, or someone, to do the same for 
him, were the tables reversed. [R. 1176,11. 22-25, R. 1177,11. 1-25, R. 1178,11. 
1-5,R. 1182,11. 13-25,R. 1183,11. 1-19] 
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Gourley took offense with Frausto's remarks about distrust. They went 
outside and went to blows. [R. 1168,11. 8-10] They were clutched together, 
locked up, and rolling around on the ground, when Donald Turnbow showed up 
and broke up the fight. [R. 1168,11. 15-18] The two brawlers agreed they 
would resume throwing blows when Frausto was sober. [R. 1168,11. 19-25, R. 
1169,11. 1-8] 
Later, Frausto, Turnbow, and Perez went over to nearby David Ice's 
house, in search of more beer. [R. 1165,11. 10-22] From there, Frausto and 
Turnbow continued on over to another friend's, known only as "Ted", and 
stayed through a couple of more rounds. Then, Frausto and Turnbow returned 
to Frausto's home, where Perez had preceded them. [R. 1166,11. 2-20] 
Still later, Frausto and Turnbow returned to Johnny Gourley's and Debbie 
Hem's house to ask Debbie if she had any more beer. While there, Frausto 
reminded Gourley that they would take care of it later, would "throw blows" 
later, when Frausto was not drunk. 
Gourley responded with, "All right." 
This visit was brief, as Gourley and Hem did not have any more beer. [R. 
1167,11. 14-25,R. 1169,11. 11-25,R. 1170,11. 1-3,R. 1169,11.2-8] 
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Frausto and Turnbow returned to Frausto's residence. It was after 
midnight. Perez was there, and Frausto's wife and daughter-in-law were still out 
in the living room. [R. 1170,11. 5-25] 
Frausto drank "quite a bit" of tequila. [R. 1171,11. 19-25] 
At this point, it would be appropriate to note that Frausto's accounts, of 
the following events of July 28, 1992, are varied and conflicted. Some of these 
deviations he blames on the fact that he was "wasted." Other discrepancies, 
encountered upon cross-examination, he allows to the fact that certain 
statements and representations that he had made to authorities were not taken 
under oath, and that said authorities had lied to him. He also asserts that it took 
two days, after his arrest, for his head to clear and for an accurate recall of 
events to emerge from his memory. He cannot recall many statements he made 
to authorities prior to his testimony at trial. 
At some point during the early morning, subsequent to the consumption 
of the tequila, Frausto took a gun from a drawer and told Tumbow and Perez 
that he was going to shoot himself [R. 1179,11. 9-22] He fired the gun into his 
living room wall to demonstrate that it was loaded. [R. 1172,11. 20-25, R. 1173, 
11. 1-3] 
His fatigue from his fight with drugs was weighing heavily on him, 
causing him concern, as was his recently acquired knowledge that someone from 
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California was on their way to "take care of him." [R. 1173, 11. 11-12, R. 1174, 
11. 1-22] Then, there was the aforementioned sighting of Terry- Buck, and two 
strangers, in front of the house, on the 27th of July. [R. 1177, 11. 1-25, R. 1178, 
11. 1-3] 
The others heard Frausto say that he wanted to talk to Larry Gilstrap. 
[R. 1179, 11. 24-25, R. 1180, 1-8] Frausto had other issues with Gilstrap, 
besides Gilstrap having left his wife to live with LeighAnn. Frausto had assured 
Reta Gilstrap that he would try to talk to Larry about returning home. He had 
learned, about a week before, that Gilstrap, known to carry a gun everywhere he 
went, had tried to pull his gun on Donald Turnbow. [R. 1178,11. 1-20] l 
Shortly, Johnny Gourley arrived at Frausto's residence. Frausto met him 
at the front door, .357 in hand. [R. 1180,11. 9-24] 
When Gourley asked if the gun was loaded, Frausto answered that it was 
and fired it into the air to demonstrate. Leaving Gourley on the front porch, 
Frausto returned to his living room and sat down. [R. 1181, 11. 2-11] 
1
 At trial, John Gourley says that he knew Gilstrap was known to carry a 
gun. [R. 856,11. 10-11] 
Gourley says he saw Frausto fire his gun into the air on the night in 
question. [R. 859,11.4-10] 
Gourley says that, witnessing from the porch, he saw Frausto shoot 
Gilstrap while holding the gun in his left hand. In contradictory testimony, he 
has stated that he, witnessing from a different location, saw Frausto shoot 
Gilstrap using his right hand. [R. 925,11. 3-25, R. 926,11. 1-23] 
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Minutes later, Gourley again appeared at the door to announce that Larry 
Gilstrap had arrived. Frausto put the gun in his pants, pulled his T-shirt down 
over it, and walked out front to meet Gilstrap, who had pulled up in his truck. 
[R. 1181,11. 10-25] 3 
According to Frausto, Johnny Gourley followed him off the porch and out 
the front yard gate toward Gilstrap's truck. [R. 1184,11. 17-25] 4 
When Frausto got within about five or six feet of the truck, Gilstrap was 
already out of the truck and to the middle, or the end part, of the truck bed. 
They exchanged words to the following effect. 
Frausto asked Gilstrap, why was he having an affair with Frausto's 
friend's (Tony Ambrose) old lady, and why he didn't go back to his wife. 
Gilstrap answered, that was none of Frausto's business. 
According to Frausto, Gilstrap then drew his gun on Frausto. 
Gourley says Frausto had a gun in his hand when he went out front to 
meet Gilstrap, then reverses his statement. [R. 921,11. 2-25, R. 922,11. 1-2] 
Gourley says that, witnessing from the porch, he saw Frausto shoot 
Gilstrap while holding the gun in his left hand. In contradictory testimony, he 
has stated that he, witnessing from a different location, saw Frausto shoot 
Gilstrap using his right hand. [R. 925,11. 3-25, R. 926,11. 1-23] 
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Frausto hit Gilstrap and a scuffle ensued, leading to a fight that brought 
them both, entangled, to the ground. [R. 1182,11. 1-25, R. 1183,11. 1-25, R. 
1184,11. 1-14, R. 1185,11.4-8] 
According to Frausto, he heard gunshots at that point, but was uncertain 
as to the source. Gilstrap seemed to fall on Frausto. Frausto rolled away from 
him, pulled his own gun, and started shooting with the .357, firing twice into 
Gilstrap. [R. 1185, 11. 8-25, R. 1186,11. 1-3] 
Frausto then arose and asked Johnny Gourley to help him get Gilstrap into 
the truck, so he could get him to the hospital. At that point, Gilstrap was still 
breathing. Frausto looked through the truck for Gilstrap's keys. [R. 1186, 4 -
25, R. 1187,11. 1-5] 
The two men had difficulty getting Gilstrap into the truck. Frausto went 
into the house to enlist the help of his son. When he and his son returned, 
Johnny Gourley was gone. [R. 1187,11. 6-25] 
After getting Gilstrap into the truck, Frausto and his son went, on foot, to 
Reta Gilstrap's house, to inform her that Gilstrap had pulled a gun on Frausto 
and that Frausto had shot him. Frausto states his other purpose was to change 
5
 When Gourley discovered Gilstrap was still breathing, he says he called out for 
someone to get an ambulance, then told Frausto to ".. .just let him die." He says 
that he only feigned helping Frausto get Gilstrap into the truck, a task at which 
they were unsuccessful. [F 870,11. 4-25, R. 871,11. 1-25, R. 872,11. 1-25] 
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his bloodied pants, not wanting to appear at the hospital that way. [R. 1188,11. 
1-25] 
Reta provided Gilstrap with a pair of pants. He changed in the back room 
and put the soiled clothing under a mattress. [R. 1190, 11. 7-17] 
At this point, on direct examination, Frausto reveals that he had a second 
gun in his pocket, a .22, which he cannot recall whether having pulled out that 
evening. 
His son detected police presence outside, at Frausto's residence. Frausto 
hid the .22 under Reta's porch; the .357, he hid in a trashcan. Frausto and son 
started back toward home. [R. 1190,11. 18-25,R. 1191,R. 1192,11. 1-20] 
The pair were confronted by police and told to drop to the ground. 
Frausto refused, at first, until they ceased pointing a gun at his son. Then 
Frausto lay on the ground as his son knelt before them. Frausto denied any 
knowledge of the shooting and he and his son were released. 
Frausto proceeded past his house, as the police were there, and went down 
to Tammy Howard's house, about a block down the street. [R. 1193,11. 10-25, 
R. 1194,11. 1-25, R. 1195,11. 1-10] 
Witness, LaReta Gilstrap, states that, when Frausto and his son visited her, just 
after the shooting, he told her that she would be next, if she talked to police. [R. 
425,11.1-3] 
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He obtained a cigarette from Tammy Howard and remained in her living 
room, for about fifteen minutes, until someone came knocking at the door. 
Frausto moved to a back room. [R. 1195, 2-25, R. 1196,11. 1-15] 
He was called out of the back room by a police officer. Frausto complied, 
unarmed, and without incident, after the third call. 
Frausto denies having given any statement at the time of his arrest. He 
says the officer told him to say nothing. Upon seeing that the police had Donald 
Turnbow in one of their cars, he asked why, as Turnbow "... did not do it." [R. 
1196,11. 16-25, R. 1197,11. 1-25, R. 1198,11. 1-15] 
At trial, Frausto's memory of that night, and his earlier statements to 
police, is sketchy. His complete memory, he says, returned to him only after a 
couple of days sleep in jail. [R. 1201, 21-25, R. 1202,11. 1-9] Thereafter, he 
never had a doubt in his mind as to what happened. 
Frausto believes there were other people around as the incident took 
place, but is not certain exactly who was present. His concern about someone 
on their way from California, "to take care of him", contributed to his state of 
mmd during the altercation. [R. 1204,11. 11-25, R. 1205,11. 1-5, R. 1201,11. 5-
25, R. 01202,11. 1-9] 
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Frausto believes it is all right to lie to police, when not under oath. He 
also believes that it is self-defense to carry a gun to meet someone else who is 
also known to be carrying a gun. [R. 1242,11. 4-25, R. 1243, 11. 1-24] 
Frausto says, he had heard that Gilstrap routinely carried a gun on his 
person. [R. 1249,11. 20-25, R. 1250,11. 1-24] 
Frausto says, he had heard that Gilstrap had pulled, or tried to pull, his 
gun on one of Frausto's friends. [R. 1177,1. 25, R. 1178, 11. 1-4] 
In Frausto's first statements to authorities, he denies ever having shot his 
gun on the morning in question; upon cross-examination, he admits that he lied 
about that, and that he did fire his weapon. [R. 1225,11. 19-25, R. 1226,11. 1-15] 
He also admits that, in his first story to authorities, Gilstrap only tried to 
point his weapon at Frausto's chest, without firing, before Frausto shot him. [R. 
1236,11. 22-25, R. 1237,11. 1-13] 
State's witness, John Gourley, also exhibited discrepancies, between 
testimony he gave at trial, and earlier statements made to authorities. Along 
with other points worthy of citation, some of these incidents, where conflicts in 
his testimony occurred, are cited below. 
At trial, Gourley cannot remember if Frausto declared Gilstrap dead, alter 
the shooting, contrary to Gourley's earlier statements. [R. 869,11. 7-25, R. 867, 
11.1-16] 
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Gourley also states that he and Frausto "made up," during Frausto's 
second visit to his residence, earlier that evening. He says, Frausto "needed a 
hug," and Gourley gave it to him. Gourley also says that he had a borrowed gun 
and had it with him at the time, unbeknownst to Frausto, and that they both 
agreed on a rematch for the brawl, at some unknown point in the future, when 
Frausto would be sober. [R. 849,11. 2-9] 
Gourley says, he warned Gilstrap not to bring a gun when he went to 
Frausto's house. At that meeting with Gilstrap, his conflicted testimony creates 
confusion as to what his original motivation was for that visit: was it to tell 
Gilstrap that he no longer need Gilstrap's "backup", because he and Frausto had 
made up; or, was it to summon Gilstrap to Frausto's residence, as Frausto had 
requested? [R. 856, 11. 5-25, R.857,11. 1-16] 
Gourley had great difficulty deciding, through his different testimonies, 
how many shots were fired. R. 900,11. 11-22, R. 901,11. 13-25, R. 902 through 
R. 912, R. 913,11. 1-7] 
Donald Turnbow, another witness to the shooting, did not see much, as he 
was hiding under the front porch of the Frausto residence. He does, however, 
report hearing just three shots fired at the time of the shooting. [R. 767,11. 10-
25, R. 768 through R. 773, R. 774,11. 1-19] 
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Gourley states that Frausto, during a phone conversation with Gourley, 
while Frausto was in jail, asked Gourley to change his story. He also states that 
he never saw Gilstrap pull his gun. [R. 881 through R. 884, R. 885,11. 1-19] 
STATE OF THE CASE 
1. On July 27, 1992, Richard Andrew Frausto was charged with the 
murder of Larry Gilstrap. He was subsequently tried before a jury, and found 
guilty, December 18, 1992. At his request he proceeded with sentencing on that 
date and received an enhanced jail sentence. [R. 1338,11. 16-20] On December 
23, 1992, at a hearing, the Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment were signed 
and placed in the court file, with the admonition to the Defendant / Appellant, 
"Mr. Frausto, your appeal time starts now." [R. 1346 11. 7-14] 
2. January 25, 1993, the filing of the Notice of Appeal was 
acknowledged, with a filing date of January 26, 1993, as was the Notice of 
Transfer to the Utah Court of Appeals for Disposition, with a filing date of 
January 28, 1993. 
3. On February 10, 1993, J. McArthur Wright filed notice of 
withdrawal as counsel and Michael Miller entered an appearance as new 
counsel. 
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4. Following that date, the record reflects five entries pertaining to 
receipt of the reporter's Hearing Transcripts for December 15-18, and 23, 1993; 
all of which occurred on March 8, 1993. That ends the original, three page 
Index of Record on Appeal. 
We cite the following items, 5 through 13, in great detail due to the fact 
the documents they represent are missing from the record and effect the 
completeness of Defendant's / Appellant's appeal. These records were 
generated during and partially the direct result of Court of Appeals ORDER in 
Case No. 930357-CA, and is a remand to the Fifth Judicial District Court for 
consideration of appellant's pro se request for appointment of counsel and for 
proceedings pursuant to Rule 11 (f) or (g), Utah R. App. P. (see addendum) 
These records were the subject of a Motion to Augment the record filed 
on May 29, 2001, which was subsequently denied by the Utah Court of Appeals. 
5. A SUPPLEMENTAL RECORD, designated as page 4 of the 
INDEX, dated March 6th' 1995, and with a starting date of 6/3/93, and that 
starting document was a letter from the Supreme Court, "re: Court of Appeals 
Court", and is assigned the index number [R. 1348]. (see addendum) 
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6. Number [R. 1349] concerns the case number, and is dated 6/16/93, 
Number [R. 1350], dated 10/8/93, an extension to file brief; both letters are from 
the Court of Appeals. 
7. No further action is recorded in this file until May 3, 1994, which is 
seven months later, and that is a Notice of Hearing 5/25/94, and is designated as 
index numbers [R. 1351-1352]. 
8. May 19, 1994, a transportation order designated [R. 1344 and 
1345]. 
9. The next two entries are on May 25, 1994, and are an "Ex Parte 
Motion to Continue", designated index number [R. 1356], and an Order of 
Continuance, dated June 1, 1994, numbered [R. 1357]. 
10. June 6, 1994, there is another Transportation Order, indexed [R. 
1358], followed by three "Minute Entry - Notice," indexed as [R. 1359, 1360, 
and 1361], and dated June 6, 1994, June 8, 1994, and July 13, 1984. 
11. There are no more entries until three months later; one which is 
dated October 14, 1994, and is an "Order Supplementing Record", indexed as 
numbers [R. 1362, 1363, and 1364]. 
12. Following that index, and not numbered as part of the index, is a 
Mailing Certificate, signed by Tauna Hammer, Deputy Court Clerk, and bearing 
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a Washington County Seal, certifying that "supplemental pleadings in the file... 
was sent to the Court of Appeals on 6 March 1995".(see addendum) 
13. The paginated index is silent from October 14, 1994, until another 
Supplemental Index, covering the dates September 14, 1995, through October 
19, 2000, and bearing a Washington County Seal, signed by a Deputy Court 
Clerk, and dated October 27, 2000. 
14. A letter from Defendant / Appellant, Richard Frausto, dated Nov. 
20, 1995, [R. 1367], addressed to Judge James L. Shumate, was received by the 
Fifth District Court on Nov. 28, 1995, requesting replacement of his attorney, 
Floyd Holmes. 
15. This was followed by another letter, dated Dec. 29, 1995, and 
received by the Court on Jan 12, 1996, [R. 1368], requesting the results, if any, 
of his previous letter. This second request was entered into the Court Record on 
Jan. 12, 1996, combined with a Memorandum Decision, by Judge Shumate, of 
like date, stating that the Court did not have jurisdiction. A copy thereof was 
mailed to Defendant / Appellant. 
16. On Jan. 2, 1996, Defendant / Appellant sent a letter to the Utah 
Court of Appeals, which they received on Jan 25, 1996, [R. 1373], and attached 
same to an Order Suspending the Briefing Schedule, pending determination as to 
legal representation and remand to the Fifth District Court, for an "expedited" 
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hearing, to enquire into Defendant's counsel's alleged conflict of interest and, if 
appropriate, to appoint replacement counsel, or to accept Defendant's waiver of 
counsel. That document was [R. 1371, 1372]. 
17. By Feb. 26, 1996, the Fifth District Court had held a hearing and 
subsequently replaced counsel for the Defendant with Thomas Blakely; records, 
reflecting same, were forwarded to the Utah Court of Appeals. [R. 1397] 
18. Next is an Order of Dismissal, by the Court of Appeals, filed June 
28, 1996, [R. 1399, 1400], followed by a remittitur, dated Aug. 12, 1996. 
19. Dec. 30, 1996, Defendant / Appellant sent a letter, [R. 1405], 
received on Jan 14, 1997, by the Fifth District Court, requesting a copy of his 
commitment order, and stating that he had given his copy to his attorney, Tom 
Blakely, for duplication, and had not received them back, nor heard from 
Blakely in a long time. 
20. Following that, in a letter dated, Thursday, April 10, 1997, [R. 
1406, 1407], and received by the Court, April 17, 1997, Defendant / Appellant 
acknowledges receipt of the Court Docket and the Sentencing and Commitment 
Statement, requested in [R. 1405], the previous letter. In his letter, he takes 
exception to the wording of the commitment report. Ultimately, his exception 
was proved correct. Please note that this document bears, penciled in on the top, 
"File, No Action. 15 Apr 97", and signed by what appears to be Judge 
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Shumate's initials. This is a properly filed document with the Court, who has 
jurisdiction, since the remittitur of Aug. 12, 1996. 
21. On Aug. 26, 1997, and received Sept. 2, 1997, by the Fifth District 
Court, a letter, with a Certified Motion of twenty-five pages, was sent by 
Defendant / Appellant, along with ten pages of attachments. The Motion has a 
yellow, gummed note attached, instructing, "Just file it then. No further Action 
Needed." Again, this was signed with what appears to be the initials of Judge 
Shumate. [R. 1408-1452] This is a properly filed, certified Motion, with the 
Court, who has jurisdiction, since the remittitur of Aug. 12, 1996. 
22. Oct. 5, 1997, Defendant / Appellant wrote a letter to the Fifth 
District Court requesting information regarding a Motion to Dismiss Count 2, 
and specifically requesting a copy of the Court Order be forwarded to him; and 
again, the notation on the face of the letter reads, written in, "File, No Action 13 
Oct 97", over, what appears to be, Judge Shumate's initials. [R. 1453-1454] 
23. Oct. 17, 1997, received by the Fifth District Court on 20 Oct. 1997, 
Defendant filed a petition for an Court Order Granting Re-sentencing. [R. 1458] 
At that point, the record of the Fifth District Court falls silent until 1999. 
24. At this juncture, we refer to the opinion of Frausto v State of Utah, 
966 P.2d 849, 352 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (Utah 09/25/1998) to determine what 
occurred during this period of time. In the opinion on that case, under the 
heading of Background, we find: 
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On February 22, 1996, a fourth attorney was appointed 
to handle Frausto's appeal. After some time had 
passed, with no communication from that attorney, 
Frausto requested a copy of his case from the Utah 
Court of Appeals *fnl and discovered that on June 28, 
1996, the court had executed an order dismissing his 
appeal for failure to file an appellant's brief 
The court granted a reinstatement of the appeal, 
provided an appellant's brief was filed within ten days 
of the order; however, no brief was filed. 
On September 2, 1997, Frausto filed a "Motion 
to Withdraw Court Appointed Counsel", and on 
September 10, 1997, he filed a pro se petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus, claiming ineffective assistance 
of counsel both at trial and on appeal. The district 
court dismissed the petition pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-35a-107, the one-year statute of limitations 
provision for post-conviction relief. Specifically, the 
court found that the limitations period began to run on 
June 28, 1996, the date on which the court of appeals 
dismissed his appeal, and that Frausto filed his petition 
on September 10, 1997, more than one year later. 
Therefore, the court ruled, "[By] the express terms of 
the statute, this fact precludes Mr. Frausto from 
seeking relief in a habeas petition." (emphasis added) 
25. During the time between the three-page letter, which is entered in 
the index at 10-20-97 as [R. 1455-1458], and is captioned as a "Petition for 
Court Order Granting Re-Sentencing", and the next entry, at 8-17-99, which is 
a Minute Entry regarding an evidentiary hearing, ordering the re-sentencing of 
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defendant nun pro tunc, and stating that "Appeal time to run when judgment, 
sentence, commitment nun pro tunc is signed." 
26. This judgment was finally signed on May 8, 2000, and is on the 
record index as "Judgment, Restitution Judgment, Sentence (Second Amended 
Nunc Pro Tunc) and Commitment". [R. 1482-1486] 
27. The Notice of Appeal was filed with the Fifth District Court on 
June 5, 2000, and received by the Utah Supreme Court on June 15, 2000, and 
was transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals Oct. 3, 2000. [R. 1488-1489] 
28. A letter from the Court of Appeals, dated October 16, 2000, and 
entered into the Court record on Oct. 19, 2000, addressed to Odean Bowler, then 
Appellate Counsel of Record, advised him that the file had been transferred to 
that Court and the ten (10) day period for the transcript request. [R. 1493] 
29. A second Supplemental Index, in this case, starts with an Order, 
from the Utah Court of Appeals, for a temporary remand on a motion to 
withdraw and replace counsel. This Order is dated, by the Court, Oct. 26, 2000, 
and stamped, Received by the Fifth District Court, on Dec. 12, 2000. [R. 1494] 
The motion was scheduled for a hearing in January and resulted in appointment 
of present counsel. 
30. Current counsel attempted to get a remand to complete the record 
and tried three requests of the Utah Court of Appeals for the two docketing 
statements, filed by the appellate attorneys following both sentencing orders. 
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31. Trial Counsel, J. Mac Arthur Wright raised questions concerning the 
effect that the jury question regarding 13.c may have had on the jury at the 
sentencing of the Defendant. 
Mr. WRIGHT: [R. 1336,11. 19-25, 1337,11. 1-11] ... I think that 
there is substantial evidence in this case that suggests that there was a self-
defense. While apparently the jury has neglected that, I'm concerned about 
some of the questions that the jury expressed to us. Questions that we were 
unable to respond to before the — before the jury came back. See addendum) 
THE COURT: [R.1340,11. 22-25, R. 1341, 1-8] 
... for the purposes of the record — in response to what has been marked as 
Court's Exhibit No. 2, and Instruction No. 13-c, the Court has marked an inquiry 
from the jury as Court's Exhibit No. 2. That will go in the file. 
The Court also, at the agreement of counsel, prepared what was going to 
be given as a supplemental instruction prior to the time that the jury came back 
with a verdict and before we could answer the question in Exhibit No. 2 — 
Court's Exhibit No. 2. Those will be placed in the file. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ISSUE I 
The wording of portion of Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, 
Section 76-5-104, is confusing, and the Court's use of same in Instruction 
#13.c, confused the jury. The Court erred in delivering that instruction without 
instructing the jury as to the definition of duels, mutual combat, or consensual 
altercations. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ISSUE II 
The Trial court failed to answer a juror's note regarding an instruction prior to 
accepting a verdict, thereby impairing the integrity of the verdict. The jury 
asked a question of the Court while the jury was in deliberation. A note was 
prepared by the court but not delivered to the jury. This failure to respond to the 
juror's confusion allowed the juror to remain confused about the right of self-
defense and about whose duty it was to prove self-defense, and whether or not, 
under Instruction 13.c self-defense was legal, all to the detriment of the 
Defendant / Appellant and this represented clear error. 
Defendant / Appellant was deprived of effective assistance of counsel by 
his counsel's failure to object to the inclusion of Instruction #13.c, in its 
proposed form; his failure to argue for supplemental instructions being 
submitted to the jury, based on the juror's confusion, as expressed in the subject 
note; his failure to argue for supplemental instructions that would include 
definitions pertaining to duels, mutual combat, or consensual altercations 
involving dangerous weapons; and his failing to motion for a mistrial. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ISSUE III 
Frausto was convicted of murder in December 1992, sentenced to five 
years, to life, plus one year for firearms enhancement. He has had six attorneys, 
prior to his present counsel; all chosen because they were contract employees, in 
the Fifth Judicial District, of the Public Defenders Office. Few ever filed a 
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request for Enlargement of Time, and not one filed a brief on his direct appeal. 
Frausto's valiant attempts to communicate, and to advocate his appeal, 
when he felt his rights jeopardized, were rejected by the Utah Court of Appeals, 
[R. 1436] and ignored by the Fifth District Court. [R. 1406, 1409) (see 
addendum) 
At the filing of this brief, Frausto's effort toward due process remains 
frustrated due to the vacancies in the record. Efforts to supplement the record 
have been thwarted. The inability to find a record, or their replacement, from 
the findings of the Miller remand, makes arguing the due process claim, 
regarding the 13c jury instructions, speculative. Unable to find a record of 
September 10, 1997, Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed in the Fifth District Court, or 
any record of the hearing and findings by the Fifth District Court, referred to in 
Frausto v State, Id., leaves a void as to what, if any, post conviction motions 
may have been made, denied, or refused consideration, per State vRawlings, 
829 P. 2d 150, (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
When resentencing takes place to allow a first right of 
appeal, as set forth in Johnson, this should not rule out 
the procedural possibility that post-conviction motions 
may be appropriately heard in the sentencing court. 
The court will then have an opportunity to rectify 
mistakes, if it is persuaded such occurred, at the trial 
level. Disposition of those matters can then be raised 
by direct appeal, avoiding later collateral attacks. This 
promotes judicial economy and is consistent with Utah 
law which favors raising issues on direct appeal rather 
than through post-conviction proceedings. Porter v. 
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Cook, 747P.2d 1031, 1032 (Utah 1987); Codiana v. 
Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 1104 (Utah 1983). 
See Harrisv. Champion, 15 F.3d 1538 (10th Cir. 1994) 
We may add to this list the requirement that the 
State afford the defendant a timely appeal, for an 
appeal that is inordinately delayed is as much a 
"meaningless ritual," Douglas, 372 U.S. at 358, as an 
appeal that is adjudicated without the benefit of 
effective counsel or a transcript of the trial court 
proceedings. See Burkett I, 826 F.2d at 1221-22; 
United States ex rel. Smith v. Twomey, 486 F.2d 736, 
739 (7th Cir. 1973), cert, denied, 416 U.S. 994, 40 L. 
Ed. 2d 773, 94 S. Ct. 2408 (1974); cf Coppedge v. 
United States, 369 U.S. 438, 449, 8 L. Eel 2d 21, 82 S. 
Ct. 917(1962)... . 
ARGUMENT ISSUE I 
Had the trial court included the definitions of, or what constituted, duels, 
mutual combat, or consensual altercations, as referred to in Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 as amended, Section 76-5-104 Consensual altercation, as cited 
above, the Court could have eliminated jury confusion. This was made evident 
by the juror's note to the judge. That note, regarding Instruction #13.c, cited 
below, and designated as Court's Exhibit #2, reads as follows: 
Instruction #13.c Does the statement "it is no defense "to" 
the prosecution mean no help for the prosecution. 
Though the Court did prepare a note, to the jury, in response, Court's 
Exhibit #1, the jury returned before receiving the reply and was allowed to enter 
its verdict before its confusion was addressed. If the Court had insisted on 
addressing the issue, before allowing the verdict, the jury might have returned to 
further deliberation, to the benefit of the Defendant. 
In People State New York v. Jamar Smith, 1996, NY., 637 N.Y.S.2d 279, 
168 Misc. 2d 33, the matter of jury notes is dealt with as follows. 
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How a court responds to jury notes for information is 
governed by statute and case law. New York's statute 
clearly vests the trial court with discretion in the 
manner in which jury requests for information are 
answered: "Upon such a request, the court must direct 
that the jury be returned to the courtroom, and after 
notice to both the people and counsel for the 
defendant, and in the presence of the defendant, must 
give such requested information as the court deems 
proper." (CPL 310.30.) 
In Utah, this same method is used in addition to sending back a written 
response to the jury. In this instance the record does not reflect the j ury being 
returned to the court room for the answer to the question. 
The juror's motivation for the question is speculative; if, for instance, that 
it was not the juror's desire to avoid assisting the prosecution, and, based upon 
his confusion and, under the mistaken assumption that involvement in a duel did 
constitute self defense, would have urged his fellow jurymen toward 
entertaining a finding that both shooter, and victim, were actually involved in a 
consensual altercation; one including an agreement, or understanding, that 
deadly weapons would be used. Or, conversely, with the same motivation at 
heart, that the same juror might have argued, with fellow jurymen, that no such 
agreement had been reached, thereby allowing for an inadvertent use of said 
weapons, and therefore, possibly finding reason to endorse a self defense 
position. 
The elements of an unspoken, or uncertain, agreement could 
certainly be construed to be present, on the part of both parties, by virtue of the 
fact that each held good reason to suspect the other's possession of firearms on 
his person ; Frausto, by his knowledge that the victim routinely carried a gun; 
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the victim, by his having heard Frausto firing his weapon earlier, along with the 
rest of the neighborhood. [R. 1249,11. 20-25, R.1250, 11. 1-24] 
By a layman's interpretation of a duel, based on a dose of Westerns, and a 
host of other historical traditions, it would not be implausible for a juror to 
conclude that a determination of self defense was achievable in this case. 
However, such a possibility was greatly diminished because of the 
limitations and the ambiguity imposed by the given instruction, #13.c, as given, 
and the Court's failure to address the jury's ensuing confusion. 
One could wonder, is 76-5-104 unconstitutional, when considering what 
the juror might have been thinking, because it could deprive one of the 
protection of self-defense, under all circumstances, in which one might carry a 
gun, and use it? What is the juror thinking? Is it, in fact, true that, by statute, if 
you have a gun, and use it, you are guilty of murder? Or, if you bring a gun to 
what becomes a fight, and wind up using it, to defend yourself, you are guilty of 
murder? Based on the choice of words in the jury note, this is the nature of the 
confusion likely posed by Instruction #13.c and left without clarification by the 
Trial Court. See State v. Souza, 846 P.2d 1313, (UT App 1993) 
.. .the general rule is that an accurate instruction upon 
the basic elements of an offense is essential,'" failure 
to provide such an instruction is reversible error that 
can never be considered harmless. State v. Jones, 823 
P.2d 1059, 1061 (Utah 1991) (quoting State v. Roberts, 
711 P.2d 235, 239 (Utah 1985)). 
In State of Utah v. Nick Kozik, 1984 UT 151, 688 P. 2d 459, reversible 
error, versus harmless error, are considered in the effect of mishandling jury 
notes, as follows: 
The jury' s note to the judge involved a point of law, 
which was resolved in the present of defendant and 
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both counsel, and which duly was recorded by the trial 
court. In any event, irrespective of the authority 
designated in the Rule, the decision in Chapman v. 
California, 386 U.S. 18, (1967), is dispositive. That 
decision articulates the "harmless error' rule. In our 
own recent decision in State v. Urias, Utah, 609 P. 2d 
1326 (1980), we referred to Chapman and held as 
follows: 
We do not upset the verdict of a jury merely 
because some error or irregularity may have occurred, 
but will do so only if is it something substantial and 
prejudicial in the sense that there is a reasonable 
likelihood that in its absence there would have been a 
different result. 
In the instant trial, the only debate in that jury room, and in our jury's 
mind, was murder or self-defense. No other, lesser option than murder was 
considered. Did the confusion of the jury include the belief that the burden of 
proof of self defense fell upon the Defendant? See State v. Garcia, 2001 UT 
App 19 (Utah App. 01/25/2001) 
lf6 Garcia asserts the jury was not adequately 
instructed about the burden of proof of self-defense. 
Because Garcia did not object on the record to the jury 
instructions at trial, he can only obtain relief by 
demonstrating plain error. See State v. Parker, 2000 
UT 51, ^ 6, 4 P.3d 778. Plain error requires a showing 
that " (i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have 
been obvious to the trial court; and (hi) the error is 
harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable outcome for [Garcia]"' 
Id. at V (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 
(Utah 1993)). To show obviousness of the error, 
Garcia must show that the law was clear at the time of 
trial. See State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236, 239 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1997) (stating "error is not plain where there was 
no settled appellate law to guide the trial court"). 
Again at State v. Garcia, 2001 UT App 19 (Utah App. 01/25/2001) 
TJ20 The law in Utah requires a trial court to 
adequately instruct the jury about the burden of proof 
for self-defense when the defendant presents the 
quantum of evidence necessary to assert self-defense. 
See State v Torres, 619 P.2d 694, 695 (Utah 1985); 
State v Knoll, 712 P. 2d 211, 214—15 (Utah 1980). 
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Here the trial court erred by failing to do so. The error 
was obvious because the law was clear at the time of 
trial. Finally, the error was harmful because we cannot 
say that the jury did not mistakenly consider the 
burden of proof of self-defense to be on the defendant; 
thus, absent this error, there was a reasonable 
possibility of a more favorable outcome for Garcia. 
In view of the vacillation of the eye-witness's testimony, one can see how 
the consideration of a self defense argument might have been a more serious 
undertaking had the jury been reminded, by the answer to the juror's question, 
that the burden of proof for self defense did not rest upon the Defendant. Failure 
to so instruct represented clear error. See State v. Souza, 846 P.2d 1313, (UT 
Appl993) 
After the jury in this case had been sequestered 
for deliberation, it requested clarification of the words 
"supply or furnish" as used in the trial court's 
instruction pertaining to the offense of supplying 
alcohol to minors. *in7 The trial court appropriately 
considered the common meaning of the words in 
evaluating what response would assist the jury. *fn8 
This consideration was proper because Utah's statutes 
generally direct that "words and phrases are to be 
construed according to the context and the approved 
usage of the language." Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-11 
78-35a-107 (1986). However, where the jury requests 
the definition of a "term critical to the meaning of a 
criminal statute," that requested definition becomes a 
"point of law." State v. Couch, 635 P. 2d 89, 94 (Utah 
1981). The appropriate standard of review for a trial 
court's response to a question of law is correction of 
error. State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 796 (Utah 1991) 
(discussing the standard of review for interpretation of 
statutory law). Further, because "'the general rule is 
that an accurate instruction upon the basic elements of 
an offense is essential,'" failure to provide such an 
instruction is reversible error that can never be 
considered harmless. State v. Jones, 823 P.2d 1059, 
1061 (Utah 1991) (quoting State v. Roberts, 711 P. 2d 
235, 239 (Utah 1985)). 
"And again in Souza, supra 
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Both defendant and the State correctly cite 
Couch as providing the controlling law in situations 
where the jury asks the trial court to define words used 
injury instructions that normally are not considered to 
have unique legal meaning. According to the Couch 
decision, although the court usually need not volunteer 
the definitions of terms of common usage injury 
instructions, where the jury requests the'instruction, 
the trial court should provide it. Couch, 635 P. 2d at 
94-95. The Couch court reasoned that the rule 
requiring the trial court to define terms of art should 
apply equally to "non-technical words of common 
usage" if the jury signifies that it does not understand 
the meaning of a word that it must apply to arrive at a 
verdict. Id. at 95. Refusal to provide a definition was 
reversible error in Couch, because "jurors cannot be 
considered properly instructed on a criminal statute if 
they are demonstrably confused about the meaning of 
the words used in it." Id. at 94. 
ARGUMENT ISSUE II 
Does Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, Section 76-5-104, state 
that a duel, mutual combat, or consensual altercation, involving the use of a 
dangerous weapon, is not a defense, in and of itself, to a charge of criminal 
homicide? 
As in the instant case, since the altercation did not transpire under 
conditions where both parties were necessarily in agreement to the use of deadly 
force, or weapons thereof, should not the implications of this telling difference 
have been addressed by the Court, and was not failure to do so injurious to the 
jury's application of law and the cause of justice? 
The Court's instruction to the jury, instruction #13.c, is the direct cause 
the juror's confusion, as it is the ambiguous wording thereof that was brought to 
the Court's attention in the note, cited above as Court's exhibit #2. 
The question arises; did the Court err, first in delivering the instruction, 
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then in failing to deliver its remedy, another instruction, to clarify the juror's 
question, before the jury reached its verdict? 
That question went unanswered, prior to the jury delivering its verdict, 
allowing whatever confusion to prevail, thus jeopardizing the integrity of the 
verdict, to the detriment of the Defendant. 
This constituted clear error. See State v. Souza, 846 P.2d 1313, (UT App 
1993) two paragraphs quoted in Argument Issue I. 
Trial Counsel for the Defendant was ineffective because: 
a. he failed to object to Instruction #13.c in its proposed form; and, 
b. he failed to request supplemental instructions properly instructing the 
jury, as to the definition of a duel, mutual combat, or consensual altercation 
involving a dangerous weapon. 
c. failing to request a mistrial or motion for a verdict not withstanding 
The defendant was denied effective assistance of Counsel. See State v. 
Souza, 846 P.2d 1313, (UT App 1993) two paragraphs quoted in Argument 
Issue I. 
Argument Issue No. Ill 
We quote extensively from HARRIS V CHAMPION here after and, have 
used paragraph numbers from VersusLaw. In the interest of judicial economy a 
hardcopy of the entire case is included in the addendum bearing those same 
paragraph numbers to ensure clarity. See addendum 
InHarris v. Champion, 15 F.3d 1538 (10th Cir. 01/26/1994) the 
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit defined Appellate Delay 
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[86] B.Substantive Claim That Appellate Delay 
[87] Violates Right To Due Process 
[88] 1. Elements of the claim 
[89] The Due Process Clause provides that "No person shall . . . be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law 
U.S. Const, amend. V. Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment provides 
"nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law." Id. amend. XIV, 1. 
[90] The right to a speedy trial, which is guaranteed an accused by the Sixth 
Amendment, is a fundamental right imposed on the states by the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Barker v. Wmgo, 407 
U.S. at 515. Although the Constitution does not require the State to 
afford a criminal defendant a direct appeal to challenge alleged trial 
court errors, see McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687, 38 L. Ed. 
867, 14 S. Ct. 913 (1894), the Supreme Court has held that 
[91] if a State has created appellate courts as "an integral part of the . . . 
system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant," 
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. at 18, the procedures used in deciding 
appeals must comport with the demands of the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses of the Constitution. 
[92] Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 393, 83 L. Ed. 2d 821, 105 S. Ct. 830 
(1985)(alteration in original). 
[93] To ensure the defendant's right to a "meaningful appeal," Douglas v. 
California, 372 U. S. at 358, the Court has held that when the State 
affords a criminal defendant an appeal by right, the Fourteenth 
Amendment requires, among other things, that counsel be appointed to 
represent an indigent defendant, id. at 356-58, that the representation 
oi counsel be effective, Evitts, 469 U.S. at 396, and that either an 
indigent defendant be provided a free transcript or some equivalent 
method of reporting the trial proceedings be employed, Draper v. 
Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 495, 9 L. Ed. 2d 899, 83 S. Ct. 774 (1963); 
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. at 19-20. 
[94] We may add to this list the requirement that the State afford the 
defendant a timely appeal, for an appeal that is inordinately delayed is 
as much a "meaningless ritual," Douglas, 372 U.S. at 358, as an appeal 
that is adjudicated without the benefit of effective counsel or a 
transcript of the trial court proceedings. See Burkett I, 826 F.2d at 
1221-22; United States ex rel. Smith v. Twomey, 486 F.2d 736, 739 
Page 33 of 49 
Scarth <Dent ^CM/diteley, <BC BRIEF OF APPELLANT FRAUSTO, R.. A., CASE # 200005 20-CA 
(7m Cir. 1973), cert, denied, 416 U.S. 994, 40 L. Ed. 2d 773, 94 S. Ct. 
2408 (1974); cf. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438. 449, 8 L. 
Ed. 2d 21, 82 S. Ct. 917 (1962) ("No general respect for, nor 
adherence to, the law as a whole can well be expected without judicial 
recognition of the paramount need for prompt, eminently fair and 
sober criminal law procedures. . . . Delay in the final judgment of 
conviction, including its appellate review, unquestionably erodes the 
efficacy of law enforcement."); Mathews v. Eldndge, 424 U.S. 319, 
333, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18, 96 S. Ct. 893 (1976)("The fundamental 
requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard cat a 
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."'). 
[95] When determining whether a criminal defendant has been deprived of 
his or her right to timely process at the trial level, the Supreme Court 
has established a balancing test to be applied on an ad hoc basis. 
Barker, 407 U.S. at 530. Four factors should be assessed and balanced: 
"(1) length of delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant's 
assertion of his right, and (4) prejudice to the defendant." Id. (numbers 
added). The fourth factor "should be assessed in the light of the 
interests of defendants which the speedy trial right was designed to 
protect." Id. at 532. The "Court has identified three such interests: (I) 
to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety 
and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the 
defense will be impaired." Id. 
[96] Although Barker addressed only a defendant's Sixth Amendment right 
to a speedy trial, the balancing test the Court enunciated provides an 
appropriate framework for evaluating whether a defendant's due 
process right to a timely direct criminal appeal has been violated. See 
Rheuark v. Shaw, 628 F.2d at 303 ("The factors of Barker are 
preferred [over] the standard announced in United States v. Lovasco, 
431 U.S. 783, 52 L. Ed. 2d 752, 97 S. Ct 2044 . . . (1977)[concerning 
pre-indictment delay], since the reasons for constraining appellate 
delay are analogous to the motives underpinning the Sixth Amendment 
right to a speedy trial.")(footnote omitted); DeLancy v. Caldwell, 741 
F.2d 1246, 1248 (1(T Cir. 1984)("We agree with the Fifth Circuit that 
the right to avoid unreasonable delay in the appellate process is similar 
to the right to a speedy trial."); Burkett II, 951 F.2d at 1445-46 
(holding that delay in adjudicating an appeal, which infringes on due 
process rights, is effectively no different than delay in imposing a 
sentence, which infringes on Sixth Amendment speedy trial right). 
[97] We can apply the first three factors of the Barker test to claims of 
appellate delay without modification. We must modify the fourth 
factor of prejudice to the defendant, however, to reflect the interests 
sought to be protected by an appeal "unencumbered by excessive 
delay." Rheuark v. Shaw, 628 R2d at 303 n.8. 
[98] The Fifth Circuit has identified the following interests that should be 
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considered when assessing prejudice arising from appellate delay: "(1) 
prevention of oppressive incarceration pending appeal; (2) 
minimization of anxiety and concern of those convicted awaiting the 
outcome of their appeals; and (3) limitation of the possibility that a 
convicted person's grounds for appeal, and his or her defenses in case 
of reversal and retrial, might be impaired." Id. In DeLancy, 741 F.2d 
at 1248, we adopted the Fifth Circuit's modification of the Barker 
prejudice factor for purposes of appellate delay. We also heeded the 
Supreme Court's admonition that the four factors of the balancing test 
are related and should be considered together with such other 
circumstances as may be relevant. Barker, 407 U.S. at 533; DeLancy, 
741F.2dat l248. 
[99] Nevertheless, as we discuss below, we view the first factor length 
of delay as a threshold that a petitioner must meet before the court 
need consider the other factors. Furthermore, we agree with the Ninth 
Circuit that, ordinarily, a petitioner must make some showing on the 
fourth factor prejudice to establish a due process violation. 
United States v. Tucker, 8 F.3d 673, 676 (9th Cir. 1993)(en banc). 
[100] Therefore, in determining whether delay in adjudicating a petitioner's 
direct criminal appeal violated the petitioner's due process rights, we 
must balance the following factors: 
[101] a. the length of the delay; 
[102] b. the reason for the delay and whether that reason is justified; 
[103] c. whether the petitioner asserted his right to a timely appeal; and 
[104] d. whether the delay prejudiced the petitioner by 
[105] i. causing the petitioner to suffer oppressive incarceration pending 
appeal; or 
[106] ii. causing the petitioner to suffer constitutionally cognizable anxiety 
and concern awaiting the outcome of his or her appeal; or 
[107] iii. impairing the petitioner's grounds for appeal or his or her defenses 
in the event of a reversal and retrial. 
[108] we will address each of these factors in turn. 
[109] a. THE LENGTH OF THE DELAY 
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At all times since the Defendant's / Appellant's sentencing on 
September 23, 1992, he has been represented by State appointed 
counsel. 
In excess of nine (9) years have passed since he was told, by The 
Honorable James L. Shumate, Judge of the Fifth District Court in 
Washington County, that "your appeal time starts now". 
Quoting Harris v. Champion, 15 F.3d 1538 (10th Cir. 01/26/1994) 
[110] "Only passage of an inordinate amount of time triggers 
due process concerns." Hill v. Reynolds, 942 F.2d 1494 at 
1497 00th Cir. 08/23/1991) 
Harris v. Champion, Id, 
[115] .. .delay substantially beyond two years, at least in a case that 
does not warrant a lengthier appellate process, will reduce the 
burden of proof on the other three factors necessary to establish a 
due process violation. See Doggett, 112 S. Ct. at 2693 (holding 
that the more protracted the delay, the more prejudice may be 
presumed from the delay). 
[110] The first factor in the balancing test is the length of the appellate delay. 
"Only passage of an inordinate amount of time triggers due process 
concerns." Hill v. Reynolds, 942 F.2d at 1497 (emphasis added). 
Therefore, if a petitioner cannot establish at least some degree of 
inordinate delay, the court need not inquire into the other lactors. Cf. 
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Doggett v. United States, 120 L. Ed. 2d 520, 112 S. Ct. 2686, 2690-91 
(1992)(holdmg that because no speedy trial violation occurs if the 
government prosecutes a defendant "with customary promptness," "to 
trigger a speedy trial analysis, an accused must allege that the interval 
between accusation and trial has crossed the threshold dividing 
ordinary from 'presumptively prejudicial' delay"). 
[ I l l ] We cannot set an inflexible length of time that will constitute 
inordinate delay in every case. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 521 ("We 
cannot definitely say how long is too long in a system where Justice is 
supposed to be swift but deliberate."); Coe v. THurman, 922 F.2d at 
531 ("There is no talismanic number of years or months, after which 
due process is automatically violated."). Nonetheless, it seems 
appropriate to Judge appellate delay by the same two-year 
presumptive standard that we used earlier to excuse exhaustion. See 
supra (slip op.) at pp. 30-31. Therefore, a two-year delay in finally 
adjudicating a direct criminal appeal ordinarily will give rise to a 
presumption of inordinate delay that will satisfy this first factor in the 
balancing test. 
[112] Creating a presumption that a two-year delay in adjudicating an appeal 
is inordinate comports with the district court's ruling that "a two-year 
period, from the notice of appeal or order permitting same, be 
established as the time period for resolution of a direct criminal appeal 
in Oklahoma beyond which any delay will be presumed to be 
unconstitutional, . . . absent a showing of good and sufficient^ cause or 
special circumstances." R., Doc. 255 at 8 (footnote omitted). 
Respondents do not challenge the district court's two-year 
presumptive period. Although petitioners argue for a snorter period, 
the only basis for their argument is that in 1991, the Tenth Circuit's 
median time for deciding direct criminal appeals was 11.7 months. See 
Appellant's Principal Br. (No.93-5123) at 57; Appellant's Principal 
Br. (No. 93-5209) at 18-19. We are not sufficiently persuaded by this 
single statistic to conclude that the district court erred in establishing a 
two-year presumptive period. See United States v. Pratt, 645 F.2d at 
91 (declining to hold nine-month appellate delay unconstitutional in 
absence of exacerbating factors); United States ex rel. Harris v. Reed, 
608 F. Supp. 1369, 1376 (N.D. 111. 1985)(holdmg that a seven-and-
one-half-month delay in adjudicating a motion for post-conviction 
relief was not so egregious as to violate petitioner's due process 
rights); Doescher v. Estelle, 454 F. Supp. 943, 952 (N.D. Tex. 
1978)(determining as a matter of law that a one-year delay in 
processing petitioner's appeal was not unjustified), appeal dismissed, 
597F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1979)(table). 
[113] The district court concluded that two year^io adjudicate an appeal in 
Oklahoma is both customary and feasible. Furthermore, a two-year 
delay is within the time frame that other courts have found to raise due 
process concerns. For example, in United States ex rel. Hankins, 582 
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F. Supp. At 184-85, the court held that the pendency of an appeal for 
two years with no decision by the state appellate court, coupled with a 
nine-month delay by the trial court in ruling on post-trial motions, 
gave rise to a prima facie due process violation. See also Dozie v. 
Cady, 430 F.2d at 638 (holding that seventeen-month delay in filing 
opening brief warrantee! inquiry into possible due process violation); 
Burkett II, 951 F.2d at 1445-46 (holding that eighteen-month delay 
between sentencing and decision on appeal gave rise to due process 
violation); United States v. Antoine, 906 F.2d 1379, 1382-83 (9th 
Cir.)(holding that three-year delay in adjudicating federal appeal was 
"substantial" and remanding for further findings regarding prejudice), 
cert, denied, 498 U.S. 963, 112 L. Ed. 2d 407, 111 S. Ct. 398 (1990); 
Snyder v. Kelly, 769 F. Supp. 108, 111 (W.D.N. Y. 1991 )(holding that 
three years is "an excessive amount of time to await the resolution of 
an appeal"), aff d 972 F.2d 1328 (2d Cir. 1992)(table); cf Jones v. 
Grouse, 360 F.2d at 158 (holding that delay of more than eighteen 
months in processing appeal of collateral attack warranted inquiry into 
possible due process violation).""1" 
[114] The passage of two years creates only a presumption of inordinate 
delay on appeal. The particular circumstances of a case may warrant a 
finding that the passage of less than two years constitutes inordinate 
delay or that the passage of more than two years does not. For 
example, althougn the length of the sentence cannot be a controlling 
factor in light of the time requirements inherent in processing an 
appeal, a case in which a very short sentence was imposed may 
warrant more expedited treatment. See Wheeler v. Kelly, 639 F. Supp. 
1374, 1379 (E.D.N.Y. 1986)(holding that "the length of the sentence is 
a factor in determining whether post-conviction delay is excessive"), 
affd, 811 F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1987). On the other hand, a particularly 
complex case may warrant a more lengthy appellate process. Cf. 
Geames v. Henderson, 725 F. Supp. 681, 685 (E.D.N.Y. 1989)(holding 
that delay of three-and-one-hall years was excessive because issues 
on appeal were "no more complex than in most criminal appeals"). 
[115] Because it is a balancing test that we employ, however, delay 
substantially beyond two years, at least in a case that does not warrant 
a lengthier appellate process, will reduce the burden of proof on the 
other three factors necessary to establish a due process violation. See 
Doggett, 112 S. Ct. at 2693 (holding that the more protracted the 
delay, the more prejudice may be presumed from the delay). 
[116] b. THE REASON FOR THE DELAY 
Harris v. Champion, Id., 
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[115] ...delay substantially beyond two years, at least in a case that 
does not warrant a lengthier appellate process, will reduce the burden 
of proof on the other three factors necessary to establish a due process 
violation. See Doggett, 112 S. Ct. at 2693 (holding that the more 
protracted the delay, the more prejudice may be presumed from the 
delay). 
[117] ... In Harris I, we laid to rest any argument that delays by the 
Public Defender in filing briefs could be attributed to petitioners on the 
ground that the Public Defender requested the continuances on 
petitioners' behalf 938 F.2d at 1065. The record indicated that "the 
delay in preparing petitioner's brief on appeal [was] caused by the 
inability of [the Public Defender] to address petitioner's case in a 
timely fashion." Id. Because this delay was "forced upon an unwilling 
petitioner by reason of his indigency," we held it should not be 
attributed to the petitioner. Id. 
[117] The second part of the balancing test is the reason for the delay. In 
Harris I, we laid to rest any argument that delays by the Public 
Defender in filing briefs could be attributed to petitioners on the 
ground that the Public Defender requested the continuances on 
petitioners' behalf 938 F.2d at 1065. The record indicated that "the 
delay in preparing petitioner's brief on appeal [was] caused by the 
inability of [the Public Defender] to address petitioner's case in a 
timely fashion." Id. Because this delay was "forced upon an unwilling 
petitioner by reason of his indigency," we held it should not be 
attributed to the petitioner. Id. The parties do not dispute that the 
delays in adjudicating petitioners' direct criminal appeals are 
attributable to the State of Oklahoma and not to petitioners.""1" See R., 
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Doc. 29 at 9 (Attorney General); Addendum to Br. Of OIDS Defs. At 
17 (Public Defender); R., Doc. 27, Ex. 3L Attachment 1 (Oklahoma 
Court of Criminal Appeals'); see also Hankins v. Fulcomer, 941 F.2d at 
252 (holding that court had. numerous opportunities to rule on pending 
matters and its delay in doing so was not attributable to petitioner); 
Wojtczak v. Fulcomer, 800 F.2d at 356 (holding that delay in 
adjudicating motion for post-conviction relief was not attributable to 
petitioner, but to "disinterest on the part of court appointed counsel 
and to a failure on the part of the court to require them to provide 
minimally effective representation"). 
[119] c. PETITIONER'S ASSERTION OF HIS OR HER RIGHT TO A 
TIMELY APPEAL 
[120] ... The Supreme Court rejected in Barker *4the rule that a 
defendant who fails to demand a speedy trial forever 
waives his right." 407 U.S. at 528. Instead, the Court held 
that whether and how strongly a defendant asserts his or 
her right to a speedy trial should be balanced with the 
other factors. Id. at 528-29. 
At all times, throughout the past nine (9) years Defendant / 
Appellant, Richard Andrew Frausto, has pursued his appeal. This 
began with his request for immediate sentencing following the jurors 
verdict. 
The first evidence is a letter from J. Mac Arthur Wright [R. 1434] 
(see addendum) advising contract attorneys, Freestone and 
Angerhoffer, engaged by Defendant / Appellant, [R. 1434] that the 
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notice of appeal, and the request for transcript, had been filed. 
Secondary evidence resides in a letter to Defendant / Appellant, 
over the signature of Janice Hill, Deputy Clerk of the Utah Court of 
Appeals, dated February 1, 1994. He had personally corresponded 
with the Court and was advised in part: 
The Court will only consider documents on your behalf if 
they are filed by your attorney. ... You must 
communicate through him regarding your appeal. 
Defendant / Appellant pursued the replacement of his first 
appointed appellate attorney, Michael Miller, for Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel and he was replaced by Mr. Floyd Holmes, who 
filed his notice of entry on June 22, 1994. 
November 28, 1995, Defendant / Appellant filed a letter with the 
Fifth District Court requesting the dismissal of attorney, Holmes, due 
to his ineffective assistance on his appeal. By February 6, 1996, this 
resulted in a remand by the Court of Appeals to the Fifth District 
Court, and the replacement of Holmes with Thomas Blakeley, which 
officially occurred February 22, 1996. 
At this point we refer to: Frausto v State of Utah, 966 P. 2d 849, 
352 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (Utah 09/25/1998) that reflects more of his 
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efforts. 
... After some time had passed, with no communication 
from that attorney, Frausto requested a copy of his case 
from the Utah Court of Appeals *fnl and discovered that 
on June 28, 1996, the court had executed an order 
dismissing his appeal for failure to file an Appellant's 
Brief ... 
... On September 2, 1997, Frausto filed a "Motion to 
Withdraw Court Appointed Counsel^, and on September 
10, 1997, he filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel both, at 
trial, and on appeal. 
We ... remand for further proceedings... . 
Thus, due to the efforts of the Defendant I Appellant a judgment 
was finally signed on May 8, 2000, and is on the record as "Judgment, 
Restitution Judgment, Sentence (Second Amended Nunc Pro Tunc) 
and Commitment". [R. 1482-1486] 
The Notice of Appeal was filed with the Fifth District Court on 
June 5, 2000, and received by the Utah Supreme Court on June 15, 
2000, and the case was transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals on 
October 3, 2000. [R. 1488-1489] 
A second Supplemental Index, in this case, starts with an Order, 
from the Utah Court of Appeals, for a Temporary Remand on a 
Motion to Withdraw and Replace Counsel. This Order is dated, by the 
Court, Oct. 26, 2000, and stamped, "Received by the Fifth District 
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Court, on Dec. 12, 2000." [R. 1494] The Motion was scheduled for a 
hearing in January and resulted in appointment of present counsel who 
has filed this brief 
[120] The third factor we must balance in determining whether a due process 
violation has occurred is the petitioner's assertion of his or her right to 
a timely appeal. The Supreme Court rejected in Barker "the rule that a 
defendant who fails to demand a speedy trial forever waives his right." 
407 U.S. at 528. Instead, the Court held that whether and how strongly 
a defendant asserts his or her right to a speedy trial should be balanced 
with the other factors. Id. at 528-29. 
[121] We will not require petitioners to have made an affirmative assertion 
of their right to a timely appeal in state court for this factor to weigh in 
their favor. Under the circumstances, the filing of these federal habeas 
petitions constitutes a sufficient assertion of petitioners' respective 
rights to a timely appeal. See Snyder, 769 F. Supp. At 111. 
[122] Unlike a criminal defendant who stands accused and may not wish to 
have any trial, much less a speedy one, e.g., Barker, 407 U.S. at 535, a 
criminal defendant who has already been convicted usually wants a 
speedy appeal and has little or no incentive to delay the outcome. 
Cody v. Henderson, 936 F.2d at 719; cf Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. at 
520 ("The prisoner's principal interest, of course, is in obtaining 
speedy federal relief on his claims."). Therefore, we presume every 
petitioner desired a timely appeal. 
[123] Furthermore, petitioners were hampered by the fact that they had to 
speak through their counsel in the state court appellate process and, in 
most instances, it was that very counsel who was responsible for the 
delay. Under these circumstances, we cannot fairly expect petitioners 
to have raised the issue of delay in state court. See Gaines v. Manson, 
194 Conn. 510, 481 A.2d 1084, 1093 (Conn. 1984)(4The petitioners 
have been handicapped in asserting rights through their counsel when 
it is the counsel itself that has been the source oi the challenged 
delays."). 
[124] Moreover, because the Public Defender had a policy of briefing cases 
on a "first m, first out" basis and the Oklahoma Court of Criminal 
Appeals was unwilling to expedite the briefing of one Public 
Defender's case over another, see Manous v. State, 797 P.2d at 1005-
06, even if petitioners had complained vigorously about delays in 
prosecuting their appeals, those complaints probably would have been 
unavailing. See Gaines, 481 A. 2d at 1093. Therefore, absent evidence 
that a petitioner affirmatively sought or caused delay in the 
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adjudication of his or her appeal, this third factor should weigh in 
favor of finding a due process violation. 
[125] d. PREJUDICE TO THE PETITIONER AS A RESULT OF 
DELAY 
d. Hi. whether the delay prejudiced the petitioner by 
impairing the petitioner's grounds for appeal or his or her 
defenses in the event of a reversal and retrial. 
One need only consider the trial transcript to see the impairment 
to justice that elapsed time can create. That transcript is replete with 
examples of inconsistency, throughout the testimony of numerous 
individuals, and especially that of eyewitness, Johnny Gourley. Many 
contradictions in witnesses testimony are reflected in the footnotes 
recited in the FACTS OF THE CASE of this brief 
For that small neighborhood in Ivins, Utah, the evening in 
question, and for some, the day preceding it, started early with copious 
imbibing of intoxicants by most, if not all, concerned. Whether it was 
the amount of alcohol consumed, and whatever may have 
accompanied same, or the amount of time between initial statements to 
authorities and later trial testimony, or a mixture of all of the above, 
the ensuing common was one of confusion, uncertain recollection. 
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outright denial, or a combination of all three. 
In considering a retrial, one would have to factor in the damage 
to the collective memory by the dominating element often years. It 
would be too much to expect the cause of justice to prevail. 
[129] Barker, 407U.S. at 532. 
[130] Impairment of one's grounds for defense in the event of a retrial is 
"the most difficult form of. . . prejudice to prove because time's 
erosion of exculpatory evidence and testimony 'can rarely be 
shown.'" DoggetU 112 S. Ct. at 2692-93 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. 
at 532). The Supreme Court has recognized that "excessive delay 
presumptively compromises the reliability of a trial in ways that 
neither party can prove or, for that matter, identify," id. at 2693, 
and the likelihood of injury "increases with the length of the 
delay," id. To support such a finding of prejudice, unjustified delay 
"unaccompanied by particularized trial prejudice must have lasted 
longer than [unjustified delay] demonstrably causing such 
prejudice." Id. at 2694. 
[126] The fourth factor we must consider when determining whether a 
petitioner's due process rights have been violated is whether the 
petitioner has suffered any prejudice due to delay in adjudicating his or 
her appeal. As we stated earlier, prejudice may result from any of the 
following: (i) oppressive incarceration pending appeal; or (ii) 
constitutionally cognizable anxiety awaiting resolution of the appeal; 
or (iii) impairment of a defendant's grounds for appeal or a 
defendant's defenses in the event of a retrial. DeLancy, 741 F.2d at 
1248; Rheuark v. Shaw, 628 F.2d at 303 n.8. 
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[127] We have not previously had occasion to discuss the meaning of 
prejudice in tne context of appellate delay. We take this opportunity to 
do so, beginning with the last and most serious form of prejudice: 
impairment of the grounds for appeal or the grounds for defense in the 
event of a retrial. *m 15 
[128] The most serious [form of prejudice] is the last, because the inability 
of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the 
entire system. If witnesses die or disappear during a delay, the 
prejudice is obvious. There is also prejudice if defense witnesses are 
unable to recall accurately events of the distant past. 
[129] See above. 
[130] See above. 
[131] That delay has impaired a petitioner's ability to mount a defense on 
retrial is irrelevant, however, if a petitioner has no credible grounds for 
reversal and retrial. See Tucker, 8 F.3d at 676. Therefore, in addition 
to establishing that excessive delay has impaired his or her defense on 
retrial, a petitioner also must assert a colorable state or federal claim 
that would warrant reversal of his or her conviction. *fn 16 See id. But 
see Harris v. Kuhlman, 601 F. Supp. 987, 994 (E.D.N. Y. 
1985)(finding that seven-year delay might impair petitioner's defense 
if he were retried, even though review of petitioner's claims suggested 
"very little chance of reversal"). Thus, if a petitioner's conviction has 
been affirmed by the time the petiticpner's claims are heard in the 
federal habeas proceeding, the petitioner will not be able to show 
prejudice on retrial because the state appellate court has finally 
decided there will be no retrial. 
[132] Likewise, because the only prejudice with which we are concerned is 
that which arises from excessive delay, for a petitioner to make a 
particularized showing of prejudice, the prejudicial event, such as the 
death of a key witness, must have occurred, or have been exacerbated, 
during the period of delay that is found to be excessive. Therefore, in 
most cases, particularized prejudice that occurs during the first two 
years that an appeal is pending will not support a due process violation 
because the prejudice would have occurred even in the absence of any 
excessive delay in adjudicating the appeal. 
[133] We turn then to the second type of prejudice: constitutionally 
cognizable anxiety awaiting resolution of the appeal. Once again, we 
are concerned only with anxiety arising out of excessive delay. 
Therefore, that a petitioner is anxious about the outcome of the appeal 
from the day the notice of appeal is filed is of no consequence; the 
anxiety must relate to the period of time that the appeal was 
excessively delayed. 
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[134] The courts appear split on the showing of anxiety that a petitioner must 
make. The Ninth Circuit, for example, requires a showing of 
"particular anxiety" distinguishable from that "of any other prisoner 
awaiting the outcome of an appeal." Antoine, 906 F.2d at 1383; see 
also Tucker, 8 F.3d at 676; Coe, 922 F.2d at 532. In Burkett II, the 
Third Circuit concluded that the petitioner had established prejudice in 
Eart because he was able "to detail anxiety related to the processing of is case post-conviction." 951 F.2d at 1447. The Second Circuit, on 
the other hand, has affirmed findings of prejudice based solely on the 
district court's assumption that the delay of four or more years worried 
the petitioner, who awaited hopefully the outcome of the appeal. 
Yourdon v. Kelly, 969 F.2d 1042 (2d Cir. 1992)(table), aff g, 769 F. 
Supp. 112, 115 (W.D.N. Y. 1991); Snyder v. Kelly, 972 F.2d 1328 (2d 
Cir. 1992)(table), aff g 769 F. Supp. 108, 111 (W.D.N.Y. 1991). We 
think the better approach is to require the petitioner to make some 
particularized and substantial showing of anxiety and concern, absent a 
delay so excessive as to trigger the Doggett presumption of prejudice. 
CONCLUSION 
The issues regarding the jury note or notes inquiring about a jury 
instruction that referred to self-defense, and the confusion of the jury 
regarding the law as it pertained to self-defense, could have defeated 
the defendant's argument of self-defense. Confidence in the verdict is 
undermined by the lack of a full record on the issue. 
Not one page of the indexed items, [R. 1346 through 1364], covering 
critical dates and information pertaining to the Defendant's / Appellant's 
Appeal, are currently in the paginated recorded. Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure Rule 11 (d) Papers on appeal. (1) Criminal cases. All of the papers 
in a criminal case shall be included by the clerk of the trial court as part of the 
record on appeal. (See addendum) 
March 16, 1994, Michael L. Miller, then attorney for Defendant / 
Appellant, filed a "Motion to Supplement Record" regarding a missing / 
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unreported record of a conversation between Trial Counsel Defense Counsel, 
and the Court relating to jury instruction 13.c. [R. 1442-1444] April 24, 1994, 
The Utah Court of Appeals issued an ORDER temporarily remanding the 
case to the Fifth District Court for consideration of a Request for a New 
Attorney by the Defendant / Appellant and for proceedings under rule 11 
pertaining to Attorney Miller's Request to Supplement the Record. [R. 1437] 
(see addendum pg. A ) 
According to the Docket record of the Fifth District Court, consisting of 6 
pages, [R. 1446-1451] (see addendum) the above dates are the period in which 
the appointment of new counsel and proceedings, regarding Rule 11, occurred or 
should have occurred. 
Page 3 and 4 [R. 1448) [R. 1449] of the Docket reflect the transactions, 
for the time period covered by page 4, of the Supplemental Index. 
According to that Docket, on 7-13-94, a hearing was held with neither the 
Attorney for the Defendant or the Defendant present. The State was represented 
by Brent W. Langston, with the stated results: 
"Mr. Langston informs the Court that a stipulation has 
been reached between counsel as to Motion to 
Supplement the Record; Court instructs Mr. Langston 
to submit written stipulation which has been signed by 
counsel and defendant." 
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That undoubtedly is the stipulation that Attorney Miller was seeking, but 
it is not in the file or listed on the Supplemental Index. 
Defendant feels the missing information has required him to proceed 
without a complete record contrary to Due Process as guaranteed by, the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the U. S. Constitution, and, Article I, Section 7, 
of the Utah Constitution. Defendant prays this court will reverse this judgment 
and in view of the elapsed time and the probable lack of witnesses with 
sufficient recollection of the events to retry the case, release defendant and grant 
such other relief as the court deems proper. 
Respectfully submitted this 19th day of November 2001. 
»Stood*. Jfo Mtik 
Brenda S "whiteley L7016J ~j 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF 
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Mark Shurtleff, Utah Attorney General 
Laura Dupaix, Assistant Attorney General 
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Harris v. Champion, 15 F.3d 1538 (10th Cir. 01/26/1994) 
[1 ] UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH 
CIRCUIT 
[2] Nos. 93-5123, 93-5209 
[3] 1994.C 10.41422 <http://www.versuslaw.com>; 15 F.3d 1538 
[4] Filed: January 26, 1994; As Corrected February 2, 1994. 
[5] ANTHONY JEROME HARRIS, GARY MIDDAUGH, THEODORE 
FORD, DOYLE KING, RANDY MEYER, TERRY CRISP, 
MICHAEL FARMER, JOHN HONEYCUTT, COY HILL, TROY 
BROWN, DEEMS ROWELL, GORDON BUNTON, ADAM 
WRIGHT, ROBERT MANOUS, KIMBALL FOREMAN, JOE 
HEADRICK, TERRY STEWARD, ARTHUR BLACKMON, 
JAMES SMITH, STEPHEN ROSS, JOHNNY SMITH, LARRY 
BROWN, WALTER ROBINSON, ROGER WILLIAMS, 
KENNETH OWENS, MARSHALL GEE, KELLY CRAIG, 
GILBERT PAYNE, DANNY GREEN, CALVIN ESLICK, PAUL 
ROGERS, MICHAEL SMITH, NATHANIEL JACKSON, JOHNNY 
ROMO, JEFFERY LEA, JOHNNY DAVIS, CHESTER WATKINS, 
RICKY WYATT, ARON COX, NERO TECUMSEH, JOSEPH 
OSBORNE, JOSEPH DICESARE, WILLIAM KNITTEL, JAMES 
MCCLAIN, EDDIE COATS, WALTER BOWERS, HUEY HALL, 
RONNIE MOORE, SHANE BOGGS, WILLIE TAYLOR, 
CLARENCE BRAMLETT, BRUCE HILL, LARRY IVES, 
DONALD MYLES, KEVIN COLE, LARRY CRAWLEY, 
EDWARD TEICHMAN, KEITH LARKINS, LEONARD 
GOUDEAU, JOEL VANSCOY, ROBERT RICHARDS, MICHAEL 
BROADNAX, RUFUS MCGEE, KYLE CHEADLE, STEVE SEITZ, 
TIMOTHY WHIPKEY, ADRIAN COLLINS, WILLIAM SEVERE, 
ROBERT BRIXEY, KEVIN PARKER, LLOYD HARJO, 
Research Scarth, Dent & Whiteley PC Page 1 of 59 
KENNETH BURRELL, LOUIS WASHINGTON, DAVID COPPLE, 
FRED COOK, ROBERT SCHNEIDER, JOEL ALLEN, BOYCE 
VANDENBURG, JERRY STILES, TONY ABNEY, JACKIE L. 
ADAIR, ROBERT ANDERSON, ASCENSION ARMENDARIZ, 
LARRY BAILEY, CHARLES BARNETT, ROGELIO BEGE, J.C. 
BERRY, LAVERN BERRYHILL, PERRY BIFFLE, JACKIE 
BLANTON, DOUGLAS BREEDEN, GREGORY BRIANS, 
ARTHUR BROWN, BOBBY BRUCE, DEREK BURGER, LARRY 
BUTCHER, JOHN BYRD, JAMES CAGLE, CLIFFORD 
CAMPBELL, DOUGLAS CAPPS, GERALD CARROLL, 
TORIANO CHANDLER, JOE CHASE, CLYDE CHUCULATE, 
JOSEPH CLOUD, JOHNNY COLE, PAM COLLEY, RONALD D. 
COPPER, DENNIS CORNELL, CYNDI CORNELL, GERMALNE 
CRAWFORD, RICKIE CRISP, JAMES CROW, GERALD 
DANIELS, BRIAN DANIELS, RICHARD DEMES, RONNIE DIAL, 
ALFONSO DURAN, LARRY EDWARDS, ANDREW EPHRIAM, 
JAMES L. EVANS, J.W. FATHERREE, LANCE FOSTER, 
DONNIE JOE FRYE, DENNIS GAINES, LOUIS GIBSON, 
RONNIE GILMORE, JAMES GODBEY, FOREST GOLBEK, 
JERRY GRAHAM, LANTZE GREEN, BRYAN GRIFFIN, JAMES 
HAMILTON, DAVID P. HAMMER, LAUREN HANKINS, EUAL 
HARDT, MICHAEL HAYES, RANDY HENDERSON, ELDON 
HENDERSON, ANDREA HESTER, ARCHIE HILL, DEWAYNE 
HOLLAND, HAROLD HOLMAN, THOMAS HONEYCUTT, 
MICHAEL HOUSTON, C. HUFFSTUTLER, KEITH HUNT, 
DORRIS JACKSON, NAPOLEON JAMES, WILLIE JEMISON, 
ALLEN JONES, ALLEN KAULAITY, JEFFERY KING, ROBERT 
KLUVER, FRED KNISLEY, MILLARD KNOX, CLARENCE 
LANDRETH, BERNARD LAWSON, ODIS LAWSON, JR., 
QUNION LEIGH, FRANK LOGAN, LAURA LONG, JOSEPH 
LYDA, BRIAN MAFFEE, MCKINLEY MAHAN, PATRICK 
MARTIN, ELIJAH MARTIN, LEOBARDO MARTINEZ, BARRY 
MCCLURE, GLENN MCGUDRE, PATRICK MEADOWS, .JUAN 
MERCADO, WALTER MILLER, JACKIE MILLER, LARRY 
MILLS, GARY MINARD, WILLIAM MOORE, ABDULLAH 
MUHAMMAD, DARPHUS MURRAY, STEVEN NESS, GEORGE 
NICHOLS, MICHAEL NORMAN, JAMES NORTHCROSS, 
RICHARD OLSEN, CARMEN PATTON, DIXIE PEBWORTH, 
ROGER PETERMAN, RICK PETRICK, GREGORY POE, 
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WILLIAM P. POTTS, MICHAEL PRATER, JAMES PRICE, 
STEVEN PYLES, NILLSON RAMIREZ, CHRISTOPHER 
RANSOM, HAZEN RAY, TERRY REEVES, KENNETH 
REYNOLDS, TERRANCE RICHARDS, EDDIE RICHIE, 
MICHAEL RIGGS, T.J. ROBY, ARTHUR RODRIGUEZ, VICTOR 
ROSE, KENNETH L. RUSSELL, DAVID RUSSELL, DAVID 
SADLER, SAMUEL SANNER, WILLIAM SHERBURN, MONTY 
SHOCKEY, MARY SHOFFNER, WAYNE SHULL, DONALD 
SIBIT, CANOVA SINGLETON, JOHN SMITH, DANNY SMITH, 
TERRY SMITH, MICHAEL S. SMITH, ANTHONY STEELE, 
RICHARD STONE, THOMAS STROTHER, JAMIE STRUBLE, H. 
STUMBLINGBEAR, SHERMAN SURFACE, STACEY SUTTON, 
STEPHEN THOMAS, DAVID THOMAS, JON TIBET, JOHNNY 
TILLEY, ROSCOE TILLEY, LYMAN TOMLIN, FLOYD R. 
TURNER, CHERYL WAGNER, LARRY WALKER, MICHAEL 
WALLING, WALTER WALTERS, WARREN WARD, LESLIE 
WARLEDO, JOHNNY WASHINGTON, ORLAND WASSON, 
JOSEPH WATKINS, THOMAS WEAVER, ANDREW WEST, 
JACK WHITLOCK, ROBERT WHITTIER, BILLY D. WILKINS, 
TYRONE WILLIAMS, MARTY WILLIAMS, JACK WILLIAMS, 
THURMAN WILSON, DONALD WILSON, WILLIE WILSON, 
RANDY WOOD, KEVIN WOOD SR., ROBERT WOODS, BILLIE 
WOOLSEY, CHARLES WOOTEN, GALEN WOOTEN, 
SHARLENE WORKMAN, COY YOCHAM, FLOYD ZEIGLER, 
FLOYD HARRIS, ROOSEVELT MCCOY, GREGORY 
MUNDINE, DONALD O'SHIELDS, GERALD THOMPSON, 
TERRY P. CROW, BRIAN LEROY JORDAN, TERRY LYNN 
RHINE, LERON ROBINSON, CAROL ANN PIERCE, RICHARD 
LEE JOHNSON, ROBERT M. ESTRADA, DAVID RICHARD, 
PETITIONERS-PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, 
v. 
RON CHAMPION, STEVE HARGETT, STEPHEN KAISER, 
BOBBY BOONE, DAN REYNOLDS, JOY HADWIGER, R. 
MICHAEL CODY, EDWARD EVANS, R. JACK COWLEY, 
NEVILLE MASSIE, H.N. SCOTT, SUE FRANK, DENISE SPEARS, 
EARL ALLEN, JIM SORRELS, WARDENS, AND ALL OTHER 
WARDENS OF CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES OF THE STATE 
OF OKLAHOMA HAVING CUSTODY OF ANY OF THE 
PLAINTIFFS; THE OKLAHOMA DEPARTMENT OF 
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CORRECTIONS; GARY MAYNARD, THE DIRECTOR OF THE 
OKLAHOMA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; THE 
OKLAHOMA COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS; THE JUDGES 
OF THE OKLAHOMA COURT OF CRIMINAL .APPEALS, TO-
WIT, HONORABLE JAMES F. LANE, HONORABLE GARY L. 
LUMPKIN, HONORABLE TOM BRETT, HONORABLE ED H. 
PARKS, AND HONORABLE CHARLES A. JOHNSON; THE 
STATE OF OKLAHOMA; THE OKLAHOMA. INDIGENT 
DEFENSE SYSTEM; HENRY A. (HANK) MEYER, III, 
CHAntMAN, RICHARD REEH, DOUG PARR, RICHARD 
JAMES, AND BECKY PFEFFERBAUM, M.D., INDIVIDUALLY 
AND AS MEMBERS OF THE OKLAHOMA INDIGENT 
DEFENSE SYSTEM BOARD; PATTI PALMER, INDIVIDUALLY 
AND AS EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE OKLAHOMA 
INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEM; AND, E. ALVIN SCHAY, 
INDIVIDUALLY AND AS APPELLATE INDIGENT DEFENDER, 
I.E., CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER OF THE 
OKLAHOMA APPELLATE INDIGENT DEFENDER DIVISION, 
RESPONDENTS-DEFEND ANTS-APPELLEES. 
[6] APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 
THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA. D.C. No. 90-C-44S-B. 
[7] David Booth of R. Thomas Seymour, Attorneys, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for 
Petitioners-Plaintiffs-Appellants. 
[8] Diane L. Slayton, Assistant Attorney General (Susan B. Loving, Attorney 
General of Oklahoma, with her on the brief), Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, 
for Warden Respondents-Defendants-Appellees. 
[9] J. Warren Jackman (William A. Caldwell, with him on the brief), of Pray, 
Walker, Jackman, Williamson & Marlar, Tulsa, Oklahoma (and Gary 
Peterson, with him on the brief, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma), for 
Oklahoma Indigent Defense System Respondents-Defendants-Appellees. 
[10] John M. Imel (John E. Rooney, Jr., with him on the brief), of Moyers, 
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Martin, Santee, Imel & Tetrick, Tulsa, Oklahoma (and Gail L. Wettstein, 
with him on the brief, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma), for Oklahoma Court 
of Criminal Appeals Respondents-Defendants-Appellees. 
[11 ] Before Logan, Brorby, and Ebel, Circuit Judges 
[12] Ebel 
[13] EBEL, Circuit Judge 
[14] These consolidated habeas appeals, which come to us after our remand in 
Hams v. Champion, 938 F.2d 1062 (10th Cir. 1991) (Hams I), require us 
to revisit the problem of appellate delay in the Oklahoma criminal Justice 
system. In Harris I, we ruled that the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Oklahoma should have excused an Oklahoma 
prisoner's failure to exhaust his state remedies before seeking federal 
habeas relief in light of extensive delay by the state public defender in 
filing an opening brief in the prisoner's direct criminal appeal. 938 F.2d 
at 1065-66, 1071. We remanded the action to the district court and 
directed it to investigate the possibility of systemic delay in the filing of 
briefs by the Oklahoma Appellate Public Defender System (Public 
Defender). — Id. at 1071. In a subsequent opinion, we expanded the 
scope of inquiry on remand to include a consideration of the entire 
criminal appellate process in Oklahoma insofar as it contributes to delay 
in deciding direct criminal appeals of indigent defendants. Hill v. 
Reynolds, 942 F.2d 1494, 1496-97 (10th Cir. 1991). We now consider 
the results of the district court's rulings on remand. 
[15] In this opinion we are called upon to address several issues arising out of 
the delay in processing petitioners' direct criminal appeals, including 
whether petitioners must exhaust their state remedies before seeking 
habeas relief in federal court and whether the delays in the state appellate 
process have violated petitioners' rights to due process, equal protection, 
or effective assistance of counsel. The record before us shows that many 
of these petitioners, all of whom are indigent and were represented by the 
Public Defender in their direct criminal appeals, had to wait three or 
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more years before a brief was filed on their behalf in their respective 
direct criminal appeals. Some petitioners also experienced delays 
elsewhere in the appellate process. 
[16] The following is a brief synopsis of our opinion, which begins with the 
issue of exhaustion. We conclude that there is a rebuttable presumption 
that the State's process is not effective and, therefore, need not be 
exhausted, if a direct criminal appeal has been pending for more than two 
years without final action by the State. This two-year presumptive period 
is not inflexible: the particular circumstances of a case may warrant 
excusing exhaustion after a delay of less than two years as, for example, 
when the length of the sentence is considered or when there is an obvious 
and massive breakdown in the procedural development of the appeal; 
alternatively, circumstances may warrant refusing to excuse exhaustion 
even after a delay of more than two years. 
[17] Next, we consider whether appellate delays also gave rise to independent 
due process violations. We apply the four-part balancing test of Barker v. 
Wingo, 407U.S. 514, 530, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101, 92 S. Ct. 2182 (1972), and 
examine the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, whether the 
petitioner asserted his or her right to a timely appeal, and whether the 
petitioner experienced any prejudice as a result of excessive delay. 
[18] First, we agree with the district court's Conclusion that delay in finally 
adjudicating a direct criminal appeal beyond two years is presumptively 
excessive. Again, this two-year presumptive period is not inflexible; 
delay of less than two years may be excessive in some cases and delay of 
more than two years may not be excessive in other cases. Generally, 
however, the longer delay in the appellate process extends beyond two 
years, the less showing a petitioner must make on the other parts of the 
balancing test, including prejudice resulting from the delay. 
[19] Second, we conclude that the reasons the State has offered for the delays 
experienced by petitioners—underfunding and, possibly, mismanagement 
of resources—are not constitutionally sufficient to justify excessive delay. 
Third, we conclude that absent a showing that a petitioner affirmatively 
sought or caused delay in adjudicating his or her appeal, a petitioner 
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sufficiently asserted his or her right to a timely appeal by filing a federal 
habeas petition seeking relief from appellate delay by the State. 
[20] Finally, we conclude that although prejudice may be presumed if 
appellate delay is sufficiently excessive, ordinarily a petitioner must 
make some particularized showing of prejudice to establish a due process 
violation. Prejudice arising from excessive appellate delay may take any 
of three forms: oppressive incarceration pending resolution of the appeal; 
anxiety and concern pending resolution of the appeal, and impairment of 
the grounds for appeal or the grounds for a retrial in the event the 
petitioner's conviction is reversed. Because we are concerned only with 
prejudice arising from excessive delay, the particularized showing must 
relate to events that occurred during the period of delay that was 
excessive. 
[21] The most significant form of prejudice, and often the most difficult to 
prove, is prejudice to the grounds for appeal or to the grounds for defense 
in the event of a retrial. As a precondition to establishing the latter, a 
petitioner must assert a colorable state or federal claim that would 
warrant a reversal and retrial. Likewise, as a precondition to establishing 
either oppressive incarceration or anxiety and concern pending resolution 
of the appeal, a petitioner generally must assert a colorable claim that 
would warrant a reversal of his or her conviction or a reduction in 
sentence that would entitle the petitioner to immediate release. Because 
the district court has not yet conducted the individualized factual inquiry 
necessary to apply the Barker balancing test to each petitioner, we 
remand the due process claims to the district court for further 
development. 
[22] Likewise, although we recognize that the Equal Protection Clause may be 
implicated if indigent petitioners face substantial delays in adjudicating 
their direct criminal appeals that petitioners who can afford to retain 
counsel do not face, we cannot review petitioners' equal protection claims 
on the factual record before us. Therefore, we must remand these claims 
to the district court, as well. 
[23] Turning to petitioners' claims for ineffective assistance of counsel, we 
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conclude that excessive delay in filing an appellate brief may violate a 
petitioner's right to effective counsel. The violation ends, however, once 
the brief is filed, and unless the delay affected the outcome of the appeal 
itself, the past violation is not redressable through a habeas action. 
Therefore, only when a brief has yet to be filed can a petitioner obtain 
habeas relief for ineffective assistance of counsel resulting from 
excessive delay in filing an appellate brief 
[24] Finally, we address two issues that do not relate to delay in the state 
appellate process. The first concerns the refusal of Judge Brett, one of the 
members of the district court panel that issued the rulings subject to 
appeal, to recuse himself from the habeas claims despite his uncle's 
presence on the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals until the uncle's 
death in early 1993. We conclude that Judge Brett abused his discretion 
in failing to recuse himself and that he should not participate in any 
further proceedings relating to petitioners' claims. We further conclude, 
nonetheless, that Judge Brett's failure to recuse himself was harmless 
error under the particular circumstances presented here and, therefore, we 
may review the merits of the district court's rulings. Lastly, we conclude 
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to award 
petitioners interim attorney fees on the ground that the fee request was 
premature. 
[25] I. HISTORICAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
[26] In 1981, following a two-year pilot project, Oklahoma instituted its first 
statewide system of public defenders. Before that time, in all but Tulsa 
and Oklahoma Counties, indigent criminal defendants were represented 
solely by appointed members of the private bar. The Oklahoma Appellate 
Public Defender System was given responsibility for appeals by all 
indigent defendants except those in Tulsa and Oklahoma Counties, who 
continued to be represented by county public defenders. Except for cases 
involving conflicts of interest, the Public Defender had no authority to 
refuse cases assigned to it by the courts. 
[27] Beginning in the mid-1980s, the Public Defender was assigned a steadily 
increasing number of felony appeals. This increase in caseload was not 
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met with a corresponding increase in funding and staffing, however, and 
a backlog of unbnefed cases began to develop. With only five attorneys 
briefing noncapital cases, the Public Defender fell further and further 
behind. At the end of fiscal year (FY) 1986, the Public Defender had a 
total of 367 unbnefed cases.*m By the end of FY 1989, that number had 
risen to 705. 
[28] In an effort to maximize the use of its limited resources, the Public 
Defender implemented a "first-in, first-out" policy, pursuant to which the 
oldest cases were briefed first. The Public Defender also began seeking 
lengthy extensions from the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals on a 
routine basis. The Public Defender would ask for an initial extension of 
360 days to be followed, if necessary, by subsequent requests for 
extensions of 180 days or less. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals 
ordinarily granted these extensions.— 
[29] Although the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals was distressed by the 
Public Defender's inability to handle the number of cases assigned to it, 
the court felt it had no power to remedy the situation directly. — In 
response to a mandamus petition by an indigent criminal defendant who 
sought an order directing the Public Defender to file appellate briefs in 
his two cases with no further delays, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal 
Appeals regretfully commented: 
[30] It is obvious that the office is understaffed to handle the number of 
appeals that are presently being handled by the office but due to the lack 
of funding by the State, the office is apparently doing the best that they 
can under the circumstances. We are powerless to cure this problem. It 
can only be cured by the legislature through the use of its budgetary 
powers. Petitioner is not entitled to have his appeal handled prior to 
others who are in similar circumstances and have been delayed even 
longer. 
[31] Manous v. State, 797 P. 2d 1005, 1005-06 (Okla. Crim. App. 1990). Enter 
Anthony Jerome Harris. 
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[32] Harris was sentenced on September 29, 1988, and the Public Defender 
was appointed to represent him on appeal. On April 16, 1990, in response 
to his inquiry, the Public Defender sent Harris a letter stating: "'It will be 
at least 3 years before we are able to file your brief with the court.'" 
Harris I, 938 F.2d at 1064 (quoting Letter from Public Defender to Harris 
of 4/16/90). Believing that he should not have to wait that long to obtain 
a review of his conviction and sentence, Harris filed a habeas petition in 
federal district court and argued that the anticipated delay in adjudicating 
his direct criminal appeal should excuse his failure to exhaust his state 
remedies. 
[33] By the time we issued our opinion in Harris I on June 17, 1991, almost 
three years had passed since Harris' sentencing and the Public Defender 
had yet to file a brief on his behalf We concluded that the briefing delay, 
which was authorized by the numerous extensions granted by the 
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, was attributable to the State and 
was not justified. Therefore, we excused Harris from exhausting his state 
remedies before proceeding in federal court. We also noted that the delay 
raised potential independent violations of Harris' constitutional rights, 
namely the right to equal protection, the right to due process, and the 
right to effective assistance of counsel. 
[34] We reversed the district court's dismissal of the habeas petition for failure 
to exhaust and, in light of the problems encountered by Harris and other 
Oklahoma habeas petitioners who had raised the issue of delay to this 
court, we directed the district court on remand 
[35] to consider this petitioner's claims within the context of the systemic 
operations of the [Public Defender]. Once the constitutional scope of the 
problem is known, the district court should consider what relief is 
appropriate for this petitioner as well as such systemic relief, if any, as 
may be needed to prevent any ongoing constitutional violations that may 
be occurring as a result of the inability of the [Public Defender] timely to 
prepare appeals for [its] indigent clients. 
[36] Harris I, 938 F.2d at 1071 (footnote omitted). Further, we instructed the 
district court (1) to consolidate, to the extent possible, any other habeas 
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cases pending in the Northern District of Oklahoma that raised a 
constitutional challenge to the delay by the Public Defender in filing 
briefs in direct criminal appeals and to coordinate its review of those 
petitions with the review of similar petitions by the courts in the Western 
and Eastern Districts of Oklahoma; (2) to "conduct a full hearing, as 
expeditiously as possible, into possible systemic delays of the [Public 
Defender] in preparing and filing appellate briefs for [its] indigent 
clients;" (3) to make "detailed findings of fact and Conclusions of law 
and . . . enter orders specifically addressing and remedying any 
constitutional violations that may be found;" and (4) "to appoint 
experienced counsel to represent the petitioners" in the collective cases. 
Id. at 1071, 1073. 
[37] Two months later, we considered an appeal by another state habeas 
petitioner who was represented by the Public Defender in his direct 
criminal appeal. The opening brief there was not filed until two years and 
nine months after the notice of appeal. Hill, 942 F.2d at 1495. At the time 
we issued our decision, Hill's appeal had been pending three years and 
four months with no decision by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal 
Appeals. Hill contended that the delay in adjudicating his appeal excused 
his failure to exhaust state remedies and violated his right to due process. 
[38] Based on our decision in Harris I, we reversed the district court's 
dismissal of Hill's habeas petition for failure to exhaust. On remand, we 
instructed the district court to consolidate Hill's habeas action with that of 
Harris for hearing. We further instructed the district court to consider the 
period both before and after the Public Defender filed its brief and to 
determine "what part of the whole period of delay caused by the state 
may have violated Hill's right to due process." Id. at 1496-97. We thereby 
expanded the scope of inquiry on remand to excessive delay in the entire 
Oklahoma criminal appellate system. 
[39] During this time, sweeping changes were taking place in Oklahoma's 
public defender system. In June 1990, the Oklahoma Supreme Court 
ruled that Oklahoma's system for appointing and compensating trial 
counsel for indigent defendants was unconstitutional. State v. Lynch, 796 
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P.2d l l50 , 1159(Okla. 1990). 
[40] In its 1991 session, the Oklahoma legislature responded to the Lynch 
decision by overhauling the entire indigent defense system, both at the 
trial and appellate levels. The Oklahoma Indigent Defense Act, Okla. 
Stat. tit. 22, 1355-68, which took effect on July 1, 1991, created the 
Oklahoma Indigent Defense System, and assigned it the responsibility of 
providing both trial and appellate counsel, as well as counsel on capital 
post-conviction matters, for indigent defendants in all but Tulsa and 
Oklahoma Counties. The legislature also authorized the Public Defender 
to hire two more attorneys to handle noncapital felony appeals. 
[41 ] Pursuant to our remand order in Harris I, in July 1991, Judges in the three 
federal districts in Oklahoma began identifying pending habeas cases that 
raised the issue of delay by the Public Defender and transferring them for 
hearing to the then-Chief Judge of the Northern District of Oklahoma, 
who was designated to sit in all three judicial districts. In January 1992, 
the district court appointed counsel to represent the petitioners in these 
cases (the Harris group), which at that time numbered sixteen. 
[42] On February 28, 1992, the petitioners in the Harris group, which then 
consisted of thirty habeas cases, presented the court with reams of 
statistical and other data gathered from the Public Defender, the 
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, and the Attorney General. This 
evidence showed that for noncapital felony appeals filed in 1989, the 
Public Defender filed only three percent of its briefs within six months of 
the date they were due; fifty-six percent of its briefs were at least three 
years late; and thirty-one percent of its briefs had yet to be filed by the 
beginning of 1992. Almost all the Public Defender briefs due in 
noncapital felony appeals filed in 1990 and 1991 had yet to be filed by 
the beginning of 1992. During much of the operative period, therefore, an 
indigent appellant could expect a delay of two to four years before his or 
her appellate brief would be filed. 
[43] The Public Defender was not the only entity having problems managing 
its caseload, however. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals also 
had a steadily growing backlog of cases. --— Each year the court was 
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struggling to dispose of the cases pending from the previous year and 
was making virtually no progress on the new cases filed that year. At the 
end of FY 1989, there were 1,148 undecided cases pending before the 
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals; a year later, there were 1,407 
undecided cases pending. Even the Attorney General was beginning to 
slip. Data collected from the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals 
showed that although the Attorney General filed almost all her briefs 
within six months of the due date, starting in 1987, there was "a clear 
trend of a decreasing number of briefs timely filed." R., Doc. 27, Ex.3(b) 
at 12. It was clear from the evidence presented that the appellate criminal 
Justice system in Oklahoma was in a crisis. 
[44] In the spring of 1992, the Oklahoma legislature began taking steps to 
alleviate the crisis. It appropriated $400,000 for the Public Defender to 
use to contract with private attorneys to handle noncapital felony appeals 
on which the Public Defender had been appointed. As a result, the Public 
Defender contracted out approximately 176 of its cases that spring. In the 
fall, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals also took steps to speed up 
the appellate process. The court adopted a summary opinion format to be 
used in all cases that would not be published. By reducing the amount of 
legal analysis and Discussion set forth in its unpublished opinions, the 
court eliminated lengthy conferences concerning the precise wording of 
the opinion, as well as the need for separate opinions when Judges 
concurred in the outcome but not in the analysis. 
[45] Meanwhile, the petitioners in the Harris group, which by then had grown 
to 108 habeas cases, increased their pressure on the State by filing a 
supplemental and amended complaint that named as defendants the State 
of Oklahoma, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals and its individual 
members, the Public Defender and its board members and administrative 
officers, as well as all the Oklahoma wardens, among others. The 
complaint, filed in July 1992, asserted against all the named defendants 
both habeas claims and claims for damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983.*fez The 
Harris petitioners also filed a motion for a preliminary injunction, 
seeking to enjoin the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals from granting 
any further extensions of time to the Public Defender, and a motion for 
partial summary judgment, seeking the release of those petitioners who 
had been, or reasonably could be expected to be, in custody for 11.7 
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months or longer without receiving a final adjudication of their appeal. - -
[46] The district court held a hearing on the pending motions on October 15, 
1992, by which time the Harris group had grown to 193 habeas cases. 
The court noted at the outset that all the parties appeared to agree that 
delays in the Oklahoma criminal appellate system had risen to the level 
of constitutional violations, and it informed the parties that it rejected the 
Attorney General's position that only the Oklahoma legislature could 
provide a remedy for those constitutional violations. The court said it, 
too, could provide a remedy. 
[47] The Public Defender recommended that the court stay its hand because 
the legislature had appropriated more money for the Public Defender to 
contract out its cases, and the Public Defender intended to award 
contracts in an additional 354-400 cases the next morning. The contracts 
would require all opening briefs to be filed on or before April 30, 1993. 
The Public Defender stated that once these cases were contracted out to 
private counsel, the Public Defender could "maintain brief filings on a 
current basis within the statutorily allotted periods." Tr. 10/15/92 at 37. 
Counsel for the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals also suggested that 
the court wait six months to see if the clog in the system would resolve 
itself. When questioned about appropriate remedies, counsel argued that 
while release of petitioners during the period of excessive appellate delay 
might be an appropriate remedy, it would have to be considered on a 
case-by-case basis. The Attorney General, in turn, also argued that the 
propriety of any remedy depended on the individual circumstances of 
each petitioner. 
[48] At the Conclusion of the hearing, the court noted that, although in the 
usual situation it would approach petitioners' claims on an individual 
basis, in light of the unusual circumstances presented, it proposed the 
following possible remedy: to release any petitioner whose appeal had 
not been fully briefed and submitted to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal 
Appeals for decision within fourteen months of the date of conviction. 
Each petitioner would be released on his or her personal recognizance 
until the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals issued its opinion; the 
State could apply for special terms and conditions of release in individual 
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cases. The court gave the parties until October 23 to comment on the 
proposal and indicated it would issue a ruling shortly thereafter. 
Unfortunately, no ruling ever appeared. 
[49] Beginning in January 1993, various Harris group petitioners, who were 
anticipating release, began filing mandamus petitions with us seeking a 
ruling by the district court. By the end of February, there were seven such 
mandamus petitions pending, including one filed by counsel on behalf of 
all the Harris group petitioners. 
[50] On February 18, 1993, on motion of the Chief Judge of the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma, approved by the 
Chief Judges of the Western and Eastern Districts, the Chief Judge of this 
court entered an order designating a three-Judge district court panel to 
adjudicate common issues of law and fact in all the habeas cases alleging 
delay in the adjudication of direct criminal appeals in Oklahoma. The 
panel, which was composed of one Judge from each of the three federal 
districts in Oklahoma, was formed in an effort to resolve uniformly and 
expeditiously the common issues arising in the approximately 275 habeas 
cases that by then made up the Harris group. 
[51] By order entered March 26, 1993 in the mandamus proceedings, we 
directed the district court panel to show cause why it should not be 
ordered, among other things, "to enter findings of fact and Conclusions of 
law in the Harris cases insofar as those cases seek habeas relief because 
of delays by the [Public Defender] in preparing and filing briefs in 
petitioners' direct criminal appeals" no later than May 10, 1993; and "to 
enter findings of fact and Conclusions of law in the Harris cases insofar 
as those cases seek habeas relief because of delays by the [Attorney 
General] or the [Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals]" no later than 
September 10, 1993. Harris v. United States Dist. Ct., (slip op.) at 7-8 
(10th Cir. 1993)(unpublished order). We also suggested that the district 
court certify those rulings for immediate appeal pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 
54(b). 
[52] In its response to the show cause order, the district court indicated that it 
had no objection to meeting the deadlines set forth in the show cause 
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order. Therefore, on April 22, 1993, we entered a mandamus order 
directing the district court to enter the findings and Conclusions 
requested in our show cause order and we also instructed the court to 
consider the issue of cumulative delay in its ruling due September 10. 
[53] On April 1, 1993, the Harris group petitioners filed a motion to disqualify 
two of the three members of the district court panel. Both motions were 
orally denied at a status conference on April 6, with the exception that 
Judge Thomas R. Brett whose uncle was a member of the Oklahoma 
Court of Criminal Appeals until his death three months earlier, agreed to 
recuse on any claims for damages. 
[54] At an evidentiary hearing on April 9, the district court said it would grant 
respondents' motion to sever from the Harris group twenty-six habeas 
cases by petitioners who were not represented by the Public Defender in 
their direct criminal appeals. The court also said that it would close the 
Harris group as of that date and any subsequent habeas petitions raising 
the issue of appellate delay would be considered on an individual basis. 
As of April 9, 284 habeas petitions that raised the issue of appellate delay 
in the Oklahoma criminal Justice system had been filed by criminal 
defendants represented by the Public Defender. 
[55] On May 6, 1993, the district court entered its findings of fact and 
Conclusions of law concerning delay by the Public Defender and 
certified its ruling as final for purposes of appeal pursuant to Rule 54(b). 
Based on the Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, the 
district court concluded that an appellate process that took up to sixteen 
months from the filing of the notice of appeal through the filing of 
appellate briefs "would satisfy constitutional concerns." R., Doc. 143 at 
21-22. In light of this standard, the court concluded that "there has been 
inordinate delay attributable to [the Public Defender] in the filing of most 
of the appellant briefs herein. This delay has thus been systemic." Id. at 
22. The court determined, however, that to decide whether the inordinate 
delay by the Public Defender gave rise to any independent due process 
violations, it would have to balance the factors set forth in Barker v. 
Wingo, 407 U.S. at 530, which would require the court to consider each 
habeas petitioner's case individually. The court said it would defer this 
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individual inquiry until after it had entered all the rulings required by our 
mandamus order of April 22. The court also deferred any rulings on the 
equal protection and ineffective assistance of counsel issues until it 
conducts the individual inquiries on due process. 
[56] The court further held that any habeas petitioner whose direct criminal 
appeal had been either affirmed or reversed with prejudice to retrial was 
not entitled to habeas relief as a result of delay in the appellate process. 
Finally, the court held that in the future, habeas petitioners would have to 
exhaust the issue of delay in the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals 
before raising it in federal court. Petitioners filed their notice of appeal 
from the district court's order on May 28. 
[57] In August, the parties submitted documentary and testimonial evidence to 
the court concerning delays by the Attorney General and the Oklahoma 
Court of Criminal Appeals, as well as cumulative delays in the system. 
Among other things, the court was advised that two pieces of legislation 
went into effect on July 1 that would speed the appellate process. 
[58] The first act established an Emergency Appellate Division of the 
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals that can be activated whenever 
more than 100 noncapital felony appeals are at issue and pending in the 
Office of the Clerk of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals. Act of 
June 3, 1993, ch. 292, sees. 2-6, 1993 Okla. Sess. Laws Serv. 1548, 
1549-51 (West)(codified at Okla. Stat. tit. 20, 60.1.-.5). Each emergency 
appellate panel consists of three trial Judges, two of whom must concur 
in any decision. Okla. Stat. tit. 20, 60.3. Each panel must dispose of any 
cases assigned to it or return the cases to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal 
Appeals for resolution within ninety days. Decisions of the panels are 
final unless the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals grants a petition for 
review. Id. at 60.1. Judge Johnson of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal 
Appeals testified that sixty-six cases had been assigned to emergency 
appellate panels since the legislation went into effect, and three of the 
cases had already been decided. 
[59] The second act cut in half the time allowed for perfecting appeals in 
misdemeanor and felony cases (i.e., filing the record with transcripts); an 
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appeal must be perfected in 90, rather than 180, days from the date the 
judgment and sentence are pronounced. Act of June 7, 1993, ch. 298, sec. 
5, 1993 Okla. Sess. Laws Serv. 1562, 1564 (West)(codified at Okla. Stat, 
tit. 22, 1054). Because the briefing schedule does not begin to run until 
the appeal has been perfected, reducing the time permitted for perfecting 
the appeal effectively reduces delay on appeal by ninety days. 
[60] The district court entered its findings of fact and Conclusions of law 
concerning delay by the Attorney General and the Oklahoma Court of 
Criminal Appeals, as well as cumulative delay throughout the appellate 
system, on September 8, 1993. The court found that pursuant to data 
provided by the parties, "there are approximately 302 matters now 
considered Harris cases as of August 13, 1993." R., Doc. 255 at 4. An 
appellate brief had been filed on behalf of the appellant in at least 301 of 
the cases and the Attorney General had filed a brief on behalf of the 
appellee in all but three cases. The Attorney General's briefs were filed 
within the statutory period in 130 cases and were filed more than sixty 
days after the statutory period in only sixty-seven cases. The Oklahoma 
Court of Criminal Appeals had issued opinions in eighty-five of the 
cases, and 217 cases remained pending before the court. Of those, six 
were not yet at issue, 125 were at issue and ready to be assigned to a 
Judge, and eighty-six were at issue and had already been assigned to a 
Judge. 
[61 ] The district court found no evidence of systemic delay in filing briefs by 
the Attorney General and also determined that although delay by the 
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals may have been inordinate in 
individual cases, it had not been systemic. The court further concluded 
that there was no cumulative inordinate systemic delay at present. The 
court held that a delay in adjudicating an appeal of more than two years 
from the notice of appeal or order permitting an appeal out of time to 
issuance of an opinion would be presumed to be unconstitutional "absent 
a showing of good and sufficient cause or special circumstances." Id. at 
8. The court again ruled that before a habeas petitioner could assert 
unconstitutional delay in federal court, he or she first had to raise the 
( issue to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals and permit it to take 
appropriate action. 
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[62] On September 28, petitioners filed their notice of appeal from the court's 
September 9 order, which the court certified as final pursuant to Rule 
54(b). The two appeals were consolidated by our order of October 14, 
and we heard oral argument in the appeals on November 8, 1993. 
[63] On appeal, petitioners assert that the district court's findings and 
Conclusions concerning their due process, equal protection, and 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims are incomplete and, in certain 
instances, erroneous. Petitioners also contend that Judge Brett, who was a 
member of the three-Judge district court panel, should have recused 
himself on the habeas claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 455. Finally, 
petitioners maintain that the district court erred in not awarding interim 
attorney fees against the State for work performed by counsel on behalf 
of petitioners. We will discuss each of these issues below. 
[64] II. ISSUES ON APPEAL RELATING TO DELAY 
[65] A. Exhaustion of State Remedies 
[66] A threshold question that must be addressed in every habeas case is that 
of exhaustion. Federal habeas relief is not available to a state prisoner 
"unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available 
in the courts of the State, or that there is either an absence of available 
State corrective process or the existence of circumstances rendering such 
process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner." 28 U.S.C. 
2254(b). 
[67] The exhaustion doctrine, which was codified in 1948, began as "a 
judicially crafted instrument which reflects a careful balance between 
important interests of federalism and the need to preserve the writ of 
habeas corpus as a 'swift and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal 
restraint or confinement.'" Braden v. 30th Judicial Cir. Ct. of Ky., 410 
U.S. 484, 490, 35 L. Ed. 2d 443, 93 S. Ct. 1123 (1973)(quotmg Secretary 
of State for Home Affairs v. O'Brien, [1923] A.C. 603, 609 (ELL.))-
Although the doctrine advances several interests, see Deters v. Collins, 
985 F.2d 789, 794 (5th Cir. 1993), it "is principally designed to protect 
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the state court's role in the enforcement of federal law and prevent 
disruption of state judicial proceedings." Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 
518,71 L.Ed. 2d 379, 102 S. Ct. 1198(1982). 
[68] Because "it would be unseemly in our dual system of government for a 
federal district court to upset a state court conviction without an 
opportunity to the state courts to correct a constitutional violation," 
federal courts apply the doctrine of comity, which "teaches that one court 
should defer action on causes properly within its jurisdiction until the 
courts of another sovereignty with concurrent powers, and already 
cognizant of the litigation, have had an opportunity to pass upon the 
matter." 
[69] Id. (quoting Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204, 94 L. Ed. 761, 70 S. Ct. 
587(1950)). 
[70] Exhaustion is, therefore, based on principles of comity; exhaustion is not 
jurisdictional. Patterson v. Leeke, 556 F.2d 1168, 1170 (4th Cir.), cert, 
denied, 434 U.S. 929, 54 L. Ed. 2d 289, 98 S. Ct. 414(1977). "Although 
there is a strong presumption in favor of requiring the prisoner to pursue 
his available state remedies, his failure to do so is not an absolute bar to 
appellate consideration of his claims." Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 
131, 95 L. Ed. 2d 119, 107S.Ct. 1671 (1987). The State may waive a 
prisoner's failure to exhaust by failing to raise the defense in federal 
district court. Id. at 135. Likewise, some cases may present special 
circumstances that make it "appropriate for an appellate court to address 
the merits of a habeas corpus petition notwithstanding the lack of 
complete exhaustion." Id. at 131; Frisbiev. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 521, 
96 L. Ed. 541, 72 S. Ct. 509 (1952). One such circumstance is when the 
State's process is inadequate to protect a prisoner's rights. See 28 U.S.C. 
2254(b); Darr, 339 U.S. at 210. 
[71] "Where state procedural snarls or obstacles preclude an effective state 
remedy against unconstitutional convictions, federal courts have no other 
choice but to grant relief in the collateral proceeding." Bartone v. United 
States, 375 U.S. 52, 54, 11 L. Ed. 2d 11, 84 S. Ct. 21 (1963); see also 
Hankins v. Fulcomer, 941 F.2d 246, 250 (3d Cir. 1991)("The principle of 
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comity weighs less heavily [when] the state has had an ample opportunity 
to pass upon the matter and has failed to sufficiently explain its . . . 
delay."); United States ex rel. Hankins v. Wicker, 582 F. Supp. 180, 182 
(W.D. Pa. 1984)("If an appropriate remedy does not exist or its 
utilization is frustrated in the state system, . . . the deference accorded the 
state judicial process must give way to the primary role of the federal 
courts to redress constitutional deprivations."), aff d, 782 F.2d 1028 (3d 
Cir.)(table), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 831, 93 L. Ed. 2d 64, 107 S. Ct. 118 
(1986). 
[72] Thus, "inexcusable or inordinate delay by the state in processing claims 
for relief may make the state process ineffective to protect the 
petitioner's rights and excuse exhaustion. Wojtczak v. Fulcomer, 800 
F.2d 353, 354 (3d Cir. 1986); accord Hill v. Reynolds, 942 F.2d at 1496 
("The delay [petitioner] faced in having a direct appeal filed proves his 
state remedies ineffective."). 
[73] In Way v. Crouse, 421 F.2d 145, 146-47 (10th Cir. 1970), we concluded 
that it was proper for a habeas petitioner who had experienced an 
eighteen-month delay in the adjudication of his direct criminal appeal to 
"seek vindication of his asserted constitutional grievance" in the federal, 
rather than the state, courts. Noting that "'the concept of federal-state 
comity involves mutuality of responsibilities, and an unacted upon 
responsibility can relieve one comity partner from continuous 
deference,'" we vacated the order dismissing the habeas petition for 
failure to exhaust. Id. at 147 (quoting Dixon v. Florida, 388 F.2d 424, 
426 (5th Cir. 1968)). 
[74] Later, in Harris I, we set forth the standard that when "a habeas petitioner 
makes colorable and sufficient allegations of an unconstitutional delay in 
obtaining direct state appellate review of his criminal conviction, . . . the 
federal district court should consider that claim on the merits without 
requiring that he exhaust his direct state appeal first." 938 F.2d at 1068-
69. Because exhaustion is a threshold issue, it often can be addressed on 
the pleadings without the need for an evidentiary hearing. However, an 
evidentiary hearing was deemed necessary in Harris I to investigate the 
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reasons for delay in light of the allegations of systemic delay. 
[75] We turn now to the question: At what point does delay in the state 
process become so inordinate that exhaustion should be excused? In 
addressing this question, we must keep in mind that "it is the legal issues 
that are to be exhausted, not the petitioner," Park v. Thompson, 356 F. 
Supp. 783, 788 (D. Haw. 1973). We cannot, of course, announce a bright 
line rule. As we noted in Way, 421 F.2d at 146-47, and Jones v. Grouse, 
360 F.2d 157, 158 (10th Cir. 1966), it is necessary to know the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the delay in order to determine whether the 
State is providing the petitioner an effective appeal. 
[76] In Way, we concluded that an eighteen-month delay in docketing a direct 
appeal before the state supreme court was enough to excuse exhaustion in 
the absence of facts and circumstances justifying that delay. 421 F.2d at 
146-47. Based on other facts and circumstances, courts have found other 
periods of delay sufficient to conclude that the state process was 
ineffective and exhaustion should be excused. See Simmons v. Reynolds, 
898 F.2d 865, 870 (2d Cir. 1990)(suggestmg that "the doctrine of 
exhaustion of state remedies does not require a prisoner to wait. . . three 
or four years before enlisting federal aid to expedite an appeal"); Rheuark 
v. Wade, 540 F.2d 1282, 1283 (5th Cir. 1976) (remanding for district 
court to excuse exhaustion if fifteen-month delay m preparing transcript 
could not be justified); Dozie v. Cady, 430 F.2d 637, 638 (7th Cir. 
1970)(remanding for district court to excuse exhaustion if seventeen-
month delay in briefing direct criminal appeal could not be justified); 
United States ex rel. Hankins, 582 F. Supp. at 182 (finding "the twenty 
four month delay in the Disposition of [petitioner's] direct appeal, to 
which is added the nine month period between his conviction and the 
filing of a notice of appeal, sufficient to question the adequacy of the 
state remedy" and to excuse exhaustion); cf. Smith v. Kansas, 356 F.2d 
654, 657 (10th Cir. 1966)(remanding for district court "to take such steps 
as it deems necessary to secure petitioner's right to a prompt hearing on 
his claim of unconstitutional restraint" where more than one year passed 
between filing of motion for post-conviction relief and entry of 
appealable order), cert, denied, 389 U.S. 871, 19 L. Ed. 2d 151, 88 S. Ct. 
154 (1967); Breazeale v. Bradley, 582 F.2d 5, 6 (5th Cir. 1978) (excusing 
exhaustion because state habeas petition had been completely dormant 
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for over one year and the State had offered "no reason for its torpor"); St. 
Jules v. Beto, 462 F.2d 1365, 1366-67 (5th Cir. 1972)(remandmg for 
district court to excuse exhaustion and address merits if seventeen-month 
delay in state trial court ruling on motion for post-conviction relief could 
not be justified); Jones, 360 F.2d at 158 (remanding for district court to 
excuse exhaustion if eighteen-month delay in adjudicating appeal from 
denial of post-conviction relief could not be justified); Dixon, 388 F.2d at 
426 (remanding for district court to excuse exhaustion and address merits 
if eighteen-month delay in state trial court ruling on post-sentencing 
motion could not be justified); Seemiller v. Wynck, 663 F.2d 805, 807-
08 (8th Cir. 1981)(remanding for district court to excuse exhaustion and 
address claims if state court had not ruled within sixty days on motion for 
post-conviction relief that had been pending for two years); Wojtczak, 
800 F.2d at 355-56 (excusing exhaustion because motion for post-
conviction relief had been pending for more than two and one-half 
years); Moore v. Deputy Comm'rs of SCI-Huntingdon, 946 F.2d 236, 242 
(3d Cir. 1991)(excusing exhaustion because petition for post-conviction 
relief had been pending for three years), cert, denied, 117 L. Ed. 2d 647, 
112S.Ct. 1509(1992). 
[77] Although we cannot establish a bright line, we think it would be helpful 
to articulate a time period beyond which there is at least a presumption 
that the state process has become ineffective because of delay. Based 
upon the record before us, as well as our review of the case law in this 
and other circuits, we conclude that delay in adjudicating a direct 
criminal appeal beyond two years from the filing of the notice of appeal 
gives rise to a presumption that the state appellate process is 
ineffective.— 
[78] We recognize that cases may arise in which exhaustion should be 
excused even though an appeal has been pending for less than two years. 
Conversely, we also recognize that, in particular cases, the State may 
show that a delay of more than two years is justified and, therefore, good 
cause exists for not excusing exhaustion. Thus, we hold only that the 
state appellate process should be presumed to be ineffective and, 
therefore, exhaustion should presumptively be excused, when a 
petitioner's direct criminal appeal has been pending for two years without 
resolution absent a constitutionally sufficient justification by the State. 
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SeeBurkett v. Cunningham, 826 F.2d 1208, 1218 (3d Cir. 1987)(Burkett 
I)("Where a petitioner has demonstrated inordinate delay, we have placed 
the burden on respondents to demonstrate why further resort to the state 
courts should be required."). 
[79] Although 2254 requires a habeas petitioner to exhaust his or her 
underlying claims before coming to federal court, it does not require a 
petitioner to exhaust the issue of exhaustion, itself. Because exhaustion 
functions as a federal court gatekeeper, the federal, not the state, courts 
decide when the state process has been exhausted or should be deemed 
ineffective because of delay. Moreover, requiring a petitioner to raise the 
issue of exhaustion first in state court would unnecessarily frustrate a 
petitioner's right to a speedy adjudication of his or her claims. See Way, 
421 F.2d at 146-47 (conditionally excusing petitioner from having to 
raise issue of delay to "the very courts which are responsible, on the face 
of the pleadings, for the very delay of which he complains"); Brooks v. 
Jones, 875 F.2d 30, 31 (2d Cir. 1989)("When the petitioner can 
substantiate his complaint that his right to appeal is being violated by 
inattention and time-consuming procedures, to require one more 
technical step would be to tolerate the frustration of the petitioner's due 
process rights."); United States ex rel. Hankins, 582 F. Supp. at 182 
("Where the state process is itself the basis for the claimed denial of due 
process the issue has properly been presented [to the state judiciary]."). 
But see Schandelmeier v. Cunningham, 819 F.2d 52, 54-55 (3d Cir. 
1986) (holding that because petitioner had not pursued procedures for 
presenting his claims based on sentencing delay to the state court, he had 
not exhausted his remedies and could not seek federal relief), cert, 
denied, 480 U.S. 938, 94 L. Ed. 2d 774, 107 S. Ct. 1584(1987). 
[80] Once exhaustion is excused, a federal court has the power to review7 the 
merits of a petitioner's habeas petition to the extent that it raises federal 
issues. See, e.g., Jones, 360 F.2d at 158. In many (indeed, most) 
instances, however, proceeding directly to the merits of a petitioner's 
claims after excusing exhaustion may not be the preferred course of 
action, or even an effective one. 
[81] If exhaustion is excused due to delay in adjudicating a petitioner's direct 
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criminal appeal, the federal habeas review will in some regards, serve as 
a surrogate for a direct state appeal. This raises several concerns. First, 
because the petitioner would be entitled to appointed counsel on direct 
appeal, Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356-58, 9 L. Ed. 2d 811, 83 
S. Ct. 814 (1963), it may be appropriate to appoint counsel to represent 
the petitioner on habeas review. Likewise, the federal court may need to 
ensure that an indigent petitioner has a free copy of the trial transcript if it 
is necessary to evaluate his or her habeas petition. See Griffin v. Illinois, 
351 U.S. 12, 19-20, 100 L. Ed. 891, 76 S. Ct. 585 (1956). 
[82] Furthermore, to the extent the petitioner's underlying claims of error are 
state claims, the federal court cannot review them even if exhaustion is 
excused, because federal habeas review is limited to alleged "violations 
of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. 
2254; see also Estelle v. McGuire, 116 L. Ed. 2d 385, 112 S. Ct. 475, 480 
(1991)("It is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state 
court determinations on state law questions. In conducting habeas review, 
a federal court is limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the 
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."). 
[83] Finally, federal courts should not be required as a routine matter to fulfill 
the State's obligation to provide an "adequate and effective" direct 
criminal appeal to its indigent criminal defendants, Griffin, 351 U.S. at 
20. Requiring the federal courts to do so on a regular basis just because 
the State does not fulfill its own constitutional obligations would 
unnecessarily tax federal resources and inject the federal courts into the 
State's process. 
[84] Thus, we consider an alternative. We start by noting that delay in 
adjudicating a state prisoner's direct criminal appeal may do more than 
simply excuse exhaustion. It also may give rise to an independent due 
process claim. Harris I, 938 F.2d at 1068; accord United States v. Pratt, 
645 F.2d 89, 91 (1st Cir.), cert, denied, 454 U.S. 881, 70 L. Ed. 2d 195, 
102 S. Ct. 369 (1981); Cody v. Henderson, 936 F.2d 715, 719 (2d Cir. 
1991); Burkett v. Fulcomer, 951 F. 2d 1431, 1446 (3d Cir. 1991), cert, 
denied, 120 L. Ed. 2d 921, 112 S. Ct. 3055 (1992)(Burkett II); Rheuark 
v. Shaw, 628 F.2d 297, 302 (5th Cir. 1980), cert, denied, 450 U.S. 931, 
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67L.Ed. 2d 365, 101 S. Ct. 1392(1981); Coev. Thurman, 922R2d528, 
530-31 (9th Cir. 1990). Thus, a habeas petition may be predicated on a 
due process violation arising from the State's delay in adjudicating a 
petitioner's direct criminal appeal even if the petitioner's allegations of 
error at the trial level are based on state law and therefore, not proper for 
federal habeas review. 
[85] Once appellate delay rises to the level of an independent due process 
violation, a wide range of remedies is available with which the federal 
district court can redress the constitutional violation. These remedies 
often will be more effective in redressing state appellate delay than will 
merely excusing exhaustion and considering the petitioner's underlying 
claims on the merits. We turn, therefore, to the requirements for 
establishing an independent due process claim based on the State's delay 
in processing a direct criminal appeal. 
[86] B.Substantive Claim That Appellate Delay 
[87] Violates Right To Due Process 
[88] 1.Elements of the claim 
[89] The Due Process Clause provides that "No person sha l l . . . be deprived 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . . " U.S. Const, 
amend. V. Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment provides "nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law. "Id. amend. XIV, 1. 
[90] The right to a speedy trial, which is guaranteed an accused by the Sixth 
Amendment, is a fundamental right imposed on the states by the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Barker v. Wingo, 407 
U.S. at 515. Although the Constitution does not require the State to 
afford a criminal defendant a direct appeal to challenge alleged trial court 
errors, see McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687, 38 L. Ed. 867, 14 S. 
Ct 913 (1894), the Supreme Court has held that 
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[91] if a State has created appellate courts as "an integral part of the . . . 
system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant," 
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. at 18, the procedures used in deciding appeals 
must comport with the demands of the Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clauses of the Constitution. 
[92] Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 393, 83 L. Ed. 2d 821, 105 S. Ct. 830 
(1985)(alteration in original). 
[93] To ensure the defendant's right to a "meaningful appeal," Douglas v. 
California, 372 U.S. at 358, the Court has held that when the State 
affords a criminal defendant an appeal by right, the Fourteenth 
Amendment requires, among other things, that counsel be appointed to 
represent an indigent defendant, id. at 356-58, that the representation of 
counsel be effective, Evitts, 469 U.S. at 396, and that either an indigent 
defendant be provided a free transcript or some equivalent method of 
reporting the trial proceedings be employed, Draper v. Washington, 372 
U.S. 487, 495, 9 L. Ed. 2d 899, 83 S. Ct. 774 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 
351 U.S. at 19-20. 
[94] We may add to this list the requirement that the State afford the 
defendant a timely appeal, for an appeal that is inordinately delayed is as 
much a "meaningless ritual," Douglas, 372 U.S. at 358, as an appeal that 
is adjudicated without the benefit of effective counsel or a transcript of 
the trial court proceedings. See Burkett I, 826 F.2d at 1221-22; United 
States ex rel. Smith v. Twomey, 486 F.2d 736, 739 (7th Cir. 1973), cert, 
denied, 416 U.S. 994, 40 L. Ed. 2d 773, 94 S. Ct. 2408 (1974); cf 
Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 449, 8 L. Ed. 2d 21, 82 S. Ct. 
917 (1962) ("No general respect for, nor adherence to, the law as a whole 
can well be expected without judicial recognition of the paramount need 
for prompt, eminently fair and sober criminal law procedures. . . . Delay 
in the final judgment of conviction, including its appellate review, 
unquestionably erodes the efficacy of law enforcement."); Mathews v. 
Eldridge, 424U.S. 319, 333, 47L. Ed. 2d 18, 96 S. Ct. 893 (1976)("The 
fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard 'at 
a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.'"). 
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[95] When determining whether a criminal defendant has been deprived of his 
or her right to timely process at the trial level, the Supreme Court has 
established a balancing test to be applied on an ad hoc basis. Barker, 407 
U.S. at 530. Four factors should be assessed and balanced: "(1) length of 
delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant's assertion of his 
right, and (4) prejudice to the defendant." Id. (numbers added). The 
fourth factor "should be assessed in the light of the interests of 
defendants which the speedy trial right was designed to protect." Id. at 
532. The "Court has identified three such interests: (i) to prevent 
oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of 
the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be 
impaired." Id. 
[96] Although Barker addressed only a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to 
a speedy trial, the balancing test the Court enunciated provides an 
appropriate framework for evaluating whether a defendant's due process 
right to a timely direct criminal appeal has been violated. See Rheuark v. 
Shaw, 628 F.2d at 303 ("The factors of Barker are preferred [over] the 
standard announced in United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 52 L. Ed. 
2d 752, 97 S. Ct. 2044 . . . (1977)[concerning pre-indictment delay], 
since the reasons for constraining appellate delay are analogous to the 
motives underpinning the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy 
trial.")(footnote omitted); DeLancy v. Caldwell, 741 F.2d 1246, 1248 
(10th Cir. 1984)("We agree with the Fifth Circuit that the right to avoid 
unreasonable delay in the appellate process is similar to the right to a 
speedy trial."); Burkett II, 951 F.2d at 1445-46 (holding that delay in 
adjudicating an appeal, which infringes on due process rights, is 
effectively no different than delay in imposing a sentence, which 
infringes on Sixth Amendment speedy trial right). 
[97] We can apply the first three factors of the Barker test to claims of 
appellate delay without modification. We must modify the fourth factor 
of prejudice to the defendant, however, to reflect the interests sought to 
be protected by an appeal "unencumbered by excessive delay." Rheuark 
v. Shaw, 628 F.2d at 303 n.8. 
[98] The Fifth Circuit has identified the following interests that should be 
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considered when assessing prejudice arising from appellate delay: "(1) 
prevention of oppressive incarceration pending appeal; (2) minimization 
of anxiety and concern of those convicted awaiting the outcome of their 
appeals; and (3) limitation of the possibility that a convicted person's 
grounds for appeal, and his or her defenses in case of reversal and retrial, 
might be impaired." Id. In DeLancy, 741 F.2d at 1248, we adopted the 
Fifth Circuit's modification of the Barker prejudice factor for purposes of 
appellate delay. We also heeded the Supreme Court's admonition that the 
four factors of the balancing test are related and should be considered 
together with such other circumstances as may be relevant. Barker, 407 
U.S. at 533; DeLancy, 741 F.2d at 1248. 
[99] Nevertheless, as we discuss below, we view the first factor—length of 
delay—as a threshold that a petitioner must meet before the court need 
consider the other factors. Furthermore, we agree with the Ninth Circuit 
that, ordinarily, a petitioner must make some showing on the fourth 
factor—prejudice—to establish a due process violation. United States v. 
Tucker, 8 F.3d 673, 676 (9th Cir. 1993)(en banc). 
[100] Therefore, in determining whether delay in adjudicating a petitioner's 
direct criminal appeal violated the petitioner's due process rights, we 
must balance the following factors: 
[101] a. the length of the delay; 
[102] b. the reason for the delay and whether that reason is justified; 
[103] c. whether the petitioner asserted his right to a timely appeal; and 
[104] d. whether the delay prejudiced the petitioner by 
[105] i. causing the petitioner to suffer oppressive incarceration pending 
appeal; or 
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[106] ii. causing the petitioner to suffer constitutionally cognizable anxiety and 
concern awaiting the outcome of his or her appeal; or 
[107] iii. impairing the petitioner's grounds for appeal or his or her defenses in 
the event of a reversal and retrial. 
[108] We will address each of these factors in turn. 
[109] a. The length of the delay . 
[110] The first factor in the balancing test is the length of the appellate delay. 
"Only passage of an inordinate amount of time triggers due process 
concerns." Hill v. Reynolds, 942 F.2d at 1497 (emphasis added). 
Therefore, if a petitioner cannot establish at least some degree of 
inordinate delay, the court need not inquire into the other factors. Cf 
Doggett v. United States, 120 L. Ed. 2d 520, 112 S. Ct. 2686, 2690-91 
(1992)(holding that because no speedy trial violation occurs if the 
government prosecutes a defendant "with customary promptness," "to 
trigger a speedy trial analysis, an accused must allege that the interval 
between accusation and trial has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary 
from 'presumptively prejudicial' delay"). 
[ I l l ] We cannot set an inflexible length of time that will constitute inordinate 
delay in every case. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 521 ("We cannot definitely 
say how long is too long in a system where Justice is supposed to be 
swift but deliberate."); Coe v. Thurman, 922 F.2d at 531 ("There is no 
talismanic number of years or months, after which due process is 
automatically violated."). Nonetheless, it seems appropriate to Judge 
appellate delay by the same two-year presumptive standard that we used 
earlier to excuse exhaustion. See supra (slip op.) at pp. 30-31. Therefore, 
a two-year delay in finally adjudicating a direct criminal appeal 
ordinarily will give rise to a presumption of inordinate delay that will 
satisfy this first factor in the balancing test. 
[112] Creating a presumption that a two-year delay in adjudicating an appeal is 
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inordinate comports with the district court's ruling that "a two-year 
period, from the notice of appeal or order permitting same, be established 
as the time period for resolution of a direct criminal appeal in Oklahoma 
beyond which any delay will be presumed to be unconstitutional, . . . 
absent a showing of good and sufficient cause or special circumstances." 
R., Doc. 255 at 8 (footnote omitted).*™ Respondents do not challenge 
the district court's two-year presumptive period. Although petitioners 
argue for a shorter period, the only basis for their argument is that in 
1991, the Tenth Circuit's median time for deciding direct criminal 
appeals was 11.7 months. See Appellant's Principal Br. (No.93-5123) at 
57; Appellant's Principal Br. (No.93-5209) at 18-19. We are not 
sufficiently persuaded by this single statistic to conclude that the district 
court erred in establishing a two-year presumptive period. See United 
States v. Pratt, 645 F.2d at 91 (declining to hold nine-month appellate 
delay unconstitutional in absence of exacerbating factors); United States 
ex rel. Harris v. Reed, 608 F. Supp. 1369, 1376 (N.D. Ill 1985)(holding 
that a seven-and-one-half-month delay in adjudicating a motion for post-
conviction relief was not so egregious as to violate petitioner's due 
process rights); Doescher v. Estelle, 454 F. Supp. 943, 952 (N.D. Tex. 
1978)(determining as a matter of law that a one-year delay in processing 
petitioner's appeal was not unjustified), appeal dismissed , 597 F.2d 281 
(5th Cir. 1979)(table). 
[113] The district court concluded that two years to adjudicate an appeal in 
Oklahoma is both customary and feasible."^11 Furthermore, a two-year 
delay is within the time frame that other courts have found to raise due 
process concerns. For example, in United States ex rel. Hankins, 582 F. 
Supp. at 184-85, the court held that the pendency of an appeal for two 
years with no decision by the state appellate court, coupled with a nine-
month delay by the trial court in ruling on post-trial motions, gave rise to 
a prima facie due process violation. See also Dozie v. Cady, 430 F.2d at 
638 (holding that seventeen-month delay in filing opening brief 
warranted inquiry into possible due process violation); Burkett II, 951 
F.2d at 1445-46 (holding that eighteen-month delay between sentencing 
and decision on appeal gave rise to due process violation); United States 
v. Antoine, 906 F.2d 1379, 1382-83 (9th Cir.)(holding that three-year 
delay in adjudicating federal appeal was "substantial" and remanding for 
further findings regarding prejudice), cert, denied, 498 U.S. 963, 112 L. 
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Ed. 2d 407, 111 S. Ct. 398 (1990); Snyder v. Kelly, 769 F. Supp. 108, 
111 (W.D.N. Y. 1991)(holding that three years is "an excessive amount of 
time to await the resolution of an appeal"), aff d 972 F.2d 1328 (2d Cir. 
1992)(table); cf Jones v. Crouse, 360 F.2d at 158 (holding that delay of 
more than eighteen months in processing appeal of collateral attack 
warranted inquiry into possible due process violation).**"" 
[114] The passage of two years creates only a presumption of inordinate delay 
on appeal. The particular circumstances of a case may warrant a finding 
that the passage of less than two years constitutes inordinate delay or that 
the passage of more than two years does not. For example, although the 
length of the sentence cannot be a controlling factor in light of the time 
requirements inherent in processing an appeal, a case in which a very 
short sentence was imposed may warrant more expedited treatment. See 
Wheeler v. Kelly, 639 F. Supp. 1374, 1379 (E.D.N. Y. 1986)(holding that 
"the length of the sentence is a factor in determining whether post-
conviction delay is excessive"), affd, 811 F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1987). On 
the other hand, a particularly complex case may warrant a more lengthy 
appellate process. Cf. Geames v. Henderson, 725 F. Supp. 681, 685 
(E.D.N. Y. 1989)(holding that delay of three-and-one-half years was 
excessive because issues on appeal were "no more complex than in most 
criminal appeals"). 
[115] Because it is a balancing test that we employ, however, delay 
substantially beyond two years, at least in a case that does not warrant a 
lengthier appellate process, will reduce the burden of proof on the other 
three factors necessary to establish a due process violation. See Doggett, 
112 S. Ct. at 2693 (holding that the more protracted the delay, the more 
prejudice may be presumed from the delay). 
[116] b. The reason for the delay 
[117] The second part of the balancing test is the reason for the delay. In Harris 
I, we laid to rest any argument that delays by the Public Defender in 
filing briefs could be attributed to petitioners on the ground that the 
Public Defender requested the continuances on petitioners' behalf. 938 
F.2d at 1065. The record indicated that "the delay in preparing 
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petitioner's brief on appeal [was] caused by the inability of [the Public 
Defender] to address petitioner's case in a timely fashion." Id. Because 
this delay was "forced upon an unwilling petitioner by reason of his 
indigency," we held it should not be attributed to the petitioner. Id. The 
parties do not dispute that the delays in adjudicating petitioners' direct 
criminal appeals are attributable to the State of Oklahoma and not to 
petit ioners.-^ See R., Doc. 29 at 9 (Attorney General); Addendum to 
Br. of OIDS Defs. at 17 (Public Defender); R., Doc. 27, Ex. 3(c), 
Attachment 1 (Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals); see also Hankins 
v. Fulcomer, 941 F.2d at 252 (holding that court had numerous 
opportunities to rule on pending matters and its delay in doing so was not 
attributable to petitioner); Wojtczak v. Fulcomer, 800 F.2d at 356 
(holding that delay in adjudicating motion for post-conviction relief was 
not attributable to petitioner, but to "disinterest on the part of court 
appointed counsel and to a failure on the part of the court to require them 
to provide minimally effective representation"). 
[118] The State has offered no constitutionally sufficient justification for the 
delays, such as that the cases are unusually complex or that they involve 
the death penalty. The only reasons offered by the State were the lack of 
funding and, possibly, the mismanagement of resources by the Public 
Defender. See R., Doc. 29 at 9; Addendum to Br. of OIDS Defs. at 17; 
R., Doc. 27, Ex.3(c), Attachment 1. Neither of these reasons 
constitutes an acceptable excuse for delay. See United States ex rel. 
Smith, 486 F.2d at 739 ("The rights announced in Griffin v. Illinois and 
Douglas v. California cannot be allowed to become meaningless through 
understaffmg of the state offices responsible for assuring those 
rights.")(citations omitted); Snyder, 769 F. Supp. at 111 (holding that the 
"brobdingnagian case load of assigned counsel" is not an acceptable 
reason for delay); Rheuark v. Shaw, 477 F. Supp. 897, 912 n. 17 (N.D. 
Tex. 1979)("The constitutional requirements of due process on appeal 
may not be abridged by failing to fund substitute court reporters."), aff d 
in part, rev'd in part, 628 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1980), cert, denied, 450 U.S. 
931 (1981); cf Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 825, 52 L. Ed. 2d 72, 97 
S. Ct. 1491 (1977) ("The cost of protecting a constitutional right cannot 
justify its total denial."); Todaro v. Ward, 565 F.2d 48, 54n.8 (2d Cir. 
1977)("Inadequate resources no longer can excuse the denial of 
constitutional rights."). 
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[119] c. Petitioner's assertion of his or her right to a timely appeal 
[120] The third factor we must balance in determining whether a due process 
violation has occurred is the petitioner's assertion of his or her right to a 
timely appeal. The Supreme Court rejected in Barker "the rule that a 
defendant who fails to demand a speedy trial forever waives his right." 
407 U.S. at 528. Instead, the Court held that whether and how strongly a 
defendant asserts his or her right to a speedy trial should be balanced 
with the other factors. Id. at 528-29. 
[121] We will not require petitioners to have made an affirmative assertion of 
their right to a timely appeal in state court for this factor to weigh in their 
favor. Under the circumstances, the filing of these federal habeas 
petitions constitutes a sufficient assertion of petitioners' respective rights 
to a timely appeal. See Snyder, 769 F. Supp. at 111. 
[122] Unlike a criminal defendant who stands accused and may not wish to 
have any trial, much less a speedy one, e.g., Barker, 407 U.S. at 535, a 
criminal defendant who has already been convicted usually wants a 
speedy appeal and has little or no incentive to delay the outcome. Cody v. 
Henderson, 936 F.2d at 719; cf Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. at 520 ("The^ 
prisoner's principal interest, of course, is in obtaining speedy federal 
relief on his claims."). Therefore, we presume every petitioner desired a 
timely appeal. 
[123] Furthermore, petitioners were hampered by the fact that they had to speak 
through their counsel in the state court appellate process and, in most 
instances, it was that very counsel who was responsible for the delay. 
Under these circumstances, we cannot fairly expect petitioners to have 
raised the issue of delay in state court. See Gaines v. Manson, 194 Conn. 
510, 481 A.2d 1084, 1093 (Conn. 1984)("The petitioners have been 
handicapped in asserting rights through their counsel when it is the 
counsel itself that has been the source of the challenged delays."). 
[124] Moreover, because the Public Defender had a policy of briefing cases on 
a "first in, first out" basis and the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals 
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was unwilling to expedite the briefing of one Public Defender's case over 
another, see Manous v. State, 797 P. 2d at 1005-06, even if petitioners had 
complained vigorously about delays in prosecuting their appeals, those 
complaints probably would have been unavailing. See Games, 481 A. 2d 
at 1093. Therefore, absent evidence that a petitioner affirmatively sought 
or caused delay in the adjudication of his or her appeal, this third factor 
should weigh in favor of finding a due process violation. 
[125] d. Prejudice to the petitioner as a result of delay 
[126] The fourth factor we must consider when determining whether a 
petitioner's due process rights have been violated is whether the 
petitioner has suffered any prejudice due to delay in adjudicating his or 
her appeal. As we stated earlier, prejudice may result from any of the 
following: (i) oppressive incarceration pending appeal; or (li) 
constitutionally cognizable anxiety awaiting resolution of the appeal; or 
(iii) impairment of a defendant's grounds for appeal or a defendant's 
defenses in the event of a retrial. DeLancy, 741 F.2d at 1248; Rheuark v. 
Shaw,628F.2dat303n.8. 
[127] We have not previously had occasion to discuss the meaning of prejudice 
in the context of appellate delay. We take this opportunity to do so, 
beginning with the last and most serious form of prejudice: impairment 
of the grounds for appeal or the grounds for defense in the event of a 
retrial. 
[128] The most serious [form of prejudice] is the last, because the inability of a 
defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire 
system. If witnesses die or disappear during a delay, the prejudice is 
obvious. There is also prejudice if defense witnesses are unable to recall 
accurately events of the distant past. 
[129] Barker, 407 U.S. at 532. 
[130] Impairment of one's grounds for defense in the event of a retrial is "the 
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most difficult form of. . . prejudice to prove because time's erosion of 
exculpatory evidence and testimony 'can rarely be shown.'" Doggett, 112 
S. Ct. at 2692-93 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 532). The Supreme Court 
has recognized that "excessive delay presumptively compromises the 
reliability of a trial in ways that neither party can prove or, for that 
matter, identify," id. at 2693, and the likelihood of injury "increases with 
the length of the delay," id. To support such a finding of prejudice, 
unjustified delay "unaccompanied by particularized trial prejudice must 
have lasted longer than [unjustified delay] demonstrably causing such 
prejudice." Id. at 2694. 
[131] That delay has impaired a petitioner's ability to mount a defense on retrial 
is irrelevant, however, if a petitioner has no credible grounds for reversal 
and retrial. See Tucker, 8 F.3d at 676. Therefore, in addition to 
establishing that excessive delay has impaired his or her defense on 
retrial, a petitioner also must assert a colorable state or federal claim that 
would warrant reversal of his or her conviction.-11-- See id. But see Harris 
v. Kuhlman, 601 F. Supp. 987, 994 (E.D.N. Y. 1985)(fmding that seven-
year delay might impair petitioner's defense if he were retried, even 
though review of petitioner's claims suggested "very little chance of 
reversal"). Thus, if a petitioner's conviction has been affirmed by the time 
the petitioner's claims are heard in the federal habeas proceeding, the 
petitioner will not be able to show prejudice on retrial because the state 
appellate court has finally decided there will be no retrial. 
[132] Likewise, because the only prejudice with which we are concerned is that 
which arises from excessive delay, for a petitioner to make a 
particularized showing of prejudice, the prejudicial event, such as the 
death of a key witness, must have occurred, or have been exacerbated, 
during the period of delay that is found to be excessive. Therefore, in 
most cases, particularized prejudice that occurs during the first two years 
that an appeal is pending will not support a due process violation because 
the prejudice would have occurred even in the absence of any excessive 
delay in adjudicating the appeal. 
[133] We turn then to the second type of prejudice: constitutionally cognizable 
anxiety awaiting resolution of the appeal. Once again, we are concerned 
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only with anxiety arising out of excessive delay. Therefore, that a 
petitioner is anxious about the outcome of the appeal from the day the 
notice of appeal is filed is of no consequence; the anxiety must relate to 
the period of time that the appeal was excessively delayed. 
[134] The courts appear split on the showing of anxiety that a petitioner must 
make. The Ninth Circuit, for example, requires a showing of "particular 
anxiety" distinguishable from that "of any other prisoner awaiting the 
outcome of an appeal." Antoine, 906 F.2d at 1383; see also Tucker, 8 
F.3d at 676; Coe, 922 F.2d at 532. In Burkett II, the Third Circuit 
concluded that the petitioner had established prejudice in part because he 
was able "to detail anxiety related to the processing of his case post-
conviction." 951 F.2d at 1447. The Second Circuit, on the other hand, has 
affirmed findings of prejudice based solely on the district court's 
assumption that the delay of four or more years worried the petitioner, 
who awaited hopefully the outcome of the appeal. Yourdon v. Kelly, 969 
F.2d 1042 (2d Cir. 1992)(table), affg, 769 F. Supp. 112, 115 (W.D~N.Y. 
1991); Snyder v. Kelly, 972 F.2d 1328 (2d Cir. 1992)(table), affg 769 F. 
Supp. 108, 111 (W.D.N. Y. 1991). We think the better approach is to 
require the petitioner to make some particularized and substantial 
showing of anxiety and concern, absent a delay so excessive as to trigger 
the Doggett presumption of prejudice. 
[135] A petitioner has no reason to be anxious or concerned about the time it 
takes to adjudicate an appeal that is without merit. Therefore, to establish 
prejudice resulting from anxiety, a petitioner must once again assert a 
colorable state or federal claim that would warrant reversal of the 
petitioner's conviction or reduction of sentence to an amount of time less 
than that taken to adjudicate the appeal. —n~" 
[136] The third form of prejudice a petitioner may suffer is oppressive 
incarceration pending appeal. In many respects this form of prejudice 
merely duplicates the prejudice of anxiety discussed above. In both cases, 
the petitioner must make some showing that his or her incarceration is 
wrongful. In addition, the petitioner must make a particularized showing 
that the incarceration is oppressive beyond that experienced by others 
awaiting the outcome of their appeals. That is, the petitioner must show 
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some oppressiveness unique to his or her situation that is directly 
attributable to the excessive delay in adjudicating the petitioner's appeal. 
[137] While we recognize that a habeas petitioner has a right to assert a 
properly exhausted habeas claim even if incarcerated under another, 
unchallenged sentence, Sciberras v. United States, 404 F.2d 247, 249 
(10th Cir. 1968)(2255); Rhodus v. Patterson, 404 F. 2d 890, 891 (10th 
Cir. 1968)(2254), incarceration under an unchallenged sentence 
substantially negates a claim of prejudice arising from incarceration 
under the challenged sentence. Because the quality of a petitioner's 
incarceration may be affected by the very multiplicity of his or her 
convictions or the seriousness of the offense that is being challenged, 
however, a petitioner's incarceration under another, unchallenged 
sentence may not always negate the claim of prejudice altogether. 
[138] Recognizing that proving any of the three forms of prejudice is difficult, 
we will not require a level of proof that would necessitate a full blown 
trial simply to determine whether a petitioner suffered actual prejudice as 
a result of excessive appellate delay. Instead, the petitioner need make 
only a colorable and particularized showing of prejudice. As we stated 
earlier, however, regardless of the form the prejudice takes, it must arise 
during the period of appellate delay that the court finds to be excessive if 
it is to factor into the Barker balancing test. 
[139] The district court determined that it could not evaluate petitioners' due 
process claims without examining each petitioner's case individually. We 
agree. While one or more of the factors in the balancing test may weigh 
the same for every petitioner, not all the factors will. Prejudice, in 
particular, will vary with the individual. Because the district court has not 
yet conducted the individual inquiries necessary to resolve petitioners' 
due process claims, the record is not sufficiently developed for us to 
review those claims at this time. We therefore remand the action for the 
district court to conduct the necessary inquiry and make an appropriate 
i r *fnl8 
record tor review. 
[140] 2. Appropriate remedies 
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[141] If the district court finds that a petitioner's due process rights have been 
violated, it must then address the matter of a remedy. We agree with the 
district court's Conclusion that any petitioner whose direct criminal 
appeal has now been decided and whose conviction has been affirmed is 
not entitled to habeas relief based solely on delay in adjudicating his or 
her appeal, unless the petitioner can show actual prejudice to the appeal, 
itself, arising from the delay.^12 See Muwwakkil v. Hoke, 968 F.2d 284, 
285 (2d Cir.)(holding that once petitioner's state conviction was affirmed, 
he was not entitled to release unless he could show a reasonable 
probability that, but for the appellate delay, his appeal would have been 
decided differently), cert, denied, 121 L. Ed. 2d 589, 113 S. Ct. 664 
(1992). 
[142] Only when appellate delay "prejudiced [the petitioner's] due process 
rights so as to make his confinement constitutionally deficient," would 
habeas relief based on appellate delay be appropriate for a petitioner 
whose conviction has been affirmed. Diaz v. Henderson, 905 F.2d 652, 
653(2dCir. 1990). 
[143] An untainted affirmance of a petitioner's state appeal while his habeas 
petition is pending makes clear that the petitioner was confined pursuant 
to a valid judgment of conviction throughout the period of delay. The 
affirmance establishes that if the delay had not occurred and petitioner's 
due process right to a timely appeal had been fully satisfied, he wrould 
have been subject to exactly the same term of confinement. Because the 
due process violation did not result in an illegal confinement, it cannot 
justify granting the habeas remedy of unconditional release. 
[144] Cody, 936 F.2d at 720. 
[145] We also agree with the district court that a petitioner whose conviction 
the state court has reversed with prejudice to retrial is not entitled to 
federal habeas relief. Because the state court has set such a petitioner's 
release in motion, federal habeas relief is neither necessary nor available. 
[146] "Absent absolute or qualified immunity or other appropriate defenses," a 
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petitioner for whom habeas relief is not available may seek redress from 
the responsible parties for any due process violation caused by state 
appellate delay through a claim for damages under 42 U.S C 1983. 
DeLancy, 741 F.2d at 1248; accord Diaz, 905 F.2d at 654; McLallen v. 
Henderson, 492 F.2d 1298, 1299-1300 (8th Cir. 1974); Doescher v 
Estelle, 477 F. Supp. 932, 934 (N.D. Tex. 1979), aff d in part, vacated in 
part, 616 F.2d 205 (5th Cir. 1980). Because this appeal concerns only 
petitioners' habeas claims, we will not rule on the implications of any 
pending 1983 claims. 
[147] A petitioner whose direct criminal appeal has not yet been decided, 
however, is entitled to some form of habeas relief if he or she can 
establish a due process violation arising from delay in adjudicating his or 
her state appeal .— The most appropriate remedy in these circumstances 
is to grant a conditional writ, i.e., release the petitioner if the State does 
not decide the petitioner's appeal within a specified period. See Harris 
I, 938 F.2d at 1070; Coe, 922 F.2d at 532-33; Brooks v. Jones, 875 F.2d 
at 32. The district court should order the State to decide the appeal within 
sixty days—or such other time as the district court decides is appropriate 
for good cause shown —or release the petitioner. 
[148] Although a conditional order of release is the preferred procedure, if the 
petitioner's underlying substantive claims are federal in nature and, either 
because of the clarity of the issues or the particular equities involved, the 
district court concludes that the better procedure would be for it to 
resolve the federal claims in the absence of exhaustion, the district court 
has discretion to adjudicate the merits of those claims. As we 
discussed supra at p. 32, however, because review on the merits by the 
district court in many regards replicates the petitioner's direct criminal 
appeal, the district court should consider the appropriateness of 
appointing counsel for the indigent petitioner, Douglas, 372 U.S. at 356-
57, and providing the indigent petitioner a free transcript, Griffin, 351 
U.S. at 19-20, when reviewing the petitioner's federal claims. 
[149] C. Substantive Claim That Appellate Delay Violates Right To Equal 
Protection 
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[150] "Unfairness results . . . if indigents are singled out by the State and 
denied meaningful access to the appellate system because of their 
poverty." Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 611. In Harris I, we noted that 
delay by the Public Defender in briefing appeals for indigent clients may 
implicate equal protection concerns. 938 F.2d at 1067; see also United 
States ex rel. Smith v. Twomey, 486 F.2d at 738; Gaines v. Manson, 481 
A. 2d at 1094. Our informal survey of published Oklahoma Court of 
Criminal Appeals opinions in Harris I suggested that appeals by criminal 
defendants who were represented by retained counsel were decided 
considerably faster than appeals by indigent criminal defendants who 
were represented by the Public Defender. 938 F.2d at 1070 & n.9. 
[151] In its ruling of September 9, 1993, the district court determined the 
parties did not dispute that criminal defendants in Oklahoma who were 
represented by private counsel had their appeals decided "in significantly 
less time" than criminal defendants who were represented by "public 
appointed counsel." R., Doc. 255 at 11. The court, however, postponed 
any ruling on petitioners' equal protection claims until it conducts the 
individual inquiries necessary to resolve petitioners' due process claims. 
[152] Determination of petitioners' equal protection claims raises a variety of 
issues, including the level of scrutiny to be applied. If the State's conduct 
creates classifications that "impermissibly interfere[] with the exercise of 
a fundamental right or operate[] to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect 
class" the classifications are subject to strict scrutiny. Massachusetts Bd. 
of Retirement v. Murgia, 427U.S. 307, 312, 49 L. Ed. 2d 520, 96 S. Ct. 
2562 (1976)(per curiam)(footnotes omitted). Absent a classification that 
interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the 
peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class, however, the State's conduct 
need only be "rationally related to a legitimate state interest." Oklahoma 
Educ. Ass'n v. Alcoholic Beverage Laws Enforcement Comm'n, 889 F.2d 
929, 932 (10th Cir. 1989).*^-
[153] Whether the right to a direct appeal is a fundamental right depends on 
whether it is "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution." 
San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34, 
36 L. Ed. 2d 16, 93 S. Ct. 1278 (1973). The Supreme Court has held that 
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"appeals from state criminal convictions are not 'explicitly or implicitly 
guaranteed by the Constitution,'" and has noted that "in dealing with 
equal protection challenges to state regulation of the right of appeal in 
criminal cases [the Court has] applied the traditional rational-basis test." 
Estellev. Dorrough, 420 U.S. 534, 538, 43 L. Ed. 2d 377, 95 S. Ct. 1173 
(1975)(per curiam); see also McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. at 687 
(holding that the Constitution does not require a state to afford a criminal 
defendant a direct appeal). 
[154] While it would appear that the rational basis test applies to petitioners' 
equal protection claims, the Ninth Circuit has suggested in dicta that 
when the classification is based on wealth, the right to a direct appeal 
may be a fundamental right for equal protection purposes. See United 
States v. Avendano-Camacho, 786 F.2d 1392, 1394 (9th Cir. 1986); Bell 
v. Hongisto, 501 F.2d 346, 353 (9th Cir. 1974), cert, denied, 420 U.S. 
962, 43 L. Ed. 2d 439, 95 S. Ct. 1351 (1975). But see Maher v. Roe, 432 
U.S. 464, 471, 53 L. Ed. 2d 484, 97 S. Ct. 2376 (1977)("This Court has 
never held that financial need alone identifies a suspect class for purposes 
of equal protection analysis."). 
[155] Because the record on appeal is insufficient for us to review petitioners' 
equal protection claims at this time, we need not decide the proper level 
of scrutiny to apply to petitioners' claims. Nor need we decide other 
thorny issues relating to those claims, such as how unequal the appellate 
processing time for indigents and non-indigents must be to constitute an 
equal protection violation. See Ross, 417 U.S. at 612 ("The Fourteenth 
Amendment does not require absolute equality or precisely equal 
advantages, nor does it require the State to equalize economic conditions. 
. . . The question is not one of absolutes, but one of degrees.")(internal 
quotations and citations omitted); Gaines, 481 A.2d at 1094 (holding that 
the difference in processing appeals of indigents and non-indigents of 
four years and six months, respectively, "reflects a disparity in 
opportunity of access to the appellate forum that is constitutionally 
impermissible"); Carter v. Thomas, 527 F.2d 1332, 1333 (5th Cir. 
1976)(holding that alleged delays of up to twenty-one months between 
the submission of motions to proceed in forma pauperis and the filing of 
complaints stated an equal protection claim). The district court must 
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address these issues in the first instance on remand. 
[156] We note that the district court may not need to reach the equal protection 
claim in some cases. Because the habeas remedies available to redress an 
equal protection violation based on appellate delay do not differ from the 
habeas remedies available to redress a due process violation based on 
appellate delay, once the court determines that a due process violation 
has occurred that warrants habeas relief, it need not address the other 
constitutional issues for purposes of the petitioner's habeas action. 
Likewise, as we discussed earlier with regard to the due process claims, 
see supra (slip op.) at p. 54, if the State has upheld the petitioner's 
conviction on direct appeal, the petitioner is precluded from obtaining 
habeas relief based on any equal protection violation resulting from delay 
in adjudicating the petitioner's appeal. In any event, because we have 
neither the factual record necessary to evaluate petitioners' equal 
protection claims, nor the benefit of a reasoned analysis of these claims 
by the district court, we decline to address petitioners' equal protection 
claims at this time. 
[157] D. Substantive Claim That Appellate Delay Violates Right to Effective 
Assistance of Counsel 
[158] "A first appeal as of r igh t . . . is not adjudicated in accord with due 
process of law if the appellant does not have the effective assistance of an 
attorney." Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. at 396. In the appellate context, the 
right to effective assistance of counsel requires that counsel "be available 
to assist in preparing and submitting a brief to the appellate court and . . . 
play the role of active advocate." Id. at 394 (citation omitted). 
[159] In Harris I, we said that, although a criminal defendant technically may 
have appointed counsel, "past and future alleged delays may be so great 
that at some point his [or her] counsel's delay in filing [an] appellate brief 
either has or will render such assistance ineffective." 938 F.2d at 1068. 
The courts in the Second Circuit also have acknowledged that delay by 
counsel in prosecuting an appeal can give rise to a claim for ineffective 
assistance of counsel. See Simmons v. Reynolds, 898 F.2d at 868 
(holding that counsel's failure to file a brief for five years constituted 
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ineffective assistance of counsel as a matter of law); Harris v. Kuhlman, 
601 F. Supp. at 993 ("By any measure, counsel's failure to perfect the 
appeal [for approximately seven years] must be considered ineffective 
assistance."); Yourdon v. Kelly, 769 F. Supp. 112, 115 (holding that 
delay of nearly four years attributable to counsel was sufficiently long to 
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel as a matter of law); Williams 
v. James, 770 F. Supp. 103, 107 (W.D.N. Y. 1991 )(holding that delay of 
two and one-half years, even if attributable to counsel, was not sufficient 
to constitute ineffective assistance of counsel as a matter of law). 
[160] To establish a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner 
must show both that "counsel's performance was deficient," and that "the 
deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668, 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). To establish 
the first of these requirements, a petitioner must show that counsel's 
performance "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" 
measured by "prevailing professional norms." Id. at 688. To establish the 
prejudice requirement, a petitioner usually has to show "a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694. Prejudice will be 
presumed, however, if the assistance of counsel is actually or 
constructively denied altogether. Id. at 692. 
[161] Many of the petitioners here have had to wait three or more years just to 
get their court-appointed counsel to file an appellate brief on their behalf 
The district court may well find that delays of this magnitude fall below 
the prevailing professional standards for providing effective legal 
assistance. The real question, therefore, is whether the petitioners can 
prove prejudice as a result of the briefing delay. 
[162] During the time that counsel delays excessively in preparing and 
submitting an appellate brief, the petitioner is left in the same position as 
someone who has no counsel on appeal at all. See Evitts, 469 U.S. at 396 
("[A] party whose counsel is unable to provide effective representation is 
in no better position than one who has no counsel at all."). Under these 
circumstances, prejudice is presumed. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 92. 
So long as the brief remains unfiled, a petitioner's claim for ineffective 
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assistance of counsel arising from briefing delay may be redressed 
through a habeas claim. The federal court may direct the State to appoint 
new counsel to represent the petitioner or otherwise ensure that the 
petitioner is provided effective assistance of counsel on appeal, and may 
grant a conditional writ, i.e., order that the petitioner be released if the 
brief is not filed and the appeal decided within a specified period of time. 
[163] Once counsel files an appellate brief, however, counsel's ineffectiveness 
because of delay ends. See Simmons v. Reynolds, 708 F. Supp. 505, 510 
(E.D.N.Y. 1989), affd 898 F.2d 865 (2d Cir. 1990)(noting that although 
petitioner was denied effective assistance by counsel who failed to file a 
brief for six years, petitioner ultimately received effective assistance from 
new counsel, who filed a brief). Thus, ineffective assistance of counsel 
arising from delay in filing an appellate brief is unlike other types of 
ineffective assistance in that it has a temporal limitation. Furthermore, 
unlike ineffectiveness arising from, for example, counsel's failure to 
cross-examine a key witness or to raise a crucial argument on appeal, 
ineffectiveness arising from delay in filing a brief is unlikely to affect the 
actual outcome of the appeal. 
[164] As we said earlier in the context of due process, supra (slip op.) at p. 55, 
if a constitutional violation does not affect the integrity of the State's 
decision, the petitioner's confinement is not unconstitutional. Granting 
the petitioner habeas relief based on counsel's past ineffective assistance, 
which has since ended and has not affected the outcome of the appeal, 
would go too far. Therefore, if an appellate brief has already been filed 
on the petitioner's behalf at the time the federal court addresses the 
petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel arising from delay 
in filing an appellate brief, the petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief 
absent a showing that the briefing delay impaired the petitioner's chances 
of prevailing on appeal.-1-^ Redress for the past constitutional violation 
is available, if at all, only through a 1983 (or other) claim for damages. 
[165] In sum, a future habeas petitioner may be able to obtain habeas relief for 
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on counsel's ongoing and 
excessive delay in filing a brief in the petitioner's direct criminal appeal. 
Such relief appears to be foreclosed for the petitioners here, however, in 
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light of the district court's finding that an appellate brief has been filed 
with the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals on behalf of all but one 
petitioner and our assumption that, by now, a brief has been filed on 
behalf of this petitioner, as well. 
[166] III. OTHER ISSUES 
[167] A. Recusal of Judge Brett 
[168] Shortly after the three-Judge district court panel was designated to 
adjudicate common issues of law and fact in these habeas cases, 
petitioners moved Judge Brett, one of the panel members, to disqualify 
himself. Petitioners filed a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 455, in which 
they noted that among the named defendants in the actions were the 
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals and the Judges thereof, including 
the Honorable Tom Brett, who was the uncle of United States District 
Court Judge Thomas R. Brett. R., Doc. 113. In their brief in support of 
the motion, petitioners recited that "allegations have been made in this 
case which will require federal Judge Thomas R. Brett to review actions 
in which Tom Brett was involved while sitting on the Oklahoma Court o[ 
Criminal Appeals." Id., Doc. 114 at 3. Petitioners expressed their concern 
that "a decision making process involving a familial relationship between 
a sitting Judge and a defendant presents at least the appearance of 
possible bias." Id. 
[169] Judge Brett declined to recuse himself because "in the habeas field . . . 
it's just a matter of reviewing [the] opinions [of the Oklahoma Court of 
Criminal Appeals]." Tr. 4/6/93 at 101. Judge Brett did agree, however, 
that though his uncle had died a few months earlier, he should not be 
involved in any damage claims against his uncle personally. Id. 
[170] On appeal, petitioners argue that Judge Brett erred in not recusing 
himself on the habeas, as well as the damage, claims. In light of this 
error, petitioners request that we set aside any findings or Conclusions by 
the three-Judge district court panel that are unfavorable to petitioners. 
Though we conclude that Judge Brett erred in failing to disqualify 
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himself in light of the allegations at issue in these cases, under the 
particular circumstances presented, we decline to set aside any findings 
or Conclusions of the three-Judge panel on that basis. 
[171 ] Section 455 provides in pertinent part as follows: 
[172] (a) Any Justice, Judge, or magistrate of the United States shall disqualify 
himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be 
questioned. 
[173] (b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances: 
[174] (5) He or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to 
either of them, or the spouse of such person: 
[175] (i) Is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee of a 
party[.] 
[176] 28 U.S.C. 455 (emphasis added). 
[177] The general purpose of 455(a) is "to promote public confidence in the 
integrity of the judicial process." Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition 
Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 858 n.7, 100 L.Ed. 2d 855, 108 S. Ct 2194(1988). 
Thus, the section is designed to eliminate "even the appearance of 
impropriety whenever possible." Id. at 865. Pursuant to 455(a), "a Judge 
has a continuing duty to recuse before, during, or in some circumstances, 
after a proceeding, if the Judge concludes that sufficient factual grounds 
exist to cause an objective observer reasonably to question the Judge's 
impartiality." United States v. Cooley, 1 F.3d 985, 992 (10th Cir. 1993). 
The standard under 455(a) is an objective one, and requires recusal 
whenever "a reasonable person, knowing all the relevant facts, would 
harbor doubts about the Judge's impartiality." Id. at 993 (further citation 
omitted). Here, petitioners' habeas and civil rights claims require the 
district court not only to review the opinions of the Oklahoma Court of 
Criminal Appeals, but also to decide whether that court participated in, or 
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at least authorized, alleged violations of petitioners' constitutional rights. 
Therefore, under 455(a) Judge Brett should have recused himself 
[178] "[Section] 455(b) is stricter than 455(a) and is concerned with situations 
that may involve actual bias rather than 455(a)'s concern with the public 
perception of the judicial process." Parker v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 
1510, 1527(1 lth Cir. 1988), cert, denied, 490 U.S. 1066, 104 L.Ed. 2d 
631, 109 S. Ct. 2066 (1989). It requires recusal if the Judge bears a third 
degree relationship, or closer, with a party to the suit. Here, although 
Judge Brett's uncle had died by the time Judge Brett was assigned to 
these cases, his uncle is, nonetheless, a named party in this action. 
Therefore, recusal under 455(b) was required. 
[179] A Conclusion that Judge Brett should have recused himself does not, 
however, end our inquiry. "Although 455 defines the circumstances that 
mandate disqualification of federal Judges, it neither prescribes nor 
prohibits any particular remedy for a violation of that duty. Congress has 
wisely delegated to the judiciary the task of fashioning the remedies that 
will best serve the purpose of the legislation." Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 862. 
Thus, the Supreme Court, noting that "there need not be a draconian 
remedy for every violation of 455(a)," has held that a Judge's violation of 
455(a) may be harmless error that does not warrant setting aside the 
Judge's previous rulings. Id. at 862, 864. Several circuits have extended 
the Supreme Court's harmless error analysis to violations of 455(b), see 
Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 867 F.2d 1415, 1420-21 (Fed. 
Cir.), cert, denied, 490 U.S. 1047, 104 L. Ed. 2d 425, 109 S. Ct. 1956 
(1989); Parker, 855 F.2d at 1527-28, and we are persuaded by their 
reasoning. Therefore, we will apply a harmless error analysis to Judge 
Brett's violations of 455. 
[180] In deciding whether a violation of 455 is harmless error, the Supreme 
Court has directed us to consider "the risk of injustice to the parties in the 
particular case, the risk that the denial of relief will produce injustice in 
other cases, and the risk of undermining the public's confidence in the 
judicial process." Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 864. 
[181] We begin our consideration of these factors by noting the following 
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pertinent facts. First, the very issue involved in the three hundred cases 
before the district court is that of delay in reviewing petitioners' claims. 
Although petitioners' claims relate only to delay by the State of 
Oklahoma, we are ever mindful of the fact that further delay by the 
federal courts will only exacerbate petitioners' injuries. Second, the facts 
before the district court were, for the most part, undisputed. Thus, the 
district court panel was not called upon to make credibility 
determinations or to make findings on disputed facts that would later be 
subject to review for clear error only. See Heins v. Ruti-Sweetwater, Inc. 
(InreRuti-Sweetwater, Inc.), 836 F.2d 1263, 1266 (10th Cir. 1988). The 
panel's legal Conclusions are subject to de novo review, see id., which we 
have done. Third, this case presents the very unusual situation that Judge 
Brett did not act alone, but rather as one member of a three-Judge panel 
that ruled unanimously on the issues presented. Finally, we note that 
Judge Brett's uncle did not act alone, either, but rather as one member of 
a five-Judge court. 
[182] Keeping these pertinent facts in mind, we consider the risks that may 
attend reviewing the panel's rulings on the merits, rather than vacating 
the district court's orders to permit an entirely new proceeding, untainted 
by the conflict. First, reviewing the district court's decisions as they 
now stand would not create an injustice to the State; vacating the 
decisions and remanding for new proceedings that would be largely 
duplicative of those before us, however, would, if anything, increase the 
risk of injury to petitioners by delaying even longer any federal 
consideration of their constitutional claims. Second, reviewing the 
present decisions carries little or no risk of injustice in other cases 
because our application of harmless error is unique to the procedural 
posture of these cases. See Poloroid Corp., 867 F.2d at 1420. Finally, we 
do not think our review of the panel's decisions will undermine the 
public's confidence in the judicial process under the circumstances here. 
Rather, our determination that a violation has occurred and our order that 
Judge Brett should recuse himself from all further proceedings involving 
these cases, should instill confidence in the judiciary. See Parker, 855 
F.2dat l527. 
[183] Therefore, we conclude that the proper remedy for Judge Brett's 
violations of 455 is to review the previous rulings of the three-Judge 
Research Scarth, Dent & Whiteley PC Page 49 of 59 
district court panel on the merits, but to direct Judge Brett to recuse 
himself from all further proceedings relating to these matters on remand, 
including any individual hearings that may be necessary. See, e.g., supra 
(slip op.) at pp. 53-54. 
[184] B Attorney Fees 
[185] In the district court, counsel for petitioners sought an award of attorney 
fees and expenses for work performed through April 30, 1993, and for 
monthly payments thereafter, on the ground that petitioners were 
prevailing parties under 42 U.S.C. 1988. R., Doc. 142. Section 1988 
provides in pertinent part that "in any action or proceeding to enforce a 
provision of sections 1981, 1981a, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this 
title, . . . the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other 
than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." 
Counsel subsequently sought an award of fees for prosecuting the fee 
application, as well. R., Doc. 176. 
[186] The district court denied both motions by order entered June 29, 1993. 
Id., Doc. 210. The court determined that the fee application was 
premature because the court had bifurcated the 1983 claims from the 
habeas claims and had yet to address petitioners' 1983 claims, which 
formed the predicate for an award of fees under 1988. Id. at 3, 7. The 
court ruled that "any attorneys fees claimed as [a] prevailing party under 
the 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims must await another day." Id. at 8. 
[187] The district court subsequently denied counsel's motion to reconsider the 
denial of fees. The court indicated that the award of any fees beyond 
those counsel already was receiving pursuant to his appointment under 
the Criminal Justice Act was premature, regardless of whether the fees 
were sought pursuant to 1988 or pursuant to the language in Hill v. 
Reynolds, 942 F.2d at 1498, suggesting that an appropriate remedy for 
any constitutional deprivations might include "assessment against the 
state of costs and possibly even attorneys' fees." R., Doc. 233 at 2-3. The 
court noted that it had yet to enter any remedy of which attorney fees 
might be an appropriate part. Id. at 3. 
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[188] "We review [a] district court's award of attorney fees for an abuse of 
discretion. Underlying factual findings will only be upset when clearly 
erroneous. However, a district court's statutory interpretation or legal 
analysis which provides the basis for the fee award is reviewable de 
novo." Homeward Bound, Inc. v. Hissom Memorial Ctr., 963 F.2d 1352, 
1355 (10th Cir. 1992). 
[189] The district court's rulings did not preclude the possibility that petitioners 
and their counsel may be entitled to an award of fees against the State in 
the future. Rather, the court ruled only that the present request for fees 
was premature. The district court did not err in so ruling. 
[190] Only after the district court conducts the analyses of petitioners' due 
process and equal protection claims that we have directed on remand can 
it enter appropriate remedies for petitioners' habeas claims. At that time, 
as indicated by our directions in Hill, 942 F.2d at 1498, the district court 
may consider whether the assessment of fees against the State would be 
an appropriate part of any remedy. But see Kennedy v. Shillinger, 971 
F.2d 558, 562 (10th Cir.)(reversing an award of fees against the State in a 
habeas proceeding on the ground that the State's conduct in that action 
did not "justify a sanction of this sort"), cert, denied, 121 L. Ed. 2d 556, 
113 S. Ct. 623 (1992). Likewise, when the district court ultimately 
addresses petitioners' civil rights claims, it may then consider whether 
petitioners are entitled to fees as prevailing parties under 42 U.S.C. 1988. 
For the time being, we agree with the district court that the application 
for attorney fees is premature. 
[191] IV. CONCLUSION 
[192] The orders and judgments of the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Oklahoma are AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED 
IN PART, and the matter is REMANDED for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
[193] Disposition 
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[ 194] AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, and REMANDED 
Opinion Footnotes 
[195] —- The Public Defender is the predecessor in interest to the Oklahoma 
Indigent Defense System (OIDS), which came into being in July 1991. 
We will refer to both as the Public Defender. 
[196] — • The Public Defender's fiscal year runs from July 1 of the named year 
through June 30 of the following calendar year. 
[197] — Judge Lumpkin, the Presiding Judge of the Oklahoma Court of 
Criminal Appeals, testified that the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals 
decided that granting extensions of time to the Public Defender was 
preferable to the alternative of reviewing appeals without the benefit of 
briefs on behalf of the appellants. He explained that, under the court's 
rules, if a case were submitted with no brief, it would be reviewed for 
fundamental error only. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals 
thought that reviewing cases without the benefit of briefs from the Public 
Defender would likely lead to the indigent appellants filing motions for 
post-conviction relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel. Because 
granting a new appeal on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel 
would only send the indigent appellant back to the bottom of the pile at 
the Public Defender's Office, the court determined that the indigent 
appellants would best be served by waiting for the Public Defender to file 
its briefs, however tardy. Apparently neither the Public Defender nor the 
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals considered releasing the indigent 
appellants pending resolution of their appeals. 
[198] *ft" The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals attempted to remedy the 
problem indirectly by repeatedly asking the legislature to provide more 
funds. 
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[199] — The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has jurisdiction over all 
criminal appeals in Oklahoma. Every person convicted of a crime in 
Oklahoma has an appeal as of right to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal 
Appeals, which is the only appellate court in the state that hears criminal 
matters. There is no intermediate court and the Oklahoma Supreme Court 
hears only civil matters. Five Judges make up the Oklahoma Court of 
Criminal Appeals. Decisions are circulated to all five Judges for 
signature, and cannot be issued until at least three of the five Judges 
concur. 
[200] — The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals' fiscal year runs from July 
1 of the previous calendar year through June 30 of the year stated. In later 
documentation submitted to the district court, the number of pending 
cases at the end of FY 1990 was reported to be 1,533. 
[201 ] —- The district court subsequently bifurcated petitioners' habeas and 
1983 claims. We review only the habeas claims in this opinion. 
[202] ™ The period of 11.7 months was based on the median time, from notice 
of appeal to decision, required by the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Tenth Circuit to adjudicate criminal appeals in 1991. , 
[203] — When a petitioner has been granted an appeal out of time, the length 
of the appellate process should be measured from the entry of that order, 
unless, of course, delay in perfecting the appeal in the first instance is 
attributable to the State. 
[204] We modify the district court's ruling only in one particular. We use 
the two year period only to presume excessive delay, and not to presume 
the ultimate issue of unconstitutionality. To reach that ultimate issue, the 
other prongs of the Barker test also must be addressed. 
^•fr»i -j 
[205] The district court arrived at the two-year period by taking into 
account the following time periods permitted for each stage of the appeal 
under the Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, plus 
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reasonable extensions: three (previously six) months to prepare the 
transcript and record, per Rule 2.3A(2), plus one extension not to exceed 
sixty days; sixty days to file appellant's brief, per Rule 3.4B, plus one 
extension not to exceed sixty days; sixty days to file appellee's brief, per 
Rule 3.4C, plus one extension not to exceed sixty days; and the 
remainder of the time, consisting of eleven months, to hear and decide 
the appeal. R., Doc. 143 at 21-22; id., Doc. 255 at 7-8. The district court 
suggested that delay beyond any of these individual interim times might 
also create a presumption of inordinate delay that would be subject to 
redress through habeas corpus. See id., Doc. 143 at 23-24; id., Doc. 255 
at 8-9. While we understand the district court's reluctance to require a 
petitioner whose direct criminal appeal has not progressed in a timely 
fashion to wait two full years before coming to federal court to seek 
redress, we think treating each component of the two-year period as a 
separate presumptive period is ill-advised and would open the federal 
courts to an unnecessary flood of litigation. Instead, we think the better 
practice is to recognize that the two-year presumptive period is neither 
absolute nor inflexible. For example, if unique circumstances dictate the 
need for a shorter adjudication time, the petitioner may establish that a 
delay of less than two years is inordinate under the circumstances. 
Similarly, if a substantial amount of time has passed and it appears a 
petitioner's direct criminal appeal cannot realistically be completed 
within the two-year period because of inordinate delay in the early stages 
of the appellate process, the petitioner may seek redress in federal court 
before the full two years has elapsed. 
[206] —~ We have searched, with little success, for appellate standards from 
other jurisdictions to guide us in our analysis of petitioners' claims of 
appellate delay. We note that the Standards Relating to Appellate Delay 
Reduction, which were established by the Appellate Delay Reduction 
Committee of the Appellate Judges Conference of the American Bar 
Association in 1988, provide that all appeals, whether civil or criminal, 
should be decided within 280 days from the filing of the notice of appeal. 
See Rita M. Novak & Douglas K. Somerlot, American Bar Ass'n, Delay 
on Appeal App. F at 187, 214 (1990). 
The ABA standards, which are significantly shorter than the two-year 
presumption we have created, have been widely criticized as unrealistic, 
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e.g., Honorable Carl West Anderson, Are the American Bar Association's 
Time Standards Relevant for California Courts of Appeal?, 27 U.S.F.L. 
Rev. 301, 307, 351 (1993); Roger Hanson et al., National Center for State 
Courts, Time on Appeal: Beyond Conjecture 3 (1993), and no court has 
formally adopted them without modification, Anderson, supra at 359. 
Only a handful of state courts have adopted appellate time standards, and 
the time standards adopted vary widely. For instance, a delay reduction 
team in the First Appellate District of the California Court of Appeals has 
proposed the following standards: for appeals from criminal cases that 
were disposed of before a trial, the court should process fifty percent of 
the appeals within 185 days and ninety percent of the appeals within 305 
days; and for appeals from criminal cases that were disposed of after a 
trial, the court should process fifty percent of the appeals within 305 days 
and ninety percent of the appeals within 475 days. Id. at 359, App. H-3. 
Justice Anderson's "comprehensive search of state appellate rules" 
revealed that the following standards have been formally adopted by state 
courts: Florida: "decision within 180 days of oral argument;" Maryland: 
"decision within 130 days of appeal for jointly-elected, expedited 
appeals;" New Mexico: "decision within 10 months of appeal." Id. at 351 
n.191. Wisconsin has adopted an internal operating procedure providing 
that "the average time for rendering a decision should not exceed 40 
days, and the maximum time for any case, except one of extraordinary 
complexity, should not exceed 70 days." Court of Appeals of Wisconsin 
Internal Operating Procedure VI(4)(h). Idaho and Virginia have 
informally adopted the following appellate standards: Idaho: "written but 
unpublished administrative goal to decide appeals within 418 to 508 
days;" Virginia: administrative goal of decision within 210-295 days of 
appeal, "depending upon whether a transcript must be prepared and/or the 
opinion is to be published." Anderson, supra at 351 n.191. There do not 
appear to be clear remedies for the appellant if any of these time 
standards are not met. 
[207] In her March23, 1992, comments on data submitted by petitioners to 
the district court, the Attorney General conceded that 
whether the delay and backlog are the result of understaffmg and 
underfunding or whether the delay is the result of possible 
mismanagement of the internal operations and allocation of resources 
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within the [Public Defender] agency, the result is still the same, that the 
reason for the delay is attributable to [the Public Defender] and not to the 
Petitioner. R., Doc. 29 at 9. 
[208] The State did offer an alternative reason for the delay in adjudicating 
petitioner Doyle King's appeal, which was at issue and pending before 
the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals for almost seven years without 
resolution. The State explained that a majority of the members of the 
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals could not reach agreement on the 
Disposition of the case. R., Doc. 143 at 29; Tr. 4/9/93 at 57. While we 
appreciate the court's dilemma, its deadlock did not justify the lengthy 
delay in adjudicating King's appeal. 
[209] ^ ^ In Rheuark v. Shaw, 628 F.2d at 303 n. 8, the Fifth Circuit gave the 
following example of delay impairing the grounds for appeal. The 
passage of time made it more difficult for the court reporter to read and 
transcribe the notes of the trial he had taken. As a result, he omitted 
defense counsel's oral motion for a mistrial. On appeal, the state court 
refused to rule on an issue because the record did not reflect any motion 
for mistrial. Id. Although such examples of delay affecting the appeal 
may exist, they are rare; a petitioner is more likely to be able to establish 
that delay has impaired the grounds for defense in the event of retrial. 
Therefore, our Discussion focuses on this latter type of prejudice rather 
than impairment of the grounds for the appeal itself 
[210] In determining the issue of prejudice, the federal district court need 
only address the colorability of the underlying claim and is not required 
to rule on the merits of the underlying claim. 
[211] We recognize that the length of sentence imposed may affect not 
only when a petitioner is subject to release, but the quality of a 
petitioner's incarceration prior to release. Cf. Burkett II, 951 F.2d at 1443 
(acknowledging that prejudice may arise from excessive delay that 
affects the quality of a petitioner's incarceration). Therefore, a petitioner 
might justifiably suffer anxiety if, for example, he or she had a colorable 
claim warranting a reduction in sentence that, though not enough to make 
the petitioner eligible for release before the Conclusion of the appeal, was 
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sufficient to affect the quality of the petitioner's incarceration by making 
the petitioner eligible for a lower level of security or for rehabilitative 
programs. See Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 439, 37 L. Ed. 2d 
56, 93 S. Ct. 2260 (1973)(recogmzing that "the prospect of 
rehabilitation" may be adversely affected by delay); Burkett II, 951 F.2d 
at 1443 (finding merit in petitioner's claim that sentencing delay kept him 
in county jail, where he could not avail himself of rehabilitative programs 
that would have been available in the state penitentiary). 
[212] *^^ Petitioners contend that the district court's due process rulings are 
insufficient in several other respects. Based on language in Harris I, 938 
F.2d at 1071, petitioners assert that the district court should have made 
findings about how much time the Public Defender can be expected to 
require in the future to file appellate briefs, as well as the specific reasons 
for the past delay in filing appellate briefs. Neither of these findings was 
necessary to the district court's analysis of petitioners' habeas claims, 
however, and neither is necessary to our review. The remainder of 
petitioners' challenges to the district court's due process rulings merit no 
independent Discussion. 
[213] * M ? Of course, if the State has decided the appeal and affirmed, the 
State's decision will be conclusive on any state claims. If the federal 
claims were properly presented in the state proceeding, however, they 
can then be regarded as exhausted, enabling the federal court to consider 
them on the merits in the habeas action. 
[214] As of August 13, 1993, 217 criminal appeals by Harris group 
petitioners were still pending before the Oklahoma Court of Criminal 
Appeals. 
[215] If the claims at issue in the direct appeal concern only the length of 
the petitioner's sentence, then release will be available only after the 
petitioner has served the uncontested portion of his or her sentence. 
Furthermore, if the petitioner is serving or has yet to serve another 
sentence that has not been challenged, "release" from the conviction and 
sentence being challenged will not actually set the petitioner free. 
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[216] For example, if the briefs have not yet been filed, good cause may 
exist to give the State more than sixty days to decide the appeal. We note, 
however, that the district court found in its order of September 8, 1993: 
that a brief had been filed on behalf of all but one of the petitioners in 
their respective direct criminal appeals. R., Doc. 255 at 4. 
[217] Of course, it will not be necessary to provide the State a time to cure 
if the due process violation is incurable. 
[218] In Harris I, 938 F.2d at 1071, we addressed other remedies that may 
be appropriate depending on the particular circumstances of the case. 
[219] - An intermediate level of review exists for "'quasi-suspect' 
classifications based on characteristics beyond an individual's control, 
such as gender, illegitimacy, and alienage." Oklahoma Edue. Ass'n, 889 
F.2d at 932. 
[220] —- Petitioners' claims for ineffective assistance of counsel relate only to 
briefing delays and are distinct from their due process claims, which 
relate to delays in the entire appellate process. Although the eventual 
filing of an appellate brief ends a petitioner's ability to obtain habeas 
relief on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim arising from delay in 
briefing the appeal, it does not end a petitioner's ability to obtain habeas 
relief on a due process claim arising from delay in the entire appellate 
process. So long as a petitioner's appeal remains undecided, the petitioner 
may still obtain habeas relief for a due process violation even if counsel 
has filed a brief on the petitioner's behalf. See supra (slip op.) at pp. 56-
57. 
[221 ] — z On December 27, 1993, the district court dismissed Judge Brett's 
uncle from this habeas action because he is not the custodian of any 
petitioner. See Mackey v. Gonzalez, 662 F.2d 712, 713 (11th Cir. 1981). 
The district court also dismissed the 1983 claims against Judge Brett's 
uncle on the ground that he is absolutely immune from damages liability. 
See Snell v. Tunnell, 920 F.2d 673, 686 (10th Cir. 1990), cert, denied, 
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499 U.S. 976, 113 L.Ed. 2d 719, 111 S. Ct. 1622(1991). 
[222] Further, on remand Judge Brett should recuse himself from all cases 
consolidated in this appeal. Thus, he will be removed from the ultimate 
Disposition of petitioners' claims. 
[223] In deciding whether to vacate the panel's previous rulings, we cannot 
simply pick and choose among the panel's findings and Conclusions, as 
petitioners would have us do. Either we will vacate all the rulings, or 
none of them. 
[224] *MQ The parties did not designate the motion to reconsider as part of the 
record on appeal. 
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Amendments to the United States Constitution. 
Amendment IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 
be seized. 
Amendment VI 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by 
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his 
defense. 
Amendment 14 
(Ratified July 9, 1868) 
Section 1. All persons bom or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.. 
Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States 
according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in 
each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any 
election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United 
States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a 
State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male 
inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the 
United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or 
GO 
other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion 
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male 
citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector 
of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the 
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a 
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of 
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to 
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection 
or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof But 
Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability. 
Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by 
law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services 
in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the 
United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred 
in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the 
loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims 
shall be held illegal and void. 
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, 
the provision of this article. 
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Article I, Section 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in 
person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against 
him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the 
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of 
witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the 
county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the 
right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before final 
judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein 
guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a 
wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his 
wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the 
function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause exists 
unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the 
use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in part at 
any preliminary examination to determine probable cause or at any pretrial 
proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is 
allowed as defined by statute or rule. 
No History for Constitution 
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78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to 
ssue all writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
nterlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings 
)f state agencies or appeals from the district court review of informal adjudicative 
proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax 
Commission, School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of 
Forestry, Fire and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive director of the 
Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state 
engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the state or 
)ther local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except those 
nvolving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a 
conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons 
who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, except petitions 
constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first degree or 
capital felony; 
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the 
lecisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first 
legree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but 
lot limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, support, parent-
ime, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four 
udges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate review 
ind determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has original 
.*. ^ x v / \ * w K-rWULV^ir I KJ-jLtli.--} Fage J. oz i 
appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, 
Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative 
proceedings. 
Amended by Chapter 302, 2001 General Session 
Amended by Chapter 255, 2001 General Session 
Download Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 78_03004.ZIP 3,120 Bytes 
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76-5-104. Consensual altercation. 
In any prosecution for criminal homicide under Part 2 of this chapter or assault, 
it is no defense to the prosecution that the defendant was a party to any duel, mutual 
combat, or other consensual altercation if during the course of the duel, combat, or 
altercation any dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 was used or if the 
defendant was engaged in an ultimate fighting match as defined in Section 76-9-
705. 
Amended by Chapter 83, 1997 General Session 
Download Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 76 05012.ZIP 1,953 Bytes 
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Last revised: Thursday, July 12, 2001 
G5-
W LU4.1 '^•X-TVJ.V/ U V V U U i l / k J _ ^ ^ C l ~ l V / / rage i 01 1 
78-35a-107. Statute of limitations for post-conviction relief. 
(1) A petitioner is entitled to relief only if the petition is filed within one year 
after the cause of action has accrued. 
(2) For purposes of this section, the cause of action accrues on the latest of the 
following dates: 
(a) the last day for filing an appeal from the entry of the final judgment of 
conviction, if no appeal is taken; 
(b) the entry of the decision of the appellate court which has jurisdiction over the 
case, if an appeal is taken; 
(c) the last day for filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the Utah Supreme 
Court or the United States Supreme Court, if no petition for writ of certiorari is 
filed; 
(d) the entry of the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari or the entry of the 
decision on the petition for certiorari review, if a petition for writ of certiorari is 
filed; or 
(e) the date on which petitioner knew or should have known, in the exercise of 
reasonable diligence, of evidentiary facts on which the petition is based. 
(3) If the court finds that the interests of justice require, a court may excuse a 
petitioner's failure to file within the time limitations. 
(4) Sections 78-12-35 and 78-12-40 do not extend the limitations period 
established in this section. 
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 235, 1996 General Session 
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58-3-11. Rules of construction as to words and phrases. Words and phrases are 
to be construed according to the context and the approved usage of the language; 
but technical words and phrases, and such others as have acquired a peculiar and 
appropriate meaning in law, or are defined by statute, are to be construed according 
:o such peculiar and appropriate meaning or definition. 
^o Change Since 1953 
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Rule 11. The record on appeal. 
(a) Composition of the record on appeal. The original papers and exhibits filed in 
the trial court, the transcript of proceedings, if any, the index prepared by the clerk 
of the trial court, and the docket sheet, shall constitute the record on appeal in all 
cases. A copy of the record certified by the clerk of the trial court to conform to the 
original may be substituted for the original as the record on appeal. Only those 
papers prescribed under paragraph (d) of this rule shall be transmitted to the 
appellate court. 
(b) Pagination and indexing of record. 
(1) Immediately upon filing of the notice of appeal, the clerk of the trial court shall 
securely fasten the record in a trial court case file, with collation in the following 
order: 
(A) the index prepared by the clerk; 
(B) the docket sheet; 
(C) all original papers in chronological order; 
(D) all published depositions in chronological order; 
(E) all transcripts prepared for appeal in chronological order; and 
(F) a list of all exhibits offered in the proceeding 
(2) (A) The clerk shall mark the bottom right corner of ever}' page of the collated 
index, docket sheet, and all original papers as well as the cover page only of all 
published depositions and the cover page only of each volume of transcripts 
constituting the record with a sequential number using one series of numerals for 
the entire record. 
— (B) If a supplemental record is forwarded to the appellate court, the clerk shall 
collate the papers, depositions, and transcripts of the supplemental record in the 
same order as the original record and mark the bottom right corner of each page of 
the collated original papers as well as the cover page only of all published 
depositions and the cover page only of each volume of transcripts constituting the 
supplemental record with a sequential number beginning with the number next 
LOT) Aaa**^J^.-W fti^d 
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following the number of the last page of the original record. 
3) The clerk shall prepare a chronological index of the record. The index shall 
:ontain a reference to the date on which the paper, deposition or transcript was filed 
in the trial court and the starting page of the record on which the paper, deposition 
:>r transcript will be found. 
'4) Clerks of the trial and appellate courts shall establish rules and procedures for 
checking out the record after pagination for use by the parties in preparing briefs for 
m appeal or in preparing or briefing a petition for writ of certiorari. 
c) Duty of appellant. After filing the notice of appeal, the appellant, or in the event 
hat more than one appeal is taken, each appellant, shall comply with the provisions 
)f paragraphs (d) and (e) of this rule and shall take any other action necessary to 
enable the clerk of the trial court to assemble and transmit the record. A single 
ecord shall be transmitted. 
d) Papers on appeal. 
1) Criminal cases. All of the papers in a criminal case shall be included by the 
lerk of the trial court as part of the record on appeal. 
2) Civil cases. In all civil cases, the papers to be transmitted shall consist of the 
bllowing. 
A) Civil cases with short records. In civil cases where all the papers, excluding any 
ranscripts, total fewer than 300 pages, all of the papers will be transmitted to the 
ippellate court upon completion of the filing of briefs. In such cases, the appellant 
hall serve upon the clerk of the trial court, simultaneously with the filing of 
ippellant's reply brief, notice of the date on which appellant's reply brief was filed, 
f appellant does not intend to file a reply brief, appellant shall notify the clerk of 
he trial court of that fact within 30 days of the filing of appellee's brief. 
B) All other civil cases. In all other civil cases where the papers, excluding any 
ranscripts, are or exceed 300 pages, all parties shall file with the clerk of the trial 
ourt, within 10 days after briefing is completed, a joint or separate designation of 
iiose papers referred to in their respective briefs. Only those designated papers and 
ie following, to the extent applicable, shall be transmitted to the clerk of the 
ppellate court by the clerk of the trial court: 
(i) the pleadings as defined in Rule 7(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; 
(ii) the pretrial order, if any; 
(iii) the final judgment, order, or interlocutory order from which the appeal is taken; 
(iv) other orders sought to be reviewed, if any; 
(v) any supporting opinion, findings of fact or conclusions of law filed or delivered 
by the trial court; 
(vi) the motion, response, and accompanying memoranda upon which the court 
rendered judgment, if any; 
(vii) jury instructions given, if any; 
(viii) jury verdicts and interrogatories, if any; 
(ix)the notice of appeal. 
(3) Agency cases. Where all papers in the agency record total fewer than 300 pages, 
the agency shall transmit all papers to the appellate court. Where all papers in the 
agency record total 300 or more pages, the parties shall, within 10 days after 
briefing is completed, file with the agency a joint or separate designation of those 
papers necessary to the appeal. The agency shall transmit those designated papers to 
the appellate court. Instead of filing all papers or designated papers, the agency 
may, with the approval of the court, file only the chronological index of the record 
or of such parts of the record as the parties may designate. All parts of the record 
retained by the agency shall be considered part of the record on review for all 
purposes. 
(e) The transcript of proceedings; duty of appellant to order; notice to appellee if 
partial transcript is ordered. 
(1) Request for transcript; time for filing. Within 10 days after filing the notice of 
appeal, the appellant shall request from the court executive a transcript of such parts 
of the proceedings not already on file as the appellant deems necessary. The request 
shall be in writing and shall state that the transcript is needed for purposes of an 
appeal. Within the same period, a copy shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court 
and the clerk of the appellate court. If the appellant desires a transcript in a 
.uie 11 rage 4 or 3 
ompressed format, appellant shall include the request for a compressed format 
vithin the request for transcript. If no such parts of the proceedings are to be 
equested, within the same period the appellant shall file a certificate to that effect 
vith the clerk of the trial court and a copy with the clerk of the appellate court. 
2) Transcript required of all evidence regarding challenged finding or conclusion. 
f the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding or conclusion is unsupported 
•y or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant shall include in the record a 
ranscript of all evidence relevant to such finding or conclusion. Neither the court 
lor the appellee is obligated to correct appellant's deficiencies in providing the 
elevant portions of the transcript. 
3) Statement of issues; cross-designation by appellee. Unless the entire transcript is 
3 be included, the appellant shall, within 10 days after filing the notice of appeal, 
ile a statement of the issues that will be presented on appeal and shall serve on the 
ppellee a copy of the request or certificate and a copy of the statement. If the 
ppellee deems a transcript of other parts of the proceedings to be necessary, the 
ppellee shall, within 10 days after the service of the request or certificate and the 
tatement of the appellant, file and serve on the appellant a designation of additional 
iarts to be included. Unless within 10 days after service of such designation the 
ppellant has requested such parts and has so notified the appellee, the appellee may 
vithin the following 10 days either request the parts or move in the trial court for an 
rder requiring the appellant to do so. 
f) Agreed statement as the record on appeal. In lieu of the record on appeal as 
lefined in paragraph (a) of this rule, the parties may prepare and sign a statement of 
tie case, snowing how the issues presented by the appeal arose and were decided in 
le trial court and setting forth only so many of the facts averred and proved or 
ought to be proved as are essential to a decision of the issues presented. If the 
tatement conforms to the truth, it, together with such additions as the trial court 
lay consider necessary fully to present the issues raised by the appeal, shall be 
pproved by the trial court. The clerk of the trial court shall transmit the statement 
3 the clerk of the appellate court within the time prescribed by Rule 12(b)(2). The 
lerk of the trial court shall transmit the index of the record to the clerk of the 
ppellate court upon approval of the statement by the trial court. 
g) Statement of evidence or proceedings when no report was made or when 
anscript is unavailable. If no report of the evidence or proceedings at a hearing or 
ial was made, or if a transcript is unavailable, or if the appellant is impecunious 
-*T i 
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and unable to afford a transcript in a civil case, the appellant may prepare a 
statement of the evidence or proceedings from the best available means, including 
recollection. The statement shall be served on the appellee, who may serve 
objections or propose amendments within 10 days after service. The statement and 
any objections or proposed amendments shall be submitted to the trial court for 
settlement and approval and, as settled and approved, shall be included by the clerk 
of the trial court in the record on appeal. 
(h) Correction or modification of the record. If any difference arises as to whether 
the record truly discloses what occurred in the trial court, the difference shall be 
submitted to and settled by that court and the record made to conform to the truth. If 
anything material to either party is omitted from the record by error or accident or is 
misstated, the parties by stipulation, the trial court, or the appellate court, either 
before or after the record is transmitted, may direct that the omission or 
misstatement be corrected and if necessary that a supplemental record be certified 
and transmitted. The moving party, or the court if it is acting on its own initiative, 
shall serve on the parties a statement of the proposed changes. Within 10 days after 
service, any party may serve objections to the proposed changes. All other 
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1 THE COURT: And still based upon that, you are 
2 telling me that you want to waive your right to be 
3 sentenced during that period of time provided by law and 
4 have the Court proceed now? Is that right, sir? 
5 MR. FRAUSTO: Yes. 
6 THE COURT: The record should reflect that the 
7 defendant, Mr. Richard Andrew Frausto, appears to this 
8 court as he has throughout the entirety of this trial to be 
9 in full command of all of his faculties. He is clearly a 
10 reasonable and intelligent individual. I have watched him 
11 testify here in court and have seen him ably deal with this 
12 situation. I find that that is a full and voluntary waiver 
13 of the statutory time for the imposition of sentence. 
14 With respect to the imposition of sentence, 
15 Mr. Wright, I will hear you in mitigation. 
16 MR. WRIGHT: Well, Your Honor, I — I know that 
17 the standard sought is that when a jury finds him guilty, 
18 that that's it. That there's no argument. But, Your 
19 Honor, I think that there is substantial evidence in this 
20 case that suggests that there was a self-defense. While 
21 apparently the jury has neglected that, I'm concerned about 
22 some of the questions that the jury expressed to us. 
23 Questions that we were unable to respond to before the — 
24 before the jury came back. And I frankly think that there 
25 is sufficient evidence to indicate that this man was — who 
71 
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1 is a man with a family whom he dearly loves — and the 
2 Court, I think, has seen occasions in the statements that 
3 were given and his demeanor, that the utmost concern was 
4 his family many times during this trial. And it seems to 
5 me, Your Honor, that with the very strong evidence that 
6 there was — even though it may not have impressed the 
7 jury — that there was very strong evidence that this was, 
8 in fact, a self-defense. That it was not an intentional 
9 ambush, as was so graphically explained during this trial. 
10 Which just is not logical. I think there should be some 
11 kind of — of mercy. 
12 I would suggest, Your Honor, at the very most, 
13 that there should be a ninety-day evaluation. 
14 THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel. 
15 Mr. Langston, on behalf of the State? 
16 MR. LANGSTON: Your Honor, the jury has spoken. 
17 We're talking about a first-degree felony, with a minimum 
18 mandatory consecutive time for the firearms enhancement. I 
19 think a ninety-day evaluation would not really help 
20 anyone. He has expressed a desire to be sentenced today 
21 right now, and a ninety-day evaluation would simply put 
22 that off. And that would go, I believe, against his 
23 wishes. That is not a sentencing. And we think that he — 
24 the Court should concede to his requests and sentence him 
25 as the Court has indicated it intends to do to a period of 
/J 
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1 time in prison for five years to life, with the enhancement 
2 of one to five for the firearms enhancement. And we would 
3 ask that the Court follow that indication and sentence 
4 Mr. Frausto accordingly. 
5 THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel. 
6 Mr. Wright, anything in addition? 
7 MR. WRIGHT: No, Your Honor. I've said 
8 everything I can say. 
9 THE COURT: Thank you. 
10 Mr. Frausto, would you stand, please. 
11 Mr. Richard Andrew Frausto, it is the sentence of this 
12 court that you be committed to the Division of Corrections 
13 in the state of Utah to be imprisoned in the Utah State 
14 Prison for a period of time not less than five years nor 
15 more than your natural life. No fine is imposed. 
16 It is the further sentence of this court that 
17 the Court, finding the enhancement provisions by use of a 
18 firearm in the commission of this offense, that the 
19 applicability of 76-3-203(1) is appropriate — the Court 
20 sentences you to an additional consecutive one year, 
21 consecutive to the initial five years. And the Court, 
22 specificaly finding that it is the intention of the 
23 legislature of the State of Utah and of the people of the 
24 State of Utah having spoken through their legislature that 
25 those who use firearms in the commission of crimes shall be 
7<c 
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punished accordingly, it is the Court's additional sentence 
that additionally to the consecutive one year as provided 
for in 76-3-203, that an additional indeterminate term of 
five years be imposed again consecutively to the initial 
sentence of five to life. 
With respect to restitution, the Court shall 
order that the defendant pay restitution in an amount 
equivalent to the costs of funeral expenses. And pursuant 
to the provisions of the Utah state law with respect to 
restitution, the Court specifically orders that that amount 
be doubled* The Court will provide for a hearing once 
notice of the funeral costs is submitted to the Court in 
order to challenge those costs if the defendant deems that 
appropriate* 
Anything else, Mr. Langston? 
MR. LANGSTON: I have nothing further. 
We will determine those costs and provide it to 
defense counsel. And then he if he wishes a hearing — 
THE COURT: Within 30 days of today's date, 
Counsel. 
MR. LANGSTON: We will do that. 
THE COURT: Mr. Wright, anything else? 
MR. WRIGHT: Nothing, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: That's the order. The Court stands 
in recess. y_ / 
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MR* WRIGHT: Your Honor, there is one other 
matter, I'm wondering if there is some way that 
Mr. Frausto could have a visit with his wife before he is 
sent up. He'd like to have a contact visit. Maybe just an 
hour or two. A very short duration. But he'd like to have 
that before he leaves. 
THE COURT: I'll encourage the sheriff's 
department to make that possible, in view of the 
precipitative decision on the part of Mr. Frausto to 
involve himself in a sentencing this quickly. However, I 
will not order it, because I leave the management of the 
jail to the sheriff's department. But I think that they 
could probably accommodate that. And I'd certainly 
encourage them to do so. 
MR. LANGSTON: Your Honor, we will get the 
judgment to the Court Monday. I think we could get it 
prepared by then. 
THE COURT: Counsel, I'll not be around. But 
you can contact me by phone and run it out to the house, if 
necessary. 
MR. LANGSTON: All right. 
THE COURT: Counsel, while we're on the record, 
the Court — and this is for the purposes of the record — 
in response to what has been marked as Court's Exhibit 




inquiry from the jury as Court's Exhibit No. 2. That will 
go in the file. 
The Court also# at the agreement of counsel, 
prepared what was going to be given as a supplemental 
instruction prior to the time that the jury came back with 
a verdict and before we could answer the question in 
Exhibit No. 2 — Court's Exhibit No. 2. Those will be 
placed in the file. 
MR. LANGSTON: Okay. 
THE COURT: Thank you, gentlemen. Good 
evening. 
(Whereupon the proceedings in the above-entitled 
matter were concluded at 8:59 P.M.) 
?? 





STATE OF UTAH 
C E R T I F I C A T E 
) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON ) 
I, PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR, an Official Court 
Reporter in and for the Fifth Judicial District, state of 
Utah, do hereby certify: 
That the foregoing matter, to wit, STATE OF UTAH 
VS. RICHARD ANDREW FRAUSTO, CRIMINAL NO. 921500702, was 
taken down by me in shorthand at the time and place therein 
named and thereafter reduced to computerized transcription 
under my direction. 
I further testify that I am not interested in 
the event of the action. 
WITNESS my hand and seal this 24th day of 
February, 1993. 
?A«JL G. MOfULLIN, CSR/RPR 
RESIDING AT: St. George, Utah 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: 6-17-95 
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January 28, 1993 
Ai^f (A J 
J MACMn'HUH vVR M 
JONATHAN » WRICH 
- AL^C LirENSf "> ^ f 
Wayne A. Freestoi*e 
David J, Angerhofer 
Contract Attorneys 
50 West 300 South, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Gentlemen: 
In reply to your letter of January 25, 199 3, the answer is, I hav 
filed a Notice of Appeal and filed the Request for Transcript• 
However, I will not be handling the appeal for Mr. Frausto, Becaus 
of some statements he made in his latest letter to me concern:m 
what issues he thinks should be the basis of an appeal, I believe i 
would be inappropriate for me to handle the appeal* Consequently 
I'm in the process of arranging for someone else, probably Mr 
Michael Miller, to do it for him. 
J. MacArthur Wright 
JMW/lq 
3H Wtl 
WAYNE A. FREESTONE 
DAVID J. ANGERHOFER 
CONTRACT ATTORNEYS 
50 West 300 South, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801) 322-1503 
(801) 363-0844 
M E M O R A N D U M 
TO: Richard Frausto USP #17886 
DATE: February 1. 1993 
RE: REQUlSSTEt) LEGAlr'SfetfnrCBS-
Enclosed please find a copy of the letter we received 





Judith M, Billings 
Presiding Judge 
Leonard H. Russon 
Associate Presiding Judge 
Russell W. Bench 
Judge 
Regnal W. Garff 
Judge 
Pamela T. Greenwood 
Judge 
Norman H. Jackson 
Judge 
Gregory K. Orme 
Judge 
®tai) Court of appeals 
230 South 500 East, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Clerks' Office 801 -578*3950 
Administration 801-578-3900 
Fax 801-578-3999 
February 1, 1994 
Mary T. Noon an 
Clerk of the Court 
Richard A. Frausto 
Iron County/Utah State Correctional Facility 
2136 North Main 
Ceda r - e r t y ,- UT~ ^nj^--
In Re: 
S t a t e of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Richard Andrew Frausto, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 930357-CA 
Dear Mr. Frausto: 
In response to your letter of January 25, 1994, received 
January 31, 1994, our records do not indicate an Anders brief 
having been filed for your appeal. 
Further, our records indicate you are represented by 
counsel as Mr. Michael L. Miller has not filed a notice of 
withdrawal. The Court will only consider documents on your 
behalf if they are filed by your attorney. It is unclear if 
counsel is aware of your sending a letter and suggest you 
discuss your intentions with your attorney. You must 
communicate through him regarding your appeal. ""' 
Your above letter has been forwarded to your attorney that 




cc: Michael L. Miller 
Jan Graham 36 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
Richard Andrew Frausto, 
Defendant and Appellant• 
Utah Court of Appeals 
APR 2 5 1334 
ORDER 
Case No* 930357-CA 
This matter is before the Court upon appellant's pro se 
request for appointment of substitute counsel, filed 7 March 
1994, and also upon the motion to supplement the record, filed 
by Michael L. Miller, counsel for appellant• Appellee's 
objection to the motion to supplement the record was filed 28 
March 1994. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the matter is temporarily 
remanded to the Fifth Judicial District Court for consideration 
of appellant's pro se request for appointment of counsel and 
for proceedings pursuant to Rule 11(f) or (g), Utah R. App. P, 
It is FURTHER ORDERED that upon disposition, the clerk of the 
trial court shall forward a copy of the court's order to the 
Utah Court of Appeals• 
Dated this day of April, 1994. 
BY THE COURT: 
9*. 
Gregory Ky^oriBeT^Judge ^r '&*$ /ja&M** P*[*A 
SplM-**?***-™ 
MICHAEL L. MILLER, Bar No. 4633 
Attorney for Defendant / Appellant 
32 East 100 South, Suite 203 
St- George, Utah 84770 
Telephone: (801) 628-7525 
IV5AR 1 8 1994 
•COURT Of APPEALS 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff / Appelleef 
vs. 
RICHARD ANDREW FRAUSTO, 
Defendant / Appellant, 
MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT RECORD 
Case No- 930357-CA 
District No- 921500702 
COMES NOW Defendant / Appellant, by and through counsel, and 
moves in the above-entitled court to supplement the record on 
appeal in this matter, pursuant to Rule 15, Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, and upon the following grounds. 
1- Counsel for Appellant was not his trial counsel- When 
Appellant counsel reviewed the transcript and spoke with trial 
counsel, it became apparent that the official transcript in this 
matter was missing a discussion between the court, and counsel for 
both parties- Counsel is informed and believes that this 
discussion concerned one of the jury instructions which the jury 
seemed to be having difficulty understanding, Instruction 13-C. 
2- Counsel then asked trial counsel for both parties to 
prepare an affidavit of what was discussed during regarding this 
instruction, which ultimately led to a Supplemental Instruction 
f3C\ 
being prepared, although never given• 
3. Defendant's trial counsel prepared his affidavit which is 
attached hereto as the proposed supplement to the record. The 
State's trial counsel did not prepare an affidavit, but ultimately 
read the affidavit of Defendant's counsel• 
4. Counsel next attempted to obtain a stipulation from the 
Attorney General's Office as to the supplementation of the record 
based upon the affidavit of Defendant's trial counsel. The 
Attorney General's office was not willing to agree to the proposed 
stipulation, and requested that counsel attempt to obtain the 
stipulation from the Washington County Attorney's office, who was 
trial counsel for the State• The Washington County Attorney's 
office declined to agree to the proposed stipulation, thus making 
this Motion the only course Appellant can pursue in order to 
insure that the record to be reviewed by this court is as full 
and complete as possible• 
WHEREFORE Appellant requests that the record on appeal be 
supplemented by the Affidavit of trial counsel; or that in the 
alternative, this Court order a remand to Fifth District Court for 
an evidentiary hearing on the subject matter of said affidavit. 
DATED this fC** day of March, 1994-
Michael L. Miller 
Attorney for Appellant 
(3$ ' 
9? 
?y># % tony 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and exact copy of the 
foregoing, postage prepaid, to: 
Jan Graham, Esq. 
Attorney General 
236 State Capital Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
DATED this /4*^ day of March, 1994• 
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COA Case: 921500702 FS 
FRAUSTO, RICHARD ANDREW State Felony 
Judge: JAMES L SHUMATE 
535 SOUTH 28 EAST 
IVINS UT 
<Sft&/-*">, % ^ 
large s 
Violation Date: 07/28/92 
1. MURDER 
Sev: Fl 
2. POSSESSION OF A DANGEROUS WEAPON 
Sev: F3 







1/11/92 Case filed from Circuit Court bindover. 
ARR scheduled for 8/19/92 at 9:00 A in room with JS 
ARR rescheduled to 8/12/92 at 8:58 A in room D with JLS 
** REFER TO HARD COPY - DELETED IN CIRCUIT COURT 
5/12/92 Fel Arraignment JUDGE: SHUMATE, JAMES L. 
TAPE: 920414 COUNT: 1050 
ATD: WRIGHT, J MACARTHUR ATP: LANGSTON, W BRENT 
Deft is present 
CUSTODY: County Sheriff 
Chrg: 76-5-203 Plea: Not Guilty 
Chrg: 76-10-503 Finding: Dismissed 
TO BE SET FOR 3-DAY JURY TRIAL IN 60-90 DAYS; REQUEST FOR 
APPOINTMENT OF INVESTIGATOR GRANTED WITH INITIAL CAP OF $2,000 
FILED: MOTION TO DISMISS COUNT II 
FILED: ORDER OF DISMISSAL ON COUNT II 
FILED: REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATOR 
FILED: AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT ON ARRAIGNMENT 
:/19/92 Judge ID changed from JS to JLS 
Notice of Set'ting" ""~'"""-' "~"',X~* S"1^ 
scheduled for 10/22/92 at 0900 A in room D with JLS 
scheduled for 10/07/92 at 0900 A in room D with JLS 
MOTION TO RELEASE EXHIBIT # 7 - FIREARM 
ORDER RELEASING EXHIBIT # 7 - FIREARM 
FILED: MOTION TO REQUIRE BALLISTICS TESTING 
FILED: ORDER REQUIRING BALLISTICS TESTING 
FILED: RECEIPT OF EXHIBIT # 7- FIREARM (DEP PAM HUMPHREYS) 
FILED: MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE OF TRIAL DATE 
FILED: MOTION FOR ADDITIONAL FUNDS FOR INVESTIGATOR 
FILED: NOTICE OF HEARING (10-7-92) 
/'07/92 Continuance JUDGE: SHUMATE, JAMES L. 
TAPE: 920493 COUNT: 0272 
Deft Present 
ATD: WRIGHT, J MACARTHUR ATP: LANGSTON, W BRENT 











































U D O C K E T , J Page 
TUESWft 
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT-ST GEORGE TUESWRY JANUARY 14, 199 
2:09 P 
Defendant Reference:921500702 COA Case: 921500702 FS 
FRAUSTO, RICHARD ANDREW State Felony 
10/07/92 COURT GRANTS DEF MOTION FOR CONT OF JURY TRIAL AND MOTION FOR TL 
$1000 ADDITIONAL FUNDS. MR LANGSTON CONCURS. JURY TRIAL TO TL 
BE RESCHEDULED FOR LATE NOV OR EARLY DEC TL 
10/19/92 TRJ on 10/22/92 was cancelled ^Q A**o(3->\ Gjr 
TRJ on 10/23/92 was cancelled 7 / f^jSr^vJTv
 GH 
TRJ on 10/26/92 was cancelled \) GK] 
FILED: REPORTER'S PRELIMINARY HEARING TRANSCRIPT (08-10-92) GH] 
10/22/92 Notice of Setting [ 3 day trial ] JN, 
TRJ scheduled for 12/15/92 at 0900 A in room D with JLS JN, 
PTC scheduled for 12/09/92 at 0900 A in room D with JLS JN, 
(JURY TRIAL SET FOR 12/15/92, 12/17/92 & 12/18/92) JN: 
12/07/92 HRG scheduled for 12/ 7/92 at 2:30 P in room C with JLS JN, 
FILED: NOTICE OF HEARING . _ GH! 
FILED: STIPULATED MOTION FOR COURT REPORTER GK 
FILED: ORDER FOR COURT REPORTER [JLS 12-09-92] GH1 
MINUTE ENTRY GH! 
Hearing: JUDGE: SHUMATE, JAMES L. GH! 
TAPE: 920594 COUNT: 1199 GH1 
Deft Present GH1 
ATD: WRIGHT, J MACARTHUR ATP: LANGSTON, W BRENT GW 
12/09/92 MINUTE ENTRY GK 
FILED: SUBPOENA AND RETURN OF SERVICE (7) GSi 
GRANT AREND GSi 
CONNIE FRAUSTO GSi 
DAVID ICE GSi 
DEBBIE HERN GSi 
MELANIE LEE AREND GSi 
TRISH ICE GSi 
KATHY SCHEAR GSi 
Hearing (PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE): JUDGE: SHUMATE, JAMES L. GH! 
TAPE: 920596 COUNT: 1576 GH! 
Deft Present GH1 
ATD: WRIGHT, J MACARTHUR ATP: LANGSTON, W BRENT GH1 
CUSTODY: County Sheriff GH1 
12/14/92 TRJ scheduled for 12/16/92 at 10:00 A in room D with JLS TL3 
FILED: ORDER FOR COURT REPORTER SU 
FILED: DEFENDANT'S" REQUESTED "JURY ~INSTRUCTT CITS ~ -- JN! 
12/15/92 JURY TRIAL: JAMES L SHUMATE TL1 
ATP W BRENT LANGSTON ATD J MACARTHUR WRIGHT TIJ 
12/16/92 CONTINUANCE OF JURY TRIAL TL! 
12/17/92 CONTINUANCE OF JURY TRIAL TD 
12/18/92 FILED: DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS TLi 
FILED: SUBPOENA'S AND RETURN OF SERVICE GSi 
JOSHUA MICHAELS GSi 
TROY WILKINSON GSi 
WILLIAM LEE DORNEY GS£ 
LEIGHANN REBER GSi 
CONTINUANCE OF JURY TRIAL TLi 
JURY VERDICT: GT LTY AS CHARGED ON INFORMATION TLi 
DEFENDANT WAIVE TIME FOR SENTENCING TLI 
' SENTENCE: 5 YE 3 TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT. TLI 
NO FINE IMPOSED. J? . .J^\ TLI 3SED- * 77 t,in\ 
:FTH DISTRICT COURT-ST GEoks^ E 
D O C K E T 
ifendant Reference:921500702 
FRAUSTO, RICHARD ANDREW 
Page 3 
TUES%*(y JANUARY 14, 1997 
2:09 PM 





;f 1 YEAR CONSECUTIVE TO 5 YEARS (WEAPON ENHANCEMENT) + 
5 YEARS CONSECUTIVE TO 5 YEARS (WEAPON ENHANCEMENT) 
FOR A TOTAL OF 11 YEARS TO LIFE. 
•" RESTITUTION ORDERED AMOUNT TO BE DOUBLED AFTER DETERM 
INATION BY COA 
DEFENDANT COMMITED TO CUSTODY OF SHERIFF FOR TRANSPOR 
TO UTAH STATE PRISON 
Chrg: 76-5-203 Find: Guilty - Jury (*? \ 
FILED: SUPPLEMENTAL INSTRUCTION ^-/) &LA£ ^V 
FILED: MENU FOR JURORS (COURT EXHIBIT #3) 
FILED: COURT EXHIBIT #1 
FILED: COURT EXHIBIT #2 
FILED: JURY -INSTTUCFIONS 
FILED: JURY VERDICT 




4t*\ i ft 
JUDGE: SHUMATE, JAMES L. 





















ATD: WRIGHT, J MACARTHUR 
CUSTODY: Dept of Corrections 
FILED: JUDGMENT, RESTITUTION JUDGMENT, SENTENCE & COMMITMENT 
Entered case disposition of: Closed 
FILED: NOTICE OF APPEAL 
FILED: REQUEST FOR TRANSCRIPT 
FILED: ORDER TO PROVIDE TRANSCRIPT [JLS 01-21-93] 
FILED: AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL 
•AMENDED NOTICE APPEAL FORWARDED TO UTAH SUPREME COURT 
FILED: SUPREME COURT THIS DAY NOTICE OF APPEAL CASE #930034 
FILED: NOTICE OF TRANSFER FROM SUPREME COURT TO UTAH COURT 
OF APPEALS FOR DISPOSITION 
FILED: WITHDRAWAL OF ATTORNEY AND APPEARANCE OF SUBSTITUTE 
COUNSEL (MICHAEL MILLER) 
FILED: REPORTERS TRIAL TRANSCRIPTS (FOUR VOLUMES) 
FILED: REPORTERS HEARING TRANSCRIPT (12-23-92) 
FILE SENT TO SUPREME COURT 
FILED: LETTER FROM SUPREME COURT T5ENT TO COtfRT OF APPEALS) 
FILED: UTAH COURT OF APPEALS CASE # 930357-CA 
FILED: LETTER FROM UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Notice of Setting 
HRG scheduled for 05/25/95 at 0900 A in room D with JLS 
*SET FOR HEARING PER JLS 
HRG rescheduled to 5/25/94 at 9:00 A in room D with JLS 
FILED: TRANSPORTATION ORDER [JLS 05-18-94] 
Hearing: JUDGE: SHUMATE, JAMES L 
TAPE: 940265 COUNT: 0001 
ATD: Deft pro se ATP: LANGSTON, W BRENT 
Deft Present and pro se 
REV scheduled for 6/ 1/94 at 9:00 A in room D with JLS 
FILED: EX PARTE MOTION TO CONTINUE 
FILED: ORDER OF CONTINUANCE(JLS 5/31/94) 





















































fm\ ^ 3 U^O 
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT-ST GEO >W: D O C K E T ;s« 
Defendant Reference:921500702 
FRAUSTO, RICHARD ANDREW 
Page 
TUES**Y JANUARY 14, 199 
2:09 P 














FILED: TRANSPORTATION ORDER (JLS 6-3-94) 
HRG IND scheduled for 6/ 8/94 at 8:54 A 
REV on 6/ 8/94 was cancelled 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Hearing (INDIGENCY HEARING): JUDGE: SHUMATE, 
TAPE: 940284 COUNT: 0040 
ATD: None Present ATP: LUDLOW, 
Deft Present -dff^ 
in room D with JLS 
JAMES L » K\ 
ERIC „ D*^\ 
MR. LUDLOW 
RETAIN COUN-
CUSTODY: Dept of Corrections 
THE ISSUE OF THE PRIOR PUBLIC DEFENDER IS MUTE. 
WASHINGTON COUNTY ATTORNEY IS ATTEMPTING TO 
IN IRON COUNTY TO ASSIST THE DEFENDANT. 
HEARING IS CONTINUED TO JUNE 1-5, 1994,. 
scheduled for 6/15/94 at 8:54 A in room D with JLS 




JUDGE: SHUMATE, JAMES L 













TAPE: 940293 COUNT: 
ATD: HOLM, FLOYD W 
Deft Present 
CUSTODY: Dept of Corrections 
MR. FLOYD HOLM IS RETAINED BY WASHINGTON COUNTY TO ASSIST 
THE DEFENDANT WITH HIS APPEAL AND HEARINGS. COUNSELS REQUIRE 
ADDITIONAL TIME BEFORE PROCEEDING. THE HEARING IS RESCHEDUL-
ED FOR JULY 13, 1994 AT 1:30 P.M. ON MOTON TO SUPPLEMENT 
THE RECORD. 
HRG scheduled for 7/13/94 at 1:30 P in room D with JLS 
FILED: NOTICE OF ENTRY OF APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL (F HOLM) 
HRG rescheduled to 7/13/94 at 1:29 P in room D with JLS 
Hearing: JUDGE: SHUMATE, JAMES L 
TAPE: 940319 COUNT: 0624 
ATD: None Present ATP: LANGSTON, W BRENT 
Deft not present 
MR LANGSTON INFORMS THE COURT THAT STIPULATION HAS BEEN 
REACHED BETWEEN COUNSEL AS TO MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT THE RECORD; 
COURT INSTRUCTS MR LANGSTON TO SUBMIT WRITTEN STIPULATION WHICH 
HAS BEEN SIGNED BY COUNSEL AND DEFENDANT — --•-••• 
FILED: ORDER SUPPLEMENTAL RECORD) (JLS 10/12/94) 
**CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING SUPPLEMENTAL RECORD TO THE 
COURT OF APPEALS 
**FILE MAILED TO COURT OF APPEALS ON REQUEST (SUE)** 
COPY OF LETTER TO FLOYD W HOLM FROM UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
RE: BRIEFING SCHEDULE 
LETTER FROM DEFENDANT RE: DISMISSAL OF ATTORNEY FLOYD 
HOLM *PER JLS, FILE 
LETTER FROM DEFENDANT REQUESTING COPY OF FILE 
OF DOCKET MAILED TO DEFENDANT 
OF LETTER MAILED TO UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LETTER TO JUDGE SHUMATE FROM DEFENDANT RE: NEW COUNSEL 
MEMORANDUM DECISION [JLS 1-12-96] 
(COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION ON MOTION - COURT OF APPEALS) 
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afendant Reference:921500702 COA Case: 921500702 FS 
FRAUSTO, RICHARD ANDREW State Felony 
2/06/96 REMANDED TO FIFTH DISTRICT FOR EXPEDITED HEARING RE: CMS 
DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL'S ALLEGED CONFLICT OF INTEREST) CMS 
**COPIES OF THESE DOCUMENTS ARE INCLUDED WITH THE ORDER: CMS 
LETTER FROM RICHARD FRAUSTO TO UTAH COURT OF APPEALS (2/2/96) CMS 
CROSS-MOTION FOR REMAND FOR HEARING ON COUNSEL
 rcj\ CMS 
MOTION TO SUSPEND BRIEFING SCHEDULE
 n AA^S?^?) C M S 
AFFIDAVIT OF FLOYD W HOLM - # ^ . Jr2_} C M 3 
2/07/96 Notice of Setting ' CPS 
HRG scheduled for 02/21/96 at 1100 A in room D with JLS CPS 
J/08/96 FILED: NOTICE OF HEARING (2/21/96) CMS 
J/15/96 RECEIVED: "FAXED" COVER LETTER AND ORDER OF TRANSPORTATION CMS 
FILED: ORDER OF TRANSPORTATION [JLS 2-15-96] CMS 
*FAXED TO FLOYD HOLM ON 2/16/96 CMS 
>/21/96 MINUTE ENTRY GHM 
Hearing: JUDGE: SHUMATE, JAMES L GHM 
TAPE: 960072 COUNT: 11:11 GHM 
ATD: HOLM, FLOYD W ATP: LANGSTON, W BRENT GHM 
Deft Present GHM 
CUSTODY: Dept of Corrections GHM 
DUE TO CONFLICT MR. FLOYD W HOLM IS RELEASED FROM THE CASE & GHM 
MR. THOMAS A BLAKELY IS APPOINTED TO REPESENT THE DEFENDANT. GHM 
1/22/96 FILED: ORDER [JLS 2-22-96) (FLOYD HOLM RELEASED AS COUNSEL AND CMS 
THOMAS BLAKELY APPOINTED) CMS 
:/23/96 FILED: NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL AS COUNSEL (FLOYD W HOLM) CMS 
:/26/96 FILED: CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING (PAGE 5 - SUPPLEMENTAL CMS 
INDEX OF RECORD ON APPEAL AND COPIES OF ALL DOCUMENTS CMS 
LISTED) CMS 
/18/96 Began tracking Appeal Review on 06/30/96 CMS 
./13/96 Appeal Review date changed to 12/31/96 CMS 
/01/96 FILED: ORDER OF DISMISSAL FROM UTAH COURT OF APPEALS CMS 
Ended tracking of Appeal CMS 
/14/96 FILED: REMITTITUR AND COPY OF DISMISSAL FROM UTAH COURT OF CMS 
APPEALS CMS 
/I4/97 FILED: LETTER FROM DEFENDANT REQUESTING COPIES TLH 
PER JLS: SEND COPY OF JUDGMEMNT AND COPY OF DOCKET TO DEFENDANT TLH 
Citation Amount: 
ditional Case Data 
Sentence Summary 
1. MURDER Plea: Not Guilty Find: Guilty - Jury 
Prison: 11 98 YR Suspended: 
2. POSS DNGR WEAP Plea: Find: Dismissed 
Case Disposition 
Disposition....: Closed DATE: 01/06/93 
Parties 
Atty for Plaintiff 
LANGSTON, W BRENT 
178 NORTH 200 EAST 
ST GEORGE UT 84770 Work Phone: (801) .634-5723 
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT-ST GEO>*ft 
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Defendant Reference:921500702 
FRAUSTO, RICHARD ANDREW 
Page e 
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COA Case: 921500702 FS 
State Felony 
Atty for Defendant 
BLAKELY, THOMAS A 
P O BOX 2181 
205 EAST TABERNACLE 
ST GEORGE UT 847712181 
.*<\ , W&) 
Home Phone: ( ) -
Work Phone: (801) 628-5130 
Personal Description 
Sex: M DOB: 06/30/54 
Dr. Lie. No.: State: UT Expires: 











End of the docket report for this case. 
0900 A in room D with 
0854 A in room D with 
0129 P in room D with 
0129 P in room D with 




Page 4 SUPPLEMENTAL RECORD 3-6-95 
State of Utah vs. Richard Andrew Frausto 
District Court Case #921500702 FS 
Court of Appeals Case #930347-CA 
6/3/93 Letter from Supreme Court re: Court of Appeals court 1348 
6/16/93 Letter from Court of Appeals re: case number 1349 
10/8/93 Letter from Court of Appeals re: extension to file brief 1350 
5/3/94 Notice of Hearing (5/25/94) 1351-1352 
5/19/94 Transportation Order 1353 
5/25/94 Minute Entry - Notice 1354-1355 
5/31/94 Ex Parte Motion to Continue 1356 
6/1/94 Order of Continuance 1357 
6/6/94 Transportation Order 1358 
6/8/94 Minute Entry - Notice 1359 
6/15/94 Minute Entry - Notice 1360 
7/13/94 Minute Entry - Notice 1361 
10/14/94 Order Supplementing Record 1362-1364 
n 
Mailing Certificate 
I do hereby certifiy that I mailed, postage prepaid, or sent via United Postal Service, 
prepaid, the supplemental pleadings in file State of Utah vs Richard Andrew Frauston, court 
case 921500702 FS, court of appeals # 930347-CA, to the Court of Appeals , on this 6th 
day of March, 1995. 
Utah Court of Appeals 
230 South 500 Esat, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Tauna Hammer 
Deputy Court Clerk 
98 
